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How Do JUDGES THINK?
JUDGE HARRIS L HARTZ
t
This Essay is a sequel, or perhaps a concurrence, to one by my for-
mer colleague Robert Henry with the much more clever title, "Do Judges
Think?"' That essay was responding to studies by social scientists pur-
porting to show that a judge's decisions could be predicted by demo-
graphic data such as age, gender, religion, party affiliation, and law
school.
The judges with whom I associate do not believe those studies. The
studies are hard to reconcile with the day-to-day experience of changing
our minds about how to decide a case. We read a persuasive appellee's
brief after being convinced of the need for reversal by the appellant's
brief; we read some more case law, a treatise, or even a persuasive law
review article (occasionally); and we actually listen to our colleagues.
The image of the judge conveyed by such studies is of a willful,
power-seeking person intent on imposing on society the judge's personal
view of good policy. My image of my colleagues during my tenure on
both a state and a federal intermediate appellate court is quite different.
The work of an intermediate appellate judge is a fascinating, challenging
task far removed from any sense of power. It would be remarkable if that
were not so. After all, what judge is as impotent as an intermediate ap-
pellate judge? We cannot find facts, and we are not the last word on the
law. Attorneys understand this. One judge I know was nominated for a
newly available position on an intermediate appellate court while his
trial-court nomination was pending; he told me that the lawyers in his
hometown who had been trying to ingratiate themselves after the an-
nouncement of the trial-court nomination suddenly lost interest after he
was nominated for the appellate court.
I suspect that most intermediate appellate judges enjoy the work
primarily because it provides a marvelous opportunity to tackle puzzles
and tell stories. I am indebted for this observation to two acquaintances.
One is my son Andrew. Not long after I had been appointed to the state
court, Andrew, a six-year-old who perhaps had been watching too many
detective shows, greeted me on my arrival home by asking, "Did you
solve any cases today?" Over the years, the more I have thought about
his question, the more I think it captures the essence of my work.
f Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
I. Robert Henry, Do Judges Think? Comments on Several Papers Presented at the Duke
Law Journal's Conference on Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2009).
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The other contributor is Ninth Circuit Judge Susan Graber, who has
been one of my favorite people ever since we studied together for the
New Mexico bar exam. She once told me that her ambition had been to
be a novelist, but coming up with plots was too difficult. "Now I have the
perfect job," she told me. "All I have to do is write the last chapter."
Perhaps nonjudicial readers are skeptical. The judges they have met
have strong personalities; they are not shrinking violets who try to avoid
the exercise of power. Repeated judicial expressions of "Moi?" will nev-
er convince such a reader of my description of judges. So in this Essay I
will take a different tack. I will not expound on the superiority of judges
as people; only a few of us believe that anyway. I will simply point out
that some of the traditions-well-known but little-discussed-that gov-
ern how judges go about their work make it much less likely that they
will engage in the "policy" maneuvers that characterize what are known
as the political branches: the legislature and the executive.
I am not going to try to tell you that judges do not make law. When-
ever a court resolves an issue that was up in the air, it makes law. But
process is important. And the process by which judges make law is quite
unlike how the political branches make law. Judicial decision-making
has many components. I will focus on only two: the traditions of con-
sistency and neutral principles.
In the political branches, consistency may be considered a virtue,
but it is a minor virtue. What is most important to constituents is that a
political figure have the "correct" position now. Perhaps they can have
more confidence in a candidate who has taken that "correct" position for
a long time, but they view a recent switch to that position as a sign of
gaining wisdom more than as a failure to play by the rules. A perfect
consistency is less likely to be praised than to be condemned as display-
ing inflexibility and a failure to perceive the new realities.
In particular, consistency in process is not highly valued in the
rough-and-tumble of politics. Whether a position is considered correct is
almost always solely a function of the ultimate result, not the propriety of
the procedure by which it was reached. The public is generally most in-
terested in whose ox is being gored, not what weapon is employed in the
goring. Failure to vigorously enforce the law is reprehensible when the
failure is by a member of the opposing party but understandable, even
laudable, when it is the failure of a member of one's own. Failure to obey
procedural niceties is always worse when the failure is by one's political
opponents. Consider Senate filibusters. Some would say that a senator's
attitude depends largely upon whether the senator's party is in the major-
ity in that body.
I am not saying that he political branches are bad. Results matter.
Even highly intelligent, well-informed people are "result oriented."
When was the last time you read a newspaper editorial condemning the
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result of a judicial opinion but saying that the judges' decision was cor-
rect on the law? (I actually recall reading one in the Albuquerque Jour-
nal, whose editor is a law-school graduate.)
Judges certainly are born with the same instincts. But they perform
in a system that frowns on being result-oriented. By tradition, a judge is
expected to be consistent. (Note, by the way, that I am distinguishing
between a judge and a court. It is more common for a court to be incon-
sistent than for a judge to be. The court, of course, can change direction
as a result of a change in membership, with no individual member having
changed his or her mind.)
Look at the ways in which the system encourages judicial con-
sistency. First, the judiciary has a great institutional memory. Judicial
decisions are published, and readily accessible, if not widely read. If a
judge is inconsistent, the judge has no place to hide. When a judge's rul-
ings on whether a party has standing to sue depends on the judge's sym-
pathy with the party's cause, the world knows. This is less a feature of
life for trial judges. I recall one judge who would, for example, overrule
an objection to a question posed to a character witness but later in the
same trial sustain an objection to the same question posed to a different
character witness. We joked that the judge wanted to make sure that he
got it right at least once. The judge's inconsistency was buried, though,
because few would order a trial transcript and read it. In contrast, it is
hard for appellate judges to cover their tracks.
Strengthening this constraint on the exercise of judicial power is the
tradition that appellate judges write opinions explaining their decisions.
An inconsistent member of the political branches may never be ques-
tioned about an inconsistency or, when questioned, may well be able to
evade the question, as by changing the subject-instead of explaining her
view on filibusters, the Senator may argue the merits of the proposed
legislation being filibustered. Judges do not have that luxury. Readers
can search the opinions for inconsistencies. And usually such a search is
unnecessary. Tradition instructs that an opinion must not only provide
the rationale for the result but must also summarize the losing parties'
arguments (often at the outset of the discussion), which are likely to rely
on any prior decision that appears inconsistent with the opinion. Most
people, and that includes judges, care sufficiently about their reputations
that they will accept an unpleasant result rather than expose themselves
as irrational. We all recognize that any judge of sufficiently long tenure
will have said things that others will find irrationally inconsistent; but I
submit that the frequency of such irrational inconsistencies is much low-
er than it would be in the absence of the tradition of written explanatory
opinions.
It is easy to overlook the importance of the role of consistency in
judicial decision-making. But its application is ubiquitous. Some applica-
tions may seem mundane. In deciding whether a party has adequately
2014]
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preserved an argument for appeal, we need to compare the case to others
where we have found or not found preservation. Some are more pro-
found: When is a dispute about official conduct a political question, one
beyond the competence of courts to decide? Judges should not examine
only the conduct of officials with whom they disagree.
Because of the mandate of consistency, the motives that led to crea-
tion of a doctrine are irrelevant when it comes time to apply it. One of
my favorite examples is the creation of the legal fiction that a suit for
injunctive relief against unconstitutional action by a state official is not a
suit against the state itself because if the official was acting unconstitu-
tionally, he or she was not acting for the state.2 The doctrine is often in-
voked on behalf of the less fortunate in society. It was enunciated by the
Supreme Court, however, to permit a railroad to challenge state regula-
tions.3
The mandate of consistency is the source of one of the great chal-
lenges in writing opinions. Judges need to speak in terms of general prin-
ciples, so their decisions do not appear ad hoc. But they do not want to
speak with such generality that their words will come back to haunt them
when a case arises with a different twist. A judge must balance the need
to give principled guidance against the risk of stating a rule so broadly
that a future case will compel the judge to write something inconsistent
with that rule. One might think that the more experienced the judge, the
more comfortable the judge will be in writing broadly. After all, over the
course of years the judge will gain expertise in a particular subject matter
and can write broadly with confidence. Sometimes that is true. At least
equally often, however, experience teaches the judge that it is impossible
for the human mind to anticipate all the variety of life and that judges
should write with some modesty.
I learned that lesson early in my career. When I joined the New
Mexico Court of Appeals, the court had to deal with three significantly
different workers' compensation statutes. The old law had been "re-
formed," and the reform had been significantly revised shortly thereafter.
A recurring question was which law applied. I was assigned a case rais-
ing the question and resolved to settle the matter once and for all. I read
every relevant published opinion in the state and decided that the courts
had always applied the law in effect on the date that the worker's cause
of action accrued. I circulated an opinion saying so. One of the members
of the panel was the senior judge on the court. He insisted that I preface
2. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) ("If the act which the state attorney
general seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under
such enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the conse-
quences of his individual conduct.").
3. See generally Barry Friedman, The Story of Ex parte Young: Once Controversial, Now
Canon, in FEDERAL COURT STORIES 247 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
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this statement of the general rule with the language, "in the absence
of ... compelling reasons to the contrary."4 I remember thinking what a
wimp he was, unwilling to take a firm stand. Although I included in the
opinion the reasoning that persuaded me of the correctness of the general
rule, I caved and included the escape-hatch language.5 Lucky for me.
Less than two years later I proudly wrote that "compelling reasons" re-
quired applying a statute whose effective date was after the worker's
6cause of action accrued. The senior judge was also on the latter panel,
but he was too much of a gentleman to say, "I told you so."
Now to the second constraint on judicial decision-making-the tra-
dition that judges should apply neutral principles. Yes, as conceded
above, judges make law. I know of no other way to describe a judicial
decision that resolves a previously undecided legal question. But judges
are less willful about it than those in the political branches of govern-
ment. They invest less ego, or at least less policy-making ego.
The reasons for this are subtle. Every judge I have known is quite
aware that he or she was not elected or appointed to decide the specific
case at issue in a particular way. Maybe those who put the judge in office
expected a favorable response on a few issues, but most matters a judge
ends up deciding were simply not on the radar screen at the outset of the
judge's term. As a result, most judges wonder from time to time what
gives them the authority, the power, to determine what the law should be
in a particular case. Why should my particular policy preferences be "the
law" when there is no reason to believe that the public at large or the
people to whom I "owe" my office share those preferences?
To avoid these self-doubts about legitimacy, judges look for neutral
principles. I use this term to refer to methods of resolving cases-under
the common law, statutes, or the Constitution-that do not require the
judge to examine his or her personal preferences about what the best
result would be. To some, maybe many or even most, the enterprise of
finding such neutral principles may seem doomed to failure. But there
has actually been great progress in recent decades.
Take the brilliant little book by Professor Melvin Eisenberg, The
Nature of the Common Law.7 This is not the place, and there is insuffi-
cient space, to summarize what the book expounds. I know of no judge,
however, who has read the book and does not think that it provides the
proper methodology for judges to do their common-law work without
relying on their personal social-policy preferences. This is not to say that
the book makes common law adjudication a mechanical process of ap-
plying algorithms. I recall vigorously dissenting from an opinion of a
4. Jojola v. Aetna Life & Cas., 782 P.2d 395, 397 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
5. Id.
6. See Lucero v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 818 P.2d 863, 866 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
7. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
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colleague of mine on the state court who shared my enthusiasm for the
Eisenberg book. But at least we had a common framework to start from.
We could debate the issue without resorting to the fallback position of,
because "that's the way, uh-huh uh-huh, I like it."
8
And much of the best work on statutory interpretation has been
written since I became a judge. I would not say that there is a consensus
on how to construe statutes. But there have certainly been developments
that have achieved near-unanimous support. For example, there is much
greater care in the use of legislative history, particularly floor debates.
And I am optimistic that the recent book by Justice Antonin Scalia and
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,9 will
lead to more intelligent use of canons of interpretation (I wish the book
had been available twenty years ago).
The ongoing debate on the gamut of interpretative issues-from the
proper use, if any, of the absurdity doctrine to discerning the purpose of a
statute and the propriety of assuming that the purpose has no bounds (is a
statute an arrow or a vector?0 )-is all about developing neutral princi-
ples, that is, deciding how to read a statute without just saying, "I would
like it to mean thus and so." We are improving what I would call the
common law of statutory interpretation. Scholars and judges produce
new insights that gradually gain traction and eventually are widely rec-
ognized as the best interpretative approach. Again, neutral principles will
not eliminate the need for discernment and judgment. But they provide
judges with a framework for adjudication that bears little resemblance to
decision-making within the political branches. No executive or legislator
wastes time asking, "Who am I to decide what the law should be?"
Alas, what about constitutional interpretation? There are deep divi-
sions in that area, and cynics (perhaps rightly so, although I dissent on
this point) view our highest court as acting pretty much like a political
branch. To a large extent, however, differences on the Supreme Court
reflect differences on what neutral principles to apply, such as the level
of generality with which to read constitutional provisions. Perhaps Jus-
tices select their neutral principles with a view to particular results. But
once those principles have been selected, the Justice is stuck with them.
The principles will regularly, and in important ways (though perhaps not
often), demand results from which the Justice would personally recoil.
My purpose here has not been to belittle judges. To say that they do
not exercise the sort of raw power exercised by the political branches is
not to say that their work is inconsequential. On the contrary. What jus-
8. KC AND THE SUNSHINE BAND, THAT'S THE WAY (I LIKE IT) (TK Records 1975).
9. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012).
10. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994).
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tice would there be in a society whose members could not resort to the
resolution of disputes by a tribunal that must apply neutral principles in a
consistent manner? Judges take considerable pride in their work. It's just
that they do not see their important work as being of the same nature as
the important work of the other branches of government.
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ABSTRACT
This Article begins by providing an overview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
municipal liability. It discusses the specific types of municipal liability
claims, focusing on Tenth Circuit jurisprudence. The Article also dis-
cusses effective strategies that plaintiffs should utilize to prevail on mu-
nicipal liability claims. Finally, the Article proposes a relaxation of the
onerous legal standards for municipal liability claims in order to fulfill
the remedial purpose of § 1983.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services,' it is well settled that municipalities can be sued
for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 However, the Mo-
nell Court declined to enunciate "the full contours of municipal liability
under § 1983," leaving that effort for "another day."3 Thirty-five years
later, the "contours of municipal liability" remain ill-defined.4 But the
Supreme Court has made at least one thing clear: plaintiffs that bring
municipal liability claims will not have an easy go of it.
Although proving municipal liability can sometimes be demonstrat-
ed fairly easily, for example when an official municipal policy directly
causes a constitutional injury, such cases are rare because municipalities
do not often announce and enforce policies that are facially unconstitu-
tional. Rather, as more often is the case, plaintiffs must show that the
alleged injury was caused by a municipality's unwritten policy or by
municipal inaction. In such cases, proving municipal liability is "excep-
tionally difficult ' 5 because the Supreme Court has instituted "rigorous
standards of culpability and causation ... to ensure that the municipality
is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee."
6
Regardless of whether one agrees with the current approach to mu-
nicipal liability, 7 the result is that courts rarely find municipalities liable
under § 1983.8 These onerous legal standards have the predictable conse-
1. 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ("Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government
units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.").
2. The term "municipality" refers to all "[1]ocal governing bodies." Id. Further, a suit against
an official in his or her official capacity is considered the same as a suit against a municipality itself.
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).
3. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
4. As one commentator observes, "[A] generation of lawyers and judges has struggled to fit
particular cases within the pigeonholes carved out by the handful of municipal 'policy' cases the
Court has fortuitously chosen to decide." Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscov-
ering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 21 (2000). The Supreme
Court has itself recognized that its jurisprudence in this area "manifestly needs clarification." City of
St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121 (1988).
5. Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1913, 1920-21 (2007).
6. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
7. Compare John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 68 (1998) (arguing that the "current law [of municipal liability] seems.., basically
sound"), with Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from Tort
Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1755 (1989) (criticizing municipal liability law as
having the "principal consequence" of "deny[ing] citizens recoveries against local governments for
damage caused by officials' constitutional violations").
8. See infra app. 1. Of the thirty-six Tenth Circuit cases charted, the plaintiff had prevailed in
the district court in only four of the cases. See generally Bass v. Pottawatomie Cnty. Pub. Safety
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quence of discouraging plaintiffs from pursuing municipal liability
claims. However, there are a number of considerations that should en-
courage plaintiffs to be vigilant in prosecuting civil rights claims against
municipalities. This Article intends to provide a comprehensive discus-
sion of the importance and benefits of Monell claims from the perspec-
tive of practicing civil rights attorneys.
Part I of the Article provides an overview of the current standards
for municipal liability, drawing primarily on Tenth Circuit law.9 It dis-
cusses the different types of municipal liability claims and the idiosyn-
crasies of each. Part II provides guidance on how to persuasively present
municipal liability claims to courts. Part III demonstrates how municipal
liability legal standards are overly restrictive and discourage plaintiffs
from bringing municipal liability claims. It explains that although bring-
ing municipal liability claims may not always lead to greater financial
gain for plaintiffs, prosecuting such claims serves social justice aims that
often outweigh the result of an individual case.
Ultimately, given the importance of municipal liability claims as a
means not only to remedy constitutional violations but also to prevent
further violations, this Article urges plaintiffs to vigorously pursue such
claims where available. Further, this Article advocates for reforming
municipal liability jurisprudence in order to encourage rather than dis-
suade plaintiffs from seeking redress for constitutional violations causal-
ly linked to municipalities.
I. SECTION 1983 AND MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
A. Overview of§ 1983 and Elements of a Municipal Liability Claim
To bring a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,10 a plaintiff must allege
that some person has deprived him or her of a federal right and that such
person acted under color of state law when depriving him or her of that
right. Prior to Monell, the Supreme Court had held that municipalities
could not be sued under § 1983 because they were not "persons" within
Ctr., 425 F. App'x 713 (10th Cir. 2011); J.M. ex rel Morris v. Hilidale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-29,
397 F. App'x 445 (10th Cir. 2010); Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2,
523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008); Zuniga v. City of Midwest City, 68 F. App'x 160 (10th Cir. 2003).
Only Bass and JM were affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
9. See infra app. 1.
10. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be shbjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
11. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
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the meaning of the statute.'2 Undertaking a "fresh analysis" of the legis-
lative history, the Court in Monell determined that "Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included among
those persons to whom § 1983 applies."' 3 Thus, the Court held that mu-
nicipalities "can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory,
or injunctive relief"
' 14
However, the Monell Court significantly narrowed the reach of its
holding by declaring that "a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."15 As this Article will demon-
strate, the federal courts' unyielding fidelity to this rule against re-
spondeat superior liability has led it to formulate far more burdensome
standards.
Broadly speaking, a plaintiff must satisfy four elements to establish
municipality liability. First, as is true for any claim brought pursuant to
§ 1983, the plaintiff must prove the deprivation of a federal right by a
person acting under color of state law.16 Second, the plaintiff must show
"the existence of a municipal policy or custom. ' 17 Third, the plaintiff
must demonstrate a "direct causal link between the policy or custom and
the injury alleged."'18 And, most onerously, the Tenth Circuit has recently
stated that "the Supreme Court require[s] a plaintiff to show that the
12. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The Supreme Court affirmed and extended Monroe several times prior
to reversing itself in Monell. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (applying Monroe to
counties); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973) (holding that Monroe protects munic-
ipalities from injunctions as well as damages). Importantly, however, Monroe greatly expanded the
breadth of § 1983 by holding that plaintiffs could employ § 1983 to remedy constitutional injuries
inflicted by local officials whose "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law [was] made
possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law." Monroe, 365
U.S. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
13. Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, 690.
14. Id. at 690.
15. Id. at 691. Respondeat superior is "[tihe doctrine holding an employer or principal liable
for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agen-
cy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (9th ed. 2009). The Monell Court reasoned that the legislative
history and text of § 1983 imposed a causation requirement that exempted municipalities from
respondeat superior liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. There is significant scholarly debate over
whether the Monell Court's analysis on the issue of respondeat superior liability is correct. See
David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2183, 2248 (2005) (concluding that
"the Monell doctrine should be overruled" on the issue of respondeat superior liability). Further, as
Achtenberg notes, four Supreme Court Justices "have called for reexamination of Monell's conclu-
sion that [municipalities] are exempt from respondeat superior liability." Id. at 2184-85.
16. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam) ("[l]f the [employ-
ee] inflicted no constitutional injury on respondent, it is inconceivable that [the city] could be liable
to respondent."); Huntley v. City of Owasso, 497 F. App'x 826, 832-33 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming
summary judgment to the defendant city where the court found that the city's officers had committed
no constitutional violation); Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) ("A
municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of
its officers.").
17. Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010).
18. Id.
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[municipal] policy was enacted or maintained with deliberate indiffer-
ence to an almost inevitable constitutional injury."' 19
The following challenged practices may constitute official munici-
pal policy or custom:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom
amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well
settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3)
the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the
ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions-and the ba-
sis for them-of subordinates to whom authority was delegated sub-
ject to these policymakers' review and approval; or (5) the failure to
adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure re-
sults from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.
20
This municipal policy or custom requirement is "intended to distinguish
acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and
thereby make[s] clear that municipal liability is limited to action for
which the municipality is actually responsible.' 'zi
If a plaintiff can establish the existence of a municipal policy or
custom, the plaintiff must then show that "the challenged policy or prac-
tice [was] 'closely related to the violation of the plaintiffs federally pro-
tected right.' 22 In other words, the municipality's policy or custom must
19. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013)
(citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)); see also Cacioppo v. Town of
Vail, 528 F. App'x 929, 931 32 (10th Cir. 2013). Relying on Brown, the court in Schneider ob-
served that "the prevailing state-of-mind standard for a municipality is deliberate indifference re-
gardless of the nature of the underlying constitutional violation." Schneider, 717 F.3d at 771 n.5.
However, Brown held only that "deliberate indifference" was necessary in cases where the plaintiff
proceeds "on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a
plaintiffs rights." Brown, 520 U.S. at 407; see also id. at 405 (noting that the strict "deliberate
indifference" element must be established only in cases "[w~here a plaintiff claims that the munici-
pality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so"). In
situations where a plaintiff claims that a municipality's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker
directly caused a constitutional injury, "proof that the municipality's decision was unconstitutional
... sufficels] to establish that the municipality itself [is] liable." Id. at 406. Thus, it appears that the
Tenth Circuit overstated the Supreme Court's holding in Brown.
20. Bryson, 627 F.3d at 788 (alteration omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The fifth category is more accurately described in broader terms as a category of municipal
inaction, as it is not limited to situations where the municipality has failed to train or supervise its
employees. See, e.g., Cacioppo, 528 F. App'x at 933 (discussing municipal liability claims based on
inadequate hiring, inadequate training, and ratification); Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (discussing a
municipal liability claim based on deficiencies in the police department's hiring process); J.M. ex
rel. Morris v. Hilldale Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-29, 397 F. App'x 445, 456 (10th Cir. 2010) (discuss-
ing a municipal liability claim based on a school district's practice of failing to investigate sexual
harassment allegations).
21. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479
(1986)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
22. Id (quoting MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
§ 7.12[B] (2014).
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have been the "moving force" behind the constitutional injury.23 This
causation element is especially rigorous when the municipal policy or
custom is not facially unconstitutional, such as claims "based upon inad-
equate training, supervision, and deficiencies in hiring."
24
The standard for deliberate indifference is satisfied when "the mu-
nicipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act
is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it con-
sciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.25 The
stated rationale for this standard is again to avoid collapsing municipal
liability into respondeat superior liability.26 In many cases, a plaintiff
proves that the municipality was on notice by demonstrating the exist-
ence of a pattern of tortious conduct.27 However, deliberate indifference
can also be established absent a pattern of tortious conduct "if a violation
of federal rights is a 'highly predictable' or 'plainly obvious' conse-
quence of a municipality's action or inaction, such as when a municipali-
ty fails to train an employee in specific skills needed to handle recurring
situations, thus presenting an obvious potential for constitutional viola-
tions. 28
B. Specific Types of Municipal Liability Claims
1. A Formal Regulation or Policy Statement
Under the "formal regulation or policy statement" theory of relief, a
municipality is responsible for a constitutional injury when the injury
was directly caused by an official policy adopted by the municipality's
lawmakers.29 Monell itself was such a case. In Monell, a class of female
employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Ed-
ucation of New York City alleged "that the Board and the Department
had as a matter of official policy compelled pregnant employees to take
unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical
reasons."30 Thus, the Monell plaintiffs challenged a formal policy that,
when implemented, necessarily caused a violation of their right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In such situations, "fault
23. Id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 404) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Id. (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, § 7.12[A]) (internal quotation mark omitted).
25. Bryson, 627 F.3d at 789 (quoting Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir.
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Brown, 520 U.S. at 415.
27. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307.
28. Id. at 1308 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409).
29. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) ("Local governing bodies ...
can be sued directly under § 1983 ... where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated by that body's officers.").
30. Id. at 660-61.
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and causation [are] obvious" and a plaintiff must prove only that he offi-
cial policy is unconstitutional.31
Claims proceeding under a formal policy theory of municipal liabil-
ity are relatively unusual,32 but there are several illustrative examples
found in the Tenth Circuit. In Christensen v. Park City Municipal
Corp.,33 the Tenth Circuit considered whether a municipality was liable
for its police officers' enforcement of ordinances that prohibited the
plaintiff from displaying and selling his artwork in a public park.34 Re-
versing the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs municipal liability
claim, the Tenth Circuit explained that "[i]f a governmental entity makes
and enforces a law that is unconstitutional as applied, it may be subject to
liability under § 1983."35 After the case was remanded to the district
court, a jury ultimately returned a verdict finding that the municipality
had violated the plaintiffs First and Fourth Amendment rights.
36
In Lopez v. LeMaster,37 the plaintiff suffered an assault at the hands
of other inmates.38 The plaintiff claimed that Jackson County, Oklahoma,
maintained a policy of understaffing its jails, which resulted in his inju-
ry.39 In reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the
defendant municipality, the Tenth Circuit explained that "the existence of
an official municipal policy which itself violated federal law" satisfies
the plaintiffs burden "as to culpability, and the heightened standard ap-
plicable to causation for unauthorized actions by a municipal employee
will not apply.
40
2. Decisions by Final Policymakers
A municipality can also be held liable for constitutional injuries re-
sulting from the decisions or conduct by "decisionmaker[s] possess[ing]
final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the [com-
plained of] action. '41 In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,42 the plaintiff
31. Brown, 520 U.S. at 406; see also Barbara Kritchevsky, "Or Causes to Be Subjected": The
Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REV. 1187, 1205
(1988) (observing that the "only question" in Monell "was whether the policy and the outcome it
prescribed were constitutional").
32. As one commentator astutely observes, rarely are modem-day policymakers found "sitting
in a smoke-filled backroom discussing whether to direct local officials to trammel the constitutional
rights of the citizenry." Gilles, supra note 4, at 36-37.
33. 554 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 1273-74.
35. Id. at 1280. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
individual officers on qualified immunity grounds because the plaintiff was unable to show that the
officers allegedly violated a clearly established constitutional right. Id. at 1278.
36. See Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 462 F. App'x 831, 833 (10th Cir. 2012). Despite
finding the municipality liable, the jury awarded the plaintiff only nominal damages in the amount of
$1.00. Id.
37. 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999).
38. Id. at 759.
39. Id. at 763.
40. Id. at 763.
41. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).
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alleged that the City of Cincinnati had violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when police
officers, at the direction of the county prosecutor, forcibly entered the
plaintiff's workplace to arrest two of his employees.43 Unlike the policy
in Monell, the decision of the prosecutor was not made through normal
legislative processes, nor was it intended to serve as a rule of general
applicability to be used in future situations like an official policy. Never-
theless, the Pembaur Court held that "municipal liability may be im-
posed for a single decision by municipal policymakers ... whether or not
that body had taken similar action in the past or intended to do so in the
future."44
As explained by the Tenth Circuit, Pembaur is a logical extension
of Monell because "[a]n act by a municipality's final policymaking au-
thority is no less an act of the institution than the act of a subordinate
employee conforming to a preexisting policy or custom.A5 Thus, a mu-
nicipality can be found liable even where a final policymaker acts in de-
fiance of a lawful municipal policy or custom.
46
As with claims challenging a formal policy enacted by a municipali-
ty's legislative body, proving that a final policymaker's decision or con-
duct was responsible for the plaintiffs injury "will also determine that
the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the
plaintiff complains.47 The difficulty with this type of claim is showing
that a municipal employee was a final policymaker, that is, one who pos-
sessed "final authority to establish municipal policy."
48
The question of who qualifies as a "final policymaker" is a matter
of state law.49 Because it is a matter of law, courts, not juries, are tasked
with determining whether a municipal employee is empowered to exer-
cise final policymaking authority.50 This makes it more difficult for a
plaintiff to prevail because while looking at state law, the key inquiry is
whether an official has "final, unreviewable discretion to make a deci-
sion or take an action.""
42. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
43. See id. at 472-74.
44. Id. at 480.
45. Simmons v. Uintah Health Care Special Dist., 506 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 2007).
46. Id.
47. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
48. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481.
49. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988) (plurality opinion). Notably, the
Praprotnik Court was sharply divided on how courts should determine whether a municipal employ-
ee possesses the final authority necessary to trigger municipal liability. See id. at 143 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (suggesting that state law be "the appropriate starting
point, but ultimately the factfinder must determine where such policymaking authority actually
resides, and not simply where the applicable law purports to put it").
50. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th
Cir. 2008).
51. Dempsey v. City of Baldwin, 143 F. App'x 976, 986 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Courts must consider whether: "1) the official is meaningfully con-
strained by policies made by another; 2) the official's decisions are sub-
ject to meaningful review; and 3) the decisions are within the realm of
the official's authority."
52
In contrast to the practical, commonsense view that juries might
take, this formalistic approach to determining the identity of a final poli-
cymaker allows a municipality "to use legal forms to hide the function of
its true policies. 53
The Court's decision in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik54 illustrates
the difficulties that plaintiffs may encounter in asserting the "final poli-
cymaker" theory of municipal liability. In Praprotnik, a city employee
who had suffered an adverse employment action brought a claim against
his supervisors and the City of St. Louis, claiming that the adverse action
55
violated the First Amendment and constituted a denial of due process.
After the Eighth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Su-
preme Court reversed on the basis that the plaintiff's supervisors did not
have final policymaking authority because the St. Louis City Charter
identified the Civil Service Commission as the final personnel policy-
maker for the municipality.56 Because the Commission had not itself
denied the plaintiff due process, the Court refused to impose municipal
liability even though there was evidence that the Commission had ac-
corded extreme deference to some lower-level personnel decisions and
failed to review others.57 As Justice Brennan observed in a biting concur-
rence, the plurality "tum[ed] a blind eye to reality" by ignoring the su-
pervisors' de facto decisionmaking authority.58
The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly adhered to this formalistic ap-
proach.59 In Ware v. Unified School District No. 492,60 for example, the
Tenth Circuit held that a superintendent was not the final policymaker of
the school district, refusing to even consider evidence in the record that
52. Id.
53. Milligan-Hitt, 523 F.3d at 1225. The Supreme Court has justified this approach by empha-
sizing a claimant's ability to show an unconstitutional municipal custom. Id. (citing Praprotnik, 485
U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion)). However, as this Article demonstrates, infra Part I.B.4, it is far more
difficult to prevail on a custom theory of relief than by showing an unconstitutional decision or
action by a final policymaker. Thus, municipalities are perversely incentivized to create final poli-
cymaker bodies that do not, in practice, make policy.
54. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
55. Id. at 114-16 (plurality opinion).
56. Id. at 117, 125-29.
57. Id. at 129-30.
58. Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., concurring). As Justice Brennan warned in his Praprotnik concur-
rence, the Court's narrow construction of who qualifies as a final policymaker allows "municipalities
to insulate themselves from liability for the acts of all but a small minority of actual city policymak-
ers." Id. at 132.
59. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2,523 F.3d 1219, 1225 (10th
Cir. 2008).
60. 902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1990).
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could "support an inference that the board delegated its final authority. 61
In Jantz v. Muci,62 the Tenth Circuit held that a school principal did not
have final policymaking authority over hiring decisions, despite the dis-
trict court's factual finding that the principal had "virtual de facto hiring
authority. 63 In Milligan-Hitt v. Sheridan County School District No. 2 ,
64
the Tenth Circuit reversed a $160,000 jury verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff on the grounds that the school superintendent was not a final policy-
maker, despite evidence that the school board's "supervision of the su-
perintendent's role in the hiring process was so deferential that he was
functionally unreviewed.
'65
3. Final Policymakers' Ratification of Decisions
A municipality can also be held liable in cases where a final poli-
66cymaker ratifies a subordinate's unconstitutional actions. However, a
final policymaker will be deemed to ratify a subordinate's decision only
where "[t]he final policymaker ... not only approve[s] the decision, but
also adopt[s] the basis for the decision.'67 As the cases in the previous
subsection indicate, final policymakers often approve decisions of subor-
dinates without any real oversight or review, and therefore do not "adopt
the basis for the decision." This creates a perverse incentive for policy-
makers to avoid careful review of subordinates' decisions.
4. Informal Custom Amounting to a Widespread Practice
Under the custom-based theory of municipal liability, a municipali-
ty can be held liable if its employees acted pursuant to the municipality's
custom, even if that custom had never been formally adopted by the mu-
nicipality.68 Unlike written policies that can be affirmatively attributed to
the decisions of governmental law-making entities or final policymakers,
customs are practices of governmental officials that are "not authorized
by written law."
69
To show that a challenged practice is a "custom," the practice must
be so "persistent and widespread" that it "constitutes the standard operat-
ing procedure of the local governmental entity.",70 Municipal custom may
61. Id. at 818 n.l.
62. 976 F.2d 623 (1Oth Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 631.
64. 523 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2008).
65. Id. at 1223, 1229-30.
66. Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 790 (10th Cir. 2010).
67. Dempsey v. City of Baldwin, 143 F. App'x 976, 986 (10th Cir. 2005).
68. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
69. Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). The
Ninth Circuit has explained that the existence of "custom" as a basis for municipal liability is neces-
sary to ensure that municipalities are held responsible for widespread practices that are sufficiently
pervasive so as to have the force of law. Thompson v. City of L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.
1989), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010)).
70. Mitchell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 112 F. App'x 662, 672 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jett
v. DalI. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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also be comprised of "a series of decisions by a subordinate [governmen-
tal] official of which the supervisor [was] aware."
71
Although the Supreme Court recognized the custom theory in Mo-
nell, it has largely ignored these cases since then.72 There are several
cases in the Tenth Circuit, however, where plaintiffs have prevailed un-
der this theory of municipal liability. In Watson v. City of Kansas City,
73
the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendant municipality where the plaintiff alleged that the Kansas
City Police Department followed an unwritten custom of responding
differently and affording less protection to victims of domestic violence
than to nondomestic assault victims. 74 In finding that the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence of an unwritten policy or custom to present
the case to a jury, the Tenth Circuit relied largely on statistical evidence
that Kansas City police officers had a significantly lower arrest rate for
domestic assaults than nondomestic assaults.75 The plaintiff also present-
ed evidence that police officers were trained in domestic violence situa-
tions to defuse the situation and to arrest the assailant only as a last re-
sort.
76
As demonstrated by Watson, statistical evidence can be highly pro-
bative in showing the existence of a custom. However, courts are nor-
mally unwilling to acknowledge the existence of an unlawful custom
when the plaintiff relies on statistical evidence alone.77 In Duran v. City
& County of Denver,78 for example, the plaintiff asserted that the Denver
Sheriffs Department maintained "a custom of routinely exonerating of-
ficers who were the subject of excessive force claims, except in cas-
es... where the officer also was found to have 'departed from the truth'
during the investigation of the charges.,79 The plaintiff presented evi-
71. Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
This formulation of "custom" appears similar to the ratification theory discussed previously. See
supra Part 1.B.3. The Tenth Circuit has explained that liability attaches in such cases because "the
supervisor could realistically be deemed to have adopted a policy that happened to have been formu-
lated or initiated by a lower-ranking official." Mitchell, 112 F. App'x at 672 (quoting Praprotnik,
485 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the law again
encourages supervisors to turn a blind eye to the actions of their subordinates because "the mere
failure to investigate the basis of a subordinate's discretionary decisions does not amount to a dele-
gation of policymaking authority." Id. (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
72. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 49 & n. 134. Post-Monell, the Supreme Court has not consid-
ered a single § 1983 case where a plaintiff alleged injury caused by an unconstitutional municipal
custom. Id.
73. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
74. Id. at 695-96.
75. Id. at 695.
76. Id. at 696.
77. See, e.g., Saviour v. Kan. City, No. 90-2430-L, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813, at *14 (D.
Kan. May 15, 1992) (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)) ("Although the plaintiffs
statistical evidence is relevant, this court would not find the statistical evidence alone enough to
prove the existence of a policy or custom.").
78. No. 10-cv-01569-REB-KMT, 2012 WL 4478800 (D. Colo. Sept. 28, 2012).
79. Id. at *2.
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dence establishing that none of the seventy-four excessive force claims
lodged against the Sheriffs Department had been sustained between
2005 and 2007.8o The district court found that this statistical evidence, by
itself, was insufficient to demonstrate that the sheriffs department main-
tained a custom of exonerating officers.8 Even in Watson, the Tenth
Circuit stated that statistical evidence, though relevant, "may not be
enough to prove the existence of a policy or custom."82
Another illustrative example of a custom claim is the recent case of
Ortega v. City & County of Denver.8 3 In that case, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Denver Police Department ("DPD") had customs of failing to
adequately investigate citizen complaints of its officers and failing to
discipline its officers for using excessive force.84 In addition to statistical
evidence, the plaintiffs presented deposition testimony from Denver's
former independent monitor that the DPD "had a 'systemic problem' of
officers not being held accountable for their uses of force."85 Additional-
ly, the plaintiffs presented evidence of specific instances in which the
DPD Internal Affairs Bureau failed to adequately investigate citizen
complaints or discipline the offending officer.86 The district court found
that this combination of statistical and testimonial evidence was "suffi-
cient to allow a reasonable juror to find that [the DPD's] failure to ade-
quately investigate citizen's excessive force complaints and to discipline
officers implicated therein was so widespread as to constitute a cus-
tom."
87
Once a plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of a municipality's
custom, the plaintiff must then show that the custom created a substantial
risk of serious harm and that the municipality was deliberately indifferent
to that risk. In Bass v. Pottawatomie County Public Safety Center,88 the
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also Trujillo v. Campbell, No. 09-cv-03011-CMA-KLM, 2012 WL 3609747, at
*5-6 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2012) (rejecting "failure to discipline" claim where plaintiff presented only
statistical evidence without additional context); Merman v. City of Camden, 824 F. Supp. 2d 581,
591 (D.N.J. 2010) ("Isolated and without further context, . . . statistical evidence alone may not
justify a jury's finding that a municipal policy or custom authorizes or condones the unconstitutional
acts of police officers."). But see Trujillo, 2012 WL 3609747 (citing Lobato v. Ford, No. 05-cv-
01437-LTB-CBS, Doc. # 266 slip op. at 20 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2007) (concluding that statistical
evidence of lower than average rate of sustained excessive force complaints was sufficient evidence
of a custom or policy of failure to discipline).
82. Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 696 (10th Cir. 1988).
83. 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Colo. 2013).
84. Id. at 1037. Using similar evidence, the plaintiffs were also able to present sufficient
evidence that Denver has a custom of tolerating its officers' "code of silence." Id. at 1040 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. at 1039.
86. Id. at 1039-40; see also Saviour v. Kan. City, No. 90-2430-L, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8813, at *14 (D. Kan. May 15, 1992) (discussing a plaintiff who had "challenged the City's investi-
gation of excessive force complaints as cursory and indifferent ... [and] proffer[ed] witnesses who
themselves ha[d] filed excessive force complaints that they believe[d] to have been wrongfully
determined by the City to be unfounded").
87. Ortega, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
88. 425 F. App'x 713 (10th Cir. 2011).
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plaintiff brought a lawsuit against a county jail after he was assaulted in
the "drunk pod" by a non-intoxicated detainee.89 The plaintiff demon-
strated that the jail had a custom of permitting its detention officers "to
commingle unclassified, intoxicated detainees with unclassified, non-
intoxicated detainees in the drunk pod when the intake facility was over-
crowded."90 Because this custom violated the State of Oklahoma's Min-
imum Jail Standards for housing intoxicated prisoners as well as the
jail's own written policies, the Tenth Circuit found that the jail's custom
created a substantial risk that intoxicated detainees, such as the plaintiff,
would suffer serious injury.91 The Tenth Circuit also found that the jail
had caused the injury because the injury would not have occurred if the
assailant had not been put in the drunk pod with the plaintiff,92 and that
the jail acted with deliberate indifference because it failed to adequately
monitor the substantial risk that it had created through its custom.
93
5. Municipal Inaction
In City of Canton v. Harris,94 the Supreme Court held that a munic-
ipality could be liable under § 1983 "for constitutional violations result-
ing from its failure to train municipal employees."95 Building upon City
of Canton, the lower federal courts have recognized municipal liability
claims based on other forms of municipal inaction such as failure to su-
pervise, failure to investigate, and failure to discipline.
96
The attraction of a municipal inaction claim is that a plaintiff does
not need to identify an unlawful municipal policy, nor must a plaintiff
locate a final policymaker within the labyrinth of a municipal bureaucra-
cy.97 However, the appeal of this model of liability is tempered by the
"rigorous standards of culpability and causation" that a plaintiff must
satisfy.98
89. Id. at 716.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 720. Notably, the Tenth Circuit held that that the custom was "sufficient in [itself] to
show the substantial risk of serious harm" and the plaintiff therefore did "not have to put forth evi-
dence showing that there had been similar assaults previously at the Jail." Id. at 720 n.2. Thus, a
plaintiff who can show that the existence of an unlawful custom violated written safety policies will
stand a better chance of showing that the custom created a substantial risk of injury.
92. Id. at 722-23.
93. Id. at 720-21.
94. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
95. Id. at 380.
96. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 41-42.
97. Because a plaintiff does not need to identify a policy or final policymaker, municipal
inaction claims are perhaps the most common type of municipal liability claim. See G. Flint Taylor,
Municipal Liability Litigation in Police Misconduct Cases from Monroe to Praprotnik and Beyond, 19
CUMB. L. REv. 447, 452 (1989).
98. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
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a. Failure to Train/Failure to Supervise
The most common type of municipal inaction claim is where the
plaintiff alleges that the municipality failed to train or supervise its police
officers in the use of force.99 To prevail on this theory, a plaintiff must
first show that the training was in fact inadequate, and then satisfy the
following requirements:
(1) the officers exceeded constitutional limitations on the use of
force; (2) the use of force arose under circumstances that constitute a
usual and recurring situation[] with which police officers must deal;
(3) the inadequate training demonstrates a deliberate indifference on
the part of the city toward persons with whom the police officers
come into contact, and (4) there is a direct causal link between the
constitutional deprivation and the inadequate training. 100
Typically, the most difficult elements to satisfy under this standard are
the third and fourth elements.0 1
In City of Canton, the Supreme Court explained that the deliberate
indifference element requires a plaintiff to show that "the need for
more ... training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in
the violation of the constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need.,102 Although this is a demanding standard,103 a plaintiff can satisfy
this element in a variety of ways. For example, In Allen v. Muskogee,'
°4
the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff demonstrated deliberate indiffer-
ence by presenting expert testimony that "the training was out of synch
with the entire United States in terms of what police are being trained to
do."10 5 In Ortega, the plaintiffs showed deliberate indifference by citing
deposition testimony of the individual officer defendants and their super-
visors that the officers' conduct was in accord with their training.,0 6 Ad-
99. The Tenth Circuit treats allegations of failure to train and failure to supervise the same
way. Whitewater v. Goss, 192 F. App'x 794, 797 (10th Cir. 2006).
100. Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d
1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2000)).
101. See id. at 1228-32 (finding that the plaintiff satisfied the first two elements, but not the
latter two); see also Whitewater, 192 F. App'x at 798-99 (finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the
third element on a failure to train or supervise claim); Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the fourth element on a failure to train or super-
vise claim).
102. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
103. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
104. 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997).
105. Id. at 843 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a practical tip, expert testimony can be
very helpful to show deliberate indifference. See Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 11 -cv-
02394-WJM-CBS, 2013 WL 438579, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2013) ("The Tenth Circuit has also
repeatedly permitted expert testimony on whether departmental policies comply with generally
accepted practices when municipal liability is at stake.").
106. See Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1038-39 (D. Colo. 2013).
Another Colorado district court recently relied on similar evidence to find the City and County of
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ditionally, the plaintiffs presented testimony of Denver's former safety
manager, who testified that he "believed Denver's police officers had
used 'heavy-handed tactics' since 1993" and that such tactics resulted
from the city's training policy.'0 7 Importantly, however, a plaintiff must
show more than deficient training; a plaintiff must also establish that the
municipality knew or should have known that its deficient training was
likely to result in constitutional violations.'
0 8
The fourth element requires a plaintiff to identify a specific defi-
ciency in a municipality's training program that is "closely related to the
ultimate injury. ' ' 109 This element is difficult to prove because a plaintiff
must establish more than "general deficiencies" in training; rather, a
plaintiff must point to a specific deficiency "closely related to his ulti-
mate injury. ' ' ° Essentially, the plaintiff must be able to show that no
constitutional injury would have occurred but for the deficient training."
A plaintiff is more likely to satisfy this causation element where he or
she can show that the training at issue was incorrect rather than inade-
quate. In Allen v. Muskogee, for example, the Tenth Circuit found the
fourth element satisfied where "the officers . . . were trained to do pre-
cisely the wrong thing.""12 Notably, the court observed that "[tlhe causal
link between the officers' [incorrect] training and the alleged constitu-
tional deprivation is more direct than in cases in which officers are not
given enough training to know the correct response to a dangerous situa-
tion.' " 3 Similarly, in Ortega, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the
officers were incorrectly trained, which allowed the reasonable inference
that the plaintiffs would not have been subjected to the same amount of
force if the DPD had provided correct training.'
14
b. Failure to Investigate/Failure to Discipline
A second type of municipal inaction claim is based on a municipali-
ty's failure to investigate or discipline an officer's conduct. This type of
claim has inherent difficulties with respect to the fourth element of cau-
sation."5 In Cordova v. Aragon,16 the Tenth Circuit considered a plain-
Denver was deliberately indifferent to the need for additional training. See Moore v. Miller, No. 10-
cv-0065 I-JLK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *23-25 (May 28, 2014).
107. Id. at 1039.
108. Carrv. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2003).
109. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989).
110. Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff "simply
has failed to tie [his] claim to his injuries").
Ill. Gilles, supra note 4, at 46-47.
112. 119 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1997).
113. Id.
114. Ortega v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 944 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (D. Colo. 2013); see also
Moore v. Miller, No. 10-cv-00651-JLK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *26-27 (May 28, 2014).
115. See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 777 (10th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1056 (10th Cir. 1993)) (rejecting a failure to
discipline claim, noting that "[r]arely if ever is 'the failure of a police department to discipline in a
specific instance ... an adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell'" (omission in original)).
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tiff's claim that the municipality failed to discipline an officer for using
deadly force.117 In affirming the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the municipality, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that "basic prin-
cip[les] of linear time prevent us from seeing how conduct that occurs
after the alleged violation could have somehow caused that violation." "
8
Although the causation element dooms the majority of failure to in-
vestigate or discipline claims, there are rare cases where such claims may
succeed. In Ortega, the plaintiffs were able to satisfy the causation ele-
ment because one of the officers alleged to have committed excessive
force had previously been involved in another excessive force incident.' "
9
Thus, the district court found that a reasonable juror could have found
that the officer would not have inflicted the injuries suffered by the Orte-
ga plaintiffs had he been adequately disciplined for his conduct in the
prior incident. 1
20
c. Failure to Adequately Screen Employee During Hiring
A third category of municipal inaction claims is when a municipali-
ty fails to adequately screen an employee during the hiring process. The
Supreme Court has cautioned that "[c]ases involving constitutional inju-
ries allegedly traceable to an ill-considered hiring decision pose the
greatest risk that a municipality will be held liable for an injury that it did
not cause."'2'1 For a plaintiff to prevail on this type of claim, he or she
must show that "adequate scrutiny of an applicant's background would
[have led] a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious
consequence of the decision to hire... would be the deprivation of a
third party's federally protected right," and that adequate screening
would have shown that "this officer was highly likely to inflict the par-
ticular injury suffered by the plaintiff."'' 22 Given this demanding stand-
ard, it is not surprising that such claims are very rarely brought, nor is it
116. 569 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2009).
117. Id. at 1194.
118. Id. (emphasis omitted). However, the Tenth Circuit opined that in the right circumstances,
"[a] subsequent cover-up might provide circumstantial evidence that the city viewed the policy as a
policy in name only and routinely encouraged contrary behavior." Id.; see also Estate of Rice v. City
& Cnty. of Denver, No. 07-cv-01571-MSK-BNB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42381, at *25 (D. Colo.
May 27, 2008) ("[P]ost-incident investigations and discipline are relevant to the issue of policy or
custom.").
119. See Ortega, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
120. Id. Another district court recently found that a demonstrated lack of discipline "is rele-
vant to the legality of the training and/or supervision." Moore v. Miller, No. 10-cv-0065 I-JLK, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72452, at *17 n.3 (May 28, 2014). The court reasoned that "if supervisors tacitly
condone illegal conduct by refraining from disciplining wrongdoers, their supervision is not ade-
quate because it lacks meaning or effect." Id.
121. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997).
122. Id. at 411-12.
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surprising that the Tenth Circuit does not appear to have held a munici-
pality liable under an inadequate screening theory of liability. 
2 3
II. EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES TO PROVING MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
Despite the onerous legal standards discussed above, plaintiffs have
found success on municipal liability claims by employing certain careful-
ly crafted strategies. This Part of the Article focuses on concrete litiga-
tion strategies that have proven effective in developing facts that can
establish municipal liability, including specific written discovery re-
quests and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) depositions.
A. Discovery Requests
Plaintiffs must be especially diligent in conducting discovery in
municipal liability cases. Carefully constructed discovery requests, while
potentially requiring production of a significant volume of documents by
governmental agencies, are often of utmost importance in demonstrating
municipal liability. Plaintiffs must overcome courts' reluctance to require
municipal defendants to undertake extensive discovery obligations, as
they often read an unwritten rule of pioportionality into discovery stand-
ards. Additionally, courts will sometimes be reluctant to allow extensive
discovery if the injuries or social import of the plaintiffs claims are con-
sidered insignificant.
Plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate municipal liability are usually
best served by establishing their municipal liability theories early in a
case in order to craft narrow discovery requests targeted at the specific
type of municipal liability claim. Courts will often require attorneys that
are attempting to obtain discovery related to governmental liability to
explain with specificity why the discovery is necessary, contrary to the
spirit of liberal discovery rules. However, courts have allowed broad
discovery where significant public policy interests would be furthered.
124
Generally, "a plaintiff asserting municipal liability under Monell is
entitled not only to factual information concerning [a governmental ac-
tor's] alleged past violations, but also to information concerning his su-
periors' knowledge of those violations and what, if anything, they did
123. See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 772-73 (10th Cir.
2013) (rejecting a hiring-based claim where a background investigation of a police officer "was not
inadequate"); Cacioppo v. Town of Vail, 528 F. App'x 929, 933 (10th Cir. 2013).
124. Fourhorn v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 08-cv-01693-MSK-KLM, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71042, at *13-14 (D. Colo. Aug. 3, 2009) ("[G]iven the apparent frequency with which
mistaken-identity arrests occurred and the alleged collateral harm caused by the arrests, the issue is
one of great importance in assuring the public that innocent citizens are not being unlawfully and
unnecessarily detained by police. While disclosure of the internal affairs documents at issue may
marginally contribute to timidity in future handling of investigations, disclosure may also have the
opposite effect here. Specifically, it may caution City officials to take similar issues seriously and to
conduct investigations and adopt policies calculated to correct and minimize future mistakes.").
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about them."'25 Documents that contain information regarding statistical
studies and comparative data of the discipline (or lack thereof) of munic-
ipal employees "are directly related to establishing notice and deliberate
indifference."'26 In the same vein, documents relating to independent
investigations are relevant to key issues, such as whether "policymaking
officials had notice of the alleged widespread practice and acted with
deliberate indifference, or tacit approval, towards the previously alleged
violations" by a governmental entity, and are also discoverable. 17 Doc-
ument requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 should be "spe-
cifically tailored to adduce statistical evidence relevant to . . . [the al-
leged] custom of unconstitutional misconduct.'
2 8
District courts in the Tenth Circuit have repeatedly found that evi-
dence of similar citizen incidents can be strong evidence in the prosecu-
tion of a municipal liability claim.129 In Mason v. Stock,130 the court per-
mitted the discovery of evidence into internal affairs files, disciplinary
investigations, and actions.'3' The plaintiff, who had brought a § 1983
claim against a municipal defendant, sought information related to citi-
zen complaints of police misconduct, including "all investigatory files
and case files related to those complaints."'' 32 In finding that the plaintiff
was entitled to discover this information, the court stated that it was
"simply giving plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to come up with evi-
dence that substantiates his 'pattern and practice' claims."',33 The Colora-
do Supreme Court has likewise held that this type of evidence is relevant
to issues regarding the training and supervision of police officers.' 
34
125. Everitt v. Brezzel, 750 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (D. Colo. 1990).
126. Graber v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 09-cv-01029-JLK-MJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82226, at *11 (D. Colo. July 27, 2011).
127. Id. at *10-11.
128. Id. at *9 (holding that a request for a police officer's performance reviews and all of the
Denver Police Department officers' disciplinary records was "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence" (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1))).
129. See, e.g., Schlenker v. City of Arvada, No. 09-cv-01 189-WDM-KLM, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84963, at *4-5 (D. Colo. July 19, 2010) ("Documents and information regarding similar
citizen complaints are clearly relevant to the conduct at issue here, particularly to Plaintiffs munici-
pal liability claim .... Further, because the definition of relevance is broadly construed for purposes
of seeking discovery, Defendant Arvada's position that the discovery sought had to be more closely
'linked' to the conduct at issue here, rather than merely similar, was likewise an unreasonable posi-
tion.").
130. 869 F. Supp. 828 (D. Kan. 1994).
131. Id. at 835.
132. Id. at 830.
133. Id. at 835.
134. Martinelli v. Dist. Ct., 612 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Colo. 1980). The court also stated:
[lInformation relating to: [citizens' complaints] against individual police officers; records
of actions taken in response to citizen complaints; and reports on the officers' handling of
many different situations...
... could be probative of the department's knowledge of specific instances of miscon-
duct on the part of the individual police officers, or their propensities toward such mis-
conduct, if any. The information could also be probative of the department's efforts to
supervise the officers and to minimize the occurrence of such misconduct, and of the de-
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Municipal defendants will often oppose even narrowly-tailored dis-
covery requests by claiming undue burden and asserting that the plaintiff
has embarked on a "fishing expedition." Governmental defendants often
proclaim it is difficult, if not impossible, to produce the requested docu-
ments due to expenses related to the lack of searchability of internal fil-
ing systems, and general difficulties surrounding document management
and retention infrastructure and processes.
However, district courts in the Tenth Circuit have repeatedly reject-
ed these boilerplate arguments, especially when plaintiffs can demon-
strate relevance and need. A municipal defendant asserting undue burden
or expense must show "that the burden or expense is unreasonable in
light of the benefits to be secured from discovery."'1 35 Courts have often
rejected monetary driven undue burden arguments as unavailing. Further,
preventing discovery because of governmental expenses resulting from
any deficiencies in a government's own document management and re-
tention systems may inappropriately incentivize governmental entities to
deliberately maintain poor filing systems of documents relating to its
misconduct.36 "The fact that Defendant maintains records in different
locations, utilizes a filing system that does not directly correspond to the
subjects set forth in Plaintiffs' interrogatory, or that responsive docu-
ments might be voluminous would not suffice to sustain a claim of undue
burden."'
' 37
partment's reasons for retaining individual police officers after the resolution by the Staff
Investigation Bureau of citizen complaints against the officers.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While Martinelli involved a discovery dispute pursuant to the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, Colorado Rule 26(b)(1), like its federal counterpart, provides
that "[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
135. Booth v. Davis, No. 10-4010-RDR, 2011 WL 1627004, at * 10 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2011)
(quoting Heartland Surgical Specialty Hosp. v. Midwest Div., Inc., No. 05-2164-MLB-DWB, 2007
WL 3171768, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (holding that the
production of 84,000 to 105,000 pages of documentation, without specificity as to why production
was burdensome, did not constitute an undue burden); see also OneSource Commercial Prop. Servs.,
Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. I0-cv-02273-WJM-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72454, at *6
(D. Colo. July 6, 2011) (citing Klesch & Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 524 (D. Colo.
2003); Schartz v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, No. 95-2491-EEO, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19123, at
*5-6 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1996) ("Discovery, by its very nature, is inherently burdensome to some
extent. The question, however, is whether the discovery [is] unduly burdens[ome] .... ").
136. Graber v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 09-cv-01029-JLK-MJW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99594, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2011) ("[W]ere I to reconsider my earlier order because of Defend-
ants' ineptitude, I would be perversely rewarding Defendants for their poor filing system. Further-
more, instead of prodding Defendants to reform their data collection, storage, and retention policies,
I would be providing an incentive to maintain a poor document management system as an excuse for
resisting meaningful participation in discovery.").
137. Greystone Constr., Inc. v. Nat'l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 07-cv-00066-MSK-CBS,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106695, at *17 (D. Colo. Mar. 21, 2008) (citing Simon v. ProNational Ins.
Co., No. 07-60757-CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96318, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 1,
2007)); see also Kelly v. Montgomery Lynch & Assocs., No. 1:07-CV-919, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93651, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (rejecting the defendant's claim of undue burden and granting the
plaintiff's motion to compel, notwithstanding the defendant's proffer that its "filing system is not
maintained in a searchable way and the information sought would require 'manually searching
through hundreds of thousands of records"'); Baine v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 328, 331
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In Rehberg v. City of Pueblo,138 the district court entered an order
denying the City of Pueblo's objection to a magistrate judge's discovery
order.'39 Critically, in the underlying order, the magistrate judge had
permitted wide discovery against Pueblo concerning municipal liability,
and found among other things that Pueblo would not be unduly burdened
in producing substantial discovery, even though Pueblo submitted an
affidavit arguing it would be expensive and time consuming to comply
with the Court's discovery order.
40
Obtaining discovery in the possession of the governmental defend-
ant is often required to survive motions for summary judgment in munic-
ipal liability cases. Plaintiffs must establish liability theories and discov-
ery plans early, and be prepared to overcome governmental defendants'
resistance by taking discovery production deficiencies to the court early
in discovery periods and as often as necessary. Attorneys who assert mu-
nicipal liability claims on behalf of their clients must take the pursuit of
discovery seriously and be well-versed in both discovery and municipal
liability standards.
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) Depositions
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), a party may take a deposition of an
organization or other entity through a designee or designees who then
testify on the organization's behalf on designated topics.14 1 This proce-
dure provides a ready venue for a plaintiff to garner testimony that it can
point to as representing the municipality. For example, a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition can be used to determine a municipality's policies, the identi-
ty of a final policymaker, or various facts related to training.1
42
One case demonstrating the effective use of Rule 30(b)(6) deposi-
tions to survive summary judgment on municipal liability is Dalgarn v.
Johnson.143 In that case, the court cited Rule 30(b)(6) testimony in find-
ing that the plaintiff had established the difficult elements of deliberate
indifference and causation in a failure to train claim.'44 Among other
(M.D. Ala. 1991) ("The mere fact that producing documents would be burdensome and expensive
and would interfere with [a] party's normal operations is not inherently a reason to refuse an other-
wise legitimate discovery request.") (granting the plaintiffs motion to compel document discovery
because a company cannot sustain a claim of undue burden by citing deficiencies in its own filing
system or claiming disruption in operations).
138. No. 10-cv-00261-LTB-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87860 (D. Colo. Aug. 9,2011).
139. See id at *2-5.
140. Rehberg v. City of Pueblo, No. I0-cv-00261-LTB-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58776,
at *3-5, *17-18 (D. Colo. June 2, 2011).
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
142. Note, however, that a municipality's designation of a person as its representative for
purposes of Rule 30(b)(6) does not mean that the designated individual enjoys final policymaking
authority for the municipality. See Heinrich v. City of Casper, 526 F. App'x 862, 863 (10th Cir.
2013).
143. No. 09-cv-01887-CMA-BNB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98566 (D. Colo. Sept. 20, 2010).
144. Id. at *30-31.
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admissions, the court found that the defendant "apparently agree[d]" that
its training was inadequate.
45
Several factors can contribute to the effective use of a Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition. One factor is which topics the plaintiff lists on the deposition
notice. As a straightforward example, a plaintiff proceeding under a fail-
ure to train theory should list the training at issue as one topic for which
the municipal representative must designate a testifying representative.
Another factor is the timing of the deposition. Rule 30(b)(6) deposi-
tions are generally more useful when taken early in a case, because they
can provide insight into the workings of a defendant organization or enti-
ty, which lays the foundation for further factual development. In the case
of a municipal liability claim, a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition taken early can
help to form the strongest municipal liability theory. 
46
III. CHALLENGES, BENEFITS, AND A PATHWAY FORWARD
The strategies presented above may give plaintiffs additional tools
to succeed in surviving summary judgment on municipal liability claims,
but the truth remains that many plaintiffs' attorneys are discouraged from
bringing such claims due to the standards imposed by federal courts.
Courts have enforced these stringent standards with sometimes open
hostility to plaintiffs' claims.147 Plaintiffs are further discouraged by
practical and procedural considerations such as the potential for bifurca-
tion and lack of economic incentive.
Against this legal backdrop, it is important to remember that the
purpose of § 1983 is "to provide a federal forum for litigants who ha[ve]
been deprived of their constitutional rights."'4s The Supreme Court has
also aptly observed that adequate damages remedies are vitally important
to protect our citizenry's "cherished constitutional guarantees, and the
importance of assuring [their] efficacy is only accentuated when the
wrongdoer is the institution that has been established to protect the very
rights it has transgressed.'' 149 In light of these purposes and the im-
portance of adequate remedies, the courts should move the standards and
requirements for municipal liability toward a legal standard that is more
unified with these goals.
145. Id. at*30 & n.51.
146. For a recent example of the detriment of waiting too long to take a Rule 30(b)(6) deposi-
tion, see Doty v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield, No. 12-cv-01340-PAB-MJW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96324 (D. Colo. July 10, 2013), in which the plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for leave to amend his
complaint "to conform to what Plaintiff argues is newly-discovered evidence obtained during the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition taken on May 16, 2013." Id. at *3.
147. See Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1223
(10th Cir. 2008)_ (suggesting that municipalities are "tempting targets for lawsuits" because they
"have more money and no immunity.").
148. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 76 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
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A. Courts' Hostility Toward Municipal Liability Claims
Federal courts have enforced the demanding standards for munici-
pal liability with such rigor that it has sometimes resulted in expressions
of open skepticism and even hostility. Ever since the Supreme Court first
rejected respondeat superior as a standard for municipal liability, courts
have been hyper-vigilant about protecting municipalities from this form
of liability and have applied heightened standards of causation and cul-
pability where the municipality did not directly inflict an injury.150 The
Supreme Court has justified these "rigorous standards" as necessary "to
ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
employee."'
' 51
These high standards have resulted in a scarcity of successful mu-
nicipal liability claims in the federal courts.152 For example, since Mo-
nell, the Supreme Court has not directly considered a single § 1983 case
where a plaintiffs alleged injury was caused by an unconstitutional mu-
nicipal custom,153 and cases in the Tenth Circuit are likewise few and far
between. 1
54
The evolution of these uniquely stringent standards has led to a per-
ception among civil rights attorneys that courts "simply do not under-
stand, or are hostile to, Monell claims."'55 This perception is demonstrat-
ed by statements, such as the Tenth Circuit's observation, that municipal-
ities "are tempting targets for lawsuits when municipal officials have
erred" because municipalities "have more money" than the officials
themselves.56 As demonstrated in the following subpart, such statements
are not only alarming in their lack of empathy for victims of civil rights
violations but also divorced from reality.
B. Other Challenges for Municipal Liability Plaintiffs
Even if plaintiffs do succeed in meeting the Supreme Court's high
municipal liability requirements, they face a number of practical and
procedural hurdles to obtaining a jury award. Contrary to the Tenth Cir-
150. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) ("Where a court fails to
adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into re-
spondeat superior liability.").
151. Id. at 405.
152. See infra app. 1.
153. Gilles, supra note 4, at 49 & n. 134.
154. See id at 21 (observing that "the truly animating forces of modem day police misconduct
are... pervasive unwritten codes of conduct followed by rank and file officers that regularly abridge
the constitutional rights of the citizenry").
155. Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in
Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 569 (1993) (quoting Taylor, supra note 97, at 464)
(discussing interviews with plaintiff civil rights attorneys about some of the reasons that plaintiffs do
not bring Monell claims, and cautioning litigators to "be aware of these sobering realities before
filing or pursuing a Monell claim in a police misconduct case").




cuit's dismissive observation, plaintiffs often have little economic incen-
tive to bring Monell claims. Unlike with claims against individual munic-
ipal employees, plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages against gov-
ernmental entities.157 Further, municipal employees are often indemnified
for their constitutional torts,158 so municipalities commonly bear the cost
of their employees' constitutional torts, regardless of whether they are
sued directly.159 Thus, plaintiffs in fact have little financial incentive to
pursue municipal liability claims rather than undertake the more attaina-
ble task of suing individual officers.
Procedural hurdles may additionally prevent plaintiffs from ever
getting to the point of collecting damages from municipalities. In particu-
lar, courts have shown an increasing willingness to bifurcate claims
against officers from claims against a municipality.'60 Their principal
reasoning is that a plaintiff must prove the underlying constitutional
harm committed by the officer to proceed against the governmental enti-
ty, 161 so the plaintiff should have to establish individual liability "before
turning to the more burdensome and time-consuming task of litigating
the Monell claim. 162
The result of bifurcation is to make the task of proving municipal li-
ability even more onerous. In bifurcated cases, plaintiffs must bear the
costs of undergoing two separate trials, or worse, two lengthy and bur-
densome discovery periods.63 In the first trial against the officers, plain-
tiffs must overcome "pro-police" juries.1 64 Furthermore, as some courts
have observed, "[t]here is a danger that bifurcation may deprive plaintiffs
of their legitimate right to place before the jury the circumstances and
atmosphere of the entire cause of action which they have brought into the
157. See Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1307 (10th Cir. 2003) ("The fact that
municipalities are immune from punitive damages does not... mean that individual officials sued in
their official capacity are likewise immune."); Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1210 (10th
Cir. 1998) ("[M]unicipalities are not liable for punitive damages under § 1983."). But see Murphy v.
Spring, No. 13-CV-96-TCK-PJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130231, at *18-19 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 12,
2013) (observing that Youren "has been called into question by lower courts" and criticized for
lacking support).
158. Gilles, supra note 4, at 30 & n.52 (referencing a list of state statutes which provide for
indemnification).
159. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (finding that "no case ... showed that an individual official
had bome the cost of an adverse constitutional tort judgment" in a survey of cases where payments
to victims of constitutional wrongs were recorded).
160. See Colbert, supra note 155, at 552-60 (discussing the trend of claim bifurcation in
§ 1983 litigation in certain U.S. cities). But see Await v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142, 2012 WL
1161500, at * 10 n.2 (N.D. I11. Apr. 9, 2012) ("It is clear that the weight of authority holds that bifur-
cation is now heavily disfavored.").
161. See City of L.A. v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
162. Ojeda-Beltran v. Lucio, No. 07 C 6667, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54116, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
July 16, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Colbert, supra note 155, at 504.
164. Id. at 548-49.
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court, replacing it with a sterile or laboratory atmosphere.'65 Because of
the additional hurdles it creates, bifurcation has been referred to as an
"'end-around' method for avoiding Supreme Court law upholding sec-
tion 1983 municipal liability" and "a nearly infallible defense strate-
gy.",
166
C. Importance and Benefits of Municipal Liability Claims
Despite the hurdles of bringing municipal liability claims, plaintiffs
nonetheless have many good reasons to bring such claims, which helps
explain why practitioners in the Tenth Circuit have begun bringing Mo-
nell claims with greater frequency.167 One such benefit is that in select
cases, Monell provides a path to recovery for plaintiffs stymied by the
doctrine of qualified immunity. To overcome qualified immunity and
prevail on a § 1983 claim against an individual governmental official, a
plaintiff usually must show that the constitutional right at issue was
"clearly established" in addition to showing that the defendant deprived
him or her of a constitutional right. 68 Because municipalities do not en-
joy qualified immunity,169 a municipality can be held liable for an of-
ficer's constitutional torts where the constitutional right at issue was not
clearly established. 1
70
However, the greater incentive for pursuit of municipal liability lies
in the potential impact of favorable rulings on a broader societal level.
For many plaintiffs, the potential of preventing future civil rights viola-
tions is significantly more important than receiving monetary compensa-
tion for their own injuries. To that end, many plaintiffs request (and re-
ceive) injunctive relief in municipal liability cases that may have no di-
rect benefit to an individual plaintiff. 71 For example, the settlements
165. Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 385 F. Supp. 2d 626, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2004)
(quoting In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 217 (6th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Marcum v. Scioto Cnty., No. 1: 10-cv-790, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93042, at *8
(S.D. Ohio July 5, 2012).
166. Colbert, supra note 155, at 507, 509.
167. As of February 25, 2014, a search on LEXIS for "municipal liability" or "Monell" in the
District of Colorado returns 602 hits, with 473 of the hits (78.6%) from cases that were filed after
January 1, 2007.
168. See, e.g., Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Martinez v.
Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
169. See Walker v. City ofOrem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006).
170. See Bass v. Pottawatomie Cnty. Pub. Safety Ctr., 425 F. App'x 713, 718 (10th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting a municipality's inconsistent verdict argument where the jury found the municipality liable
but that the individual officer was protected by qualified immunity); Christensen v. Park City Mun.
Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the individual officers were protected by
qualified immunity but that "[t]he defense of qualified immunity is not available to a municipality
such as Park City"); Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[T]here is
nothing anomalous about allowing ... a suit [against the city] to proceed when immunity [based on
a lack of clearly established law] shields the individual defendants.").
171. See, e.g., Hall v. Terrell, No. 08-cv-00999-DME-MEH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48870, at
*34 (D. Colo. June 10, 2009) (involving a female inmate who, after being brutally raped by a
prison guard, filed a § 1983 lawsuit seeking "actual, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive remedies"). Illustrating the societal benefit of municipal liability claims, Hall "prompted
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resulting from Estate of Rice v. City & County of Denver172 required the
Denver Health Medical Center and the City & County of Denver to
change the policies and customs that had contributed to the death of the
female detainee. 1
73
When municipalities are held liable for constitutional harms, they
are forced to confront their unconstitutional policies and customs and
develop comprehensive responses so that the violations do not reoccur.
74
Unfavorable jury verdicts "expose municipalities to costly, indeterminate
liability during these times of fiscal austerity, making reform of police
practices an economic, as well as a political, imperative."'' 75 The negative
publicity resulting from a municipality being put on trial can serve as a
similarly strong deterrent.7 6 Further, municipalities "possess the re-
sources and broad vantage point with which to identify the particular
deficiencies, and [to] take appropriate corrective action.'
177
IV. CONCLUSION
During the legislative debate preceding passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, now codified as § 1983,178 Representative Samuel Shella-
barger of Ohio, the drafter of the Act, stated:
the state prison system to change some of its practices." Andrea Dukakis, Prisoner Abuse Case
Leads to Big Changes, COLO. PUB. RADIO (May 26, 2010),
http://www.cpr.org/article/Prisoner Abuse CaseLeads toBig Changes.
172. No. 07-cv-01571-MSK-BNB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42381 (D. Colo. May 27, 2008).
173. See, e.g., Felisa Cardona, Settlement Reached in Jail Death: Denver Health to Pay $4
Million to Family of Emily Rae Rice, DENy. POST, May 30, 2008, at Al (noting that the settlement of
Rice's wrongful death case included a mandate that the hospital institute new procedures for check-
ing patients' vital signs); Daniel J. Chacon, City to Pay $3 Million in Emily Rice Wrongful Death
Lawsuit, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov. 13, 2008,
http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/nov/1 3/denver-pay-3-million-emily-rice-wrongful-
death-law (discussing the settlement of Rice's wrongful death case, which included Denver Health
policy changes known as "Emily's Rights," as well as "23 changes in protocol and procedures" at
the Denver jail (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, in Hall v. Terrell, the Department of
Corrections "agreed to install more security cameras in the area where the sexual assaults took
place." Gary Hunter, Sexual Abuse by Prison and Jail Staff Proves Persistent, Pandemic, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS, May 15, 2009, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/21225_displayArticle.aspx (last
visited Feb. 24, 2014).
174. See, e.g., Colbert, supra note 155, at 502 ("Jury verdicts holding municipalities liable for
depriving citizens of their constitutional rights serve to effectively short-circuit official toleration and
condonation of longstanding unconstitutional police practices." (footnote omitted)); Christina B.
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 49-50 (1980) (observing that holding local
governments liable for constitutional harms inspires the types of "systemic changes" needed to fix
"systemic problems" within local governments (internal quotation marks omitted)).
175. Colbert, supra note 155, at 502 (footnotes omitted).
176. See Gilles, supra note 4, at 88 ("[I]nstitutional change is induced not only by the threat of
monetary penalties, but for other reasons, including a defendant's desire to avoid adverse publicity,
[as well as] the cost and burden of litigation .... Such behavior-modifying factors should have an
even stronger effect in the public law sphere, where municipal liability claims based on unconstitu-
tional customs can implicate high profile social issues, such as police brutality, corruption, or cover-
ups.").
177. Note, Government Tort Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2018-19 (1998).
178. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978).
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This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty
and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authoriz-
ing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. It would be
most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of
interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own Su-
preme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is
wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the
words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes and
constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and give
remedies for their wrongs to all the people.
179
The Supreme Court has also recognized the remedial purposes
served by § 1983 and the deterrent effect it has on constitutional depriva-
tions. 18 It is no wonder that municipal liability claims have been de-
scribed as representing "the greatest hope for curbing the excessive use
of force by police officers."'
' 81
Yet, clearly there is a disconnect between the potential societal ben-
efit that can arise from successful municipal liability claims and the vari-
ous barriers that courts have erected to prevent plaintiffs from pursuing
such claims. It is important to understand that the current legal standard
reflects the courts' unyielding fidelity to the principle that municipalities
should not be subject to respondeat superior liability. 1
82
This Article does not assert hat respondeat superior liability is nec-
essarily the appropriate standard for municipal liability claims, although
there is persuasive scholarship to that effect.'83 But this Article does
question why such a stringent standard is necessary to protect munici-
palities from respondeat superior liability. After all, "Monell confines
cities' liability for compensatory damages more tightly than the common
law restricts private employers' liability for punitive damages."',84 If
avoiding respondeat superior liability is the animating force behind the
Court's jurisprudence, the Court has failed to explain why lesser stand-
ards of causation and culpability would not suffice. For example, em-
ploying a standard of gross negligence or recklessness would avoid re-
spondeat superior liability while simultaneously making it more feasible
for plaintiffs to pursue municipal liability claims.'
85
179. Id. at 684 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68 (1871)).
180. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980).
181. Colbert, supra note 155, at 502.
182. See Bd. of Cnry. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997) ("Where a court fails to
adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into re-
spondeat superior liability.... Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless delib-
erate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights."); Pem-
baur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986).
183. See Achtenberg, supra note 15, at 2191-92.
184. Id. at 2193.
185. See Teressa E. Ravenell, Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between §
1983 Municipal Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REv. 153, 171
n.75 (2011) (describing the difference between gross negligence and deliberate indifference).
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In any event, some relaxation of the idiosyncratically demanding
legal standards would permit plaintiffs to challenge the root cause of
many constitutional deprivations and more robustly deter the scourge of
constitutional deprivations on society. In the meantime, plaintiffs and
their attorneys must forge ahead to overcome the currently burdensome
standards to further societal remedies and to uphold their individual con-
stitutional rights.
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APPENDIX:
TENTH CIRCUIT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CASES FROM THE PAST TEN
YEARS
1 86




Ledbetter v. City of Final policy- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Topeka, 318 F.3d maker for summary that municipal judges do not
1183 (10th Cir. judgment act as policymakers.
2003).
Zuniga v. City of Failure to Denied motion Reversed district court. Held
Midwest City, 68 F. train for judgment as that there was insufficient
App'x 160 (10th Cir. a matter of law evidence to support munici-
2003). under Fed. R. pal liability because no link-
Civ. P. 50(a)187  age between alleged lack of
training and unconstitutional
search and seizure.
Dubbs v. Head Start, Formal policy Granted motion Reversed district court.
Inc., 336 F.3d 1194 for summary Held that a private entity act-
(10th Cir. 2003). judgment ing under color of state law
could be held liable for per-
forming medical examina-
tions on children on the basis
of forms that would not be
understood by a reasonable
person as providing parental
consent.
Carr v. Castle, 337 Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. train for summary that the plaintiff failed to
2003). prove municipal liability be-
cause he failed to show delib-
erate indifference by the mu-
nicipality, nor could he show
a direct causal link.
Ferencich v. Merritt, Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
79 F. App'x 408 cy; Informal for summary that there was no evidence
(10th Cir. 2003). custom judgment that sexual harassment of
186. This table omits cases where the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on municipal
liability claims on the basis that the plaintiffs had not met the first element of showing that there was
an underlying constitutional basis. This table also omits cases where pro se plaintiffs filed frivolous
municipal liability claims and the Tenth Circuit did not engage in any instructive analysis.




stemmed from county policy
or custom, such as a policy of
tolerating sexual harassment.
Douglas v. Beaver None Dismissed com- Affirmed district court. Held
Ctny. Sch. Dist. Bd., plaint that the plaintiff had not suf-
82 F. App'x 200 ficiently alleged that any cus-
(10th Cir. 2003). toms or policies of the school
district caused the alleged
constitutional violation.
Wright v. City of St. Formal poli- Granted motion Vacated district court's
Francis, 95 F. App'x cy; Final poli- for summary order and remanded with
915 (10th Cir. 2004). cymaker judgment respect to one claim against
city. Held that the chief of
police's false statements
about violent tendencies of
plaintiffs may have contribut-
ed to unlawful search.
Gonzales v. City of Formal poli- Dismissed com- Reversed district court.
Castle Rock, 366 cy; Informal plaint Held that the plaintiff's pro-
F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. custom cedural due process rights
2004), rev'd, 545 were violated where munici-
U.S. 748 (2005). pality did not protect the
plaintiff after issuing a pro-
tection order. The Supreme
Court then reversed the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that
there had been a constitution-
al violation.
Roberson v. Pin- Formal policy Dismissed mu- Reversed in part and re-
nacol Assurance, 98 nicipal liability manded to district court.
F. App'x 778 (10th claim Held that the plaintiff had
Cir. 2004). alleged sufficient facts for the
district court to consider her
claim that Pinnacol, a statuto-
rily created insurance compa-
ny, violated her constitutional
rights through the acts of its
authorized agents who carried
out Pinnacol's decision to
terminate her benefits.
Donohue v. Hoey, Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
109 F. App'x 340 cy; Failure to for summary that the disclosure of nude
(10th Cir. 2004). train judgment photographs of the plaintiff
by a police lieutenant was not
caused by any policy because
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the plaintiff had not submit-
ted evidence of any unconsti-
tutional policy.
Mitchell v. City & Informal cus- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Ctny. of Denver, 112 tom for summary that there was not sufficient
F. App'x 662 (10th judgment evidence of custom where
Cir. 2004). plaintiff submitted evidence
of racial discrimination by
only one supervisor toward
him and one other minority
employee.
Dempsey v. City of Final policy- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Baldwin, 143 F. maker; Ratifi- for summary that the mayor was not a final
App'x 976 (10th Cir. cation judgment policymaker on personnel
2005). matters, nor did the city
council-which was the poli-
cymaker-ratify the mayor's
discipline of municipal em-
ployees.
Beedle v. Wilson, Final policy- Dismissed com- Reversed district court in
422 F.3d 1059 (10th maker plaint part. Held that the plaintiff
Cir. 2005). had made sufficient allega-
tions that executives of hospi-
tal were official policymakers
for defendant hospital and the
hospital could therefore be
held liable for First Amend-
ment retaliation claim.
Walker v. City of Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Orem, 451 F.3d train for summary that there was insufficient
1139 (10th Cir. judgment evidence of policy that offic-
2006). ers could retain witnesses for
unreasonable amounts of
time, nor was there any evi-
dence that any of the officers
were final policymakers for
purposes of municipal liabil-
ity.
Whitewater v. Goss, Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
192 F. App'x 794 cy; Failure to for summary that the plaintiff had failed to
(10th Cir. 2006). train; Failure judgment show that possible violation
to supervise of his constitutional rights
was caused by police depart-
ment policy or failure to
train.
Novitsky v. City of Formal policy Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
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Aurora, 491 F.3d for summary that an officer's discretion in
1244 (10th Cir. judgment exercise of particular func-
2007). tions did not give rise to mu-
nicipal liability based on the
exercise of that discretion.
Darr v. Town of Formal policy Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Telluride, 495 F.3d for summary that a municipality's negli-
1243 (10th Cir. judgment gent supervision of citizens'
2007). advisory board could not
form the basis for money
damages against municipality
because negligence is not a
basis for liability under §
1983.
Simpson v. Univ. of Failure to Granted motion Reversed district court.
Colo. Boulder, 500 train; Failure for summary Held that there was sufficient
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. to supervise judgment evidence to show that the
2007). University of Colorado was
deliberately indifferent to the
need to train player-hosts of
football recruits. The plain-
tiffs claim was brought un-
der Title IX, relying on mu-
nicipal liability law.
Simmons v. Uintah Final policy- Granted motion Reversed district court.
Health Care Special maker for summary Held that a final policymaker
Serv. Dist., 506 F.3d judgment who does not follow official
1281 (10th Cir. policy still binds the munici-
2007). pality.
Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. Final policy- Jury verdict for Reversed district court on
of Trs. of Sheridan maker plaintiff municipal liability claim.
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. Held that a superintendent
2, 523 F.3d 1219 was not final policymaker for
(10th Cir. 2008). the school district and the
district could therefore not be
held liable for conduct of
superintendent.
Boyett v. Cnty. of Formal policy Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Wash., 282 F. App'x for summary that the plaintiff failed to
667 (10th Cir. 2008). judgment prove that a jail had unconsti-
tutional policies and, even if
he could, failed to show cau-
sation.
Carney v. City & Informal cus- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Ctny. of Denver, 534 tom for summary that the statistical evidence of
F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. judgment the racial and gender makeup
2014]
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2008). of the Denver Police Depart-
ment produced by plaintiff
was insufficient to show cus-
tom of discrimination.
Christensen v. Park Formal policy Granted motion Reversed district court on
City Mun. Corp., for summary municipal liability claim
554 F.3d 1271 (10th judgment and remanded. Held that an
Cir. 2009). officer's enforcement of city
ordinances regarding the dis-
play and sale of artwork in a
public park could trigger mu-
nicipal liability.
Moss v. Kopp, 559 Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. cy; Final poli- for summary that an officer's allegedly
2009). cymaker judgment unconstitutional conduct in a
single incident could not be
attributed to the municipality
because the plaintiff could
not show the officer's con-
duct was taken pursuant to a
decision made by a final poli-
cymaker.
Cordova v. Aragon, Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
569 F.3d 1183 (10th train; Failure for summary that there was insufficient
Cir. 2009). to discipline judgment evidence that a municipality
insufficiently trained its of-
ficers on the use of deadly
force, nor did the municipali-
ty's failure to discipline of-
ficer give rise to municipal
liability.
Nielander v. Bd. of Final policy- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Cnty. Comm'rs, 582 maker for summary that a county prosecutor was
F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. judgment not a municipal policymaker
2009). because, under Kansas law,
county attorneys are officials
of the state, not the county.
Brammer-Hoelter v. Formal policy Granted motion Reversed district court in
Twin Peaks Charter for summary part. Held that a First
Acad., 602 F.3d judgment Amendment retaliation claim
1175 (10th Cir. against a charter academy
2010). survived for some plaintiffs,
but held that other bases for
municipal liability were




J.M. ex rel. Morris v. Failure to Jury verdict for Affirmed district court.
Hilldale Indep. Sch. investigate plaintiff Held that a school district
Dist. No. 1-29, 397 could be held liable for fail-
F. App'x 445 (10th ing to investigate abuse of
Cir. 2010). student by teacher because
superintendent and principal
were informed about poten-
tial abuse and failed to act on
the information.
Porro v. Barnes, 624 Failure to Granted Affirmed district court. Held
F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. train motion for that a municipality's alleged
2010). summary j udg- violation of prophylactic fed-
ment eral policy does not neces-
sarily demonstrate deliberate
indifference to the plaintiffs
constitutional rights.
Bryson v. City of Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Oklahoma City, 627 train; Failure for summary that the plaintiff presented
F.3d 784 (10th Cir. to supervise judgment insufficient evidence of mu-
2010). nicipality's deliberate indif-
ference in failing to train fo-
rensic chemists where the
plaintiff was exonerated by
DNA evidence after seven-
teen years of incarceration for
a rape and kidnapping he did
not commit.
Bass v. Pottawato- Formal poli- Jury verdict for Affirmed district court.
mie Cnty. Pub. Safe- cy; Informal plaintiff Held that a jail's policy or
ty Ctr., 425 F. App'x custom custom of permitting jailors




indifference to the safety of
non-intoxicated detainees,
such as the plaintiff.
Coffey v. McKinley Formal policy Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Ctny., 504 F. App'x (failure to for summary that the plaintiff failed to
715 (10th Cir. 2012). enact policy) judgment show deliberate indifference
where claim was based on
jail's alleged lack of adequate
fourteen day medical proce-
dures policy.
Layton v. Bd. of Formal poli- Granted motion Reversed district court.
Ctny. Comm'rs, 512 cy; Final poli- for summary Held that the plaintiff pre-
2014]
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F. App'x 861 (10th cymaker judgment sented sufficient evidence to
Cir. 2013). survive summary judgment
on whether a county's polices
regarding medical care pro-
vided to detainees evidenced
the county's deliberate indif-
ference to conditions at jail.
Schneider v. City of Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Grand Junction Po- train; Failure for summary that the plaintiff failed to
lice Dep't, 717 F.3d to investigate; judgment show deliberate indifference
760 (10th Cir. 2013). Failure to by a municipality regarding
discipline; failure to train, failure to in-
Failure to vestigate, failure to disci-
supervise; pline, and inadequate hiring
Inadequate claims where a police officer
hiring had raped the plaintiff. Held
that the plaintiff also failed to
establish causation with re-
gard to failure to supervise
claim.
Bailey v. Kerns, 527 Formal poli- Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
F. App'x 680 (10th cy; Failure to for summary that any medical negligence
Cir. 2013). train judgment or deliberate indifference
resulted from municipal em-
ployees' decisions, not from
municipal policies, and that
there was no pattern of con-
duct that would have put mu-
nicipality on notice that its
training of medical staff was
inadequate.
Cacioppo v. Town of Failure to Granted motion Affirmed district court. Held
Vail, 528 F. App'x train; Inade- for summary that the plaintiff's hybrid,
929 (10th Cir. 2013). quate hiring; judgment three-tiered theory failed to
Ratification show deliberate indifference.
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTIONS FOR UNAUTHORIZED
MIGRANT VICTIMS IN COLORADO: A FEDERAL-STATE
PARTNERSHIP
MIMI E. TSANKOVt & PETULA MCSHIRAS'
ABSTRACT
Domestic violence is a worldwide phenomenon, and since the mid-
1990s, there has been a coordinated international effort to reduce its per-
vasiveness. In the United States alone, statistics suggest that one in every
four women will experience domestic violence in her lifetime. In Colo-
rado, the threat is equally pervasive with almost 19% of all criminal cas-
es filed in the Colorado county court system in 2006 classified as domes-
tic violence matters, and almost half of all murders having been commit-
ted by intimate partners. Yet, within the domestic violence victim popu-
lation, there is a subgroup of victims that has been identified globally as
uniquely vulnerable. Victims that lack legal immigration status are sub-
ject to even greater potential harm. With language and cultural barriers,
as well as lack of knowledge about the domestic legal system, they fear
that in seeking law enforcement protection, they may be removed from
the United States, and, in some cases, separated from their children.
Moreover, while unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims are
eligible to apply for federal protection, immigration relief is inherently
varied across jurisdictions, which can further discourage reporting.
The federal government has implemented a number of measures to
provide support to unauthorized domestic violence victims. The protec-
tions range from visas based on assisting law enforcement to immigrant
self-petitioning rights for victims of certain U.S. citizen and lawful per-
manent resident family members. In addition, due to Colorado's progres-
sive law enforcement policies, the state receives more than $6 million per
year in federal funds to help support and enhance victim services, law
enforcement initiatives, education programs, networking, advocacy, and
other community-based efforts to end domestic violence.
t Mimi E. Tsankov is an Immigration Judge with the Department of Justice (DOJ), Execu-
tive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). In addition, she is an Adjunct Professor of Law at the
University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. She writes in her personal capacity and the views
expressed are not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
1. Petula McShiras graduated from the University of Denver, Sturm College of Law in 2011.
She served as an Attorney Advisor with the EOIR from 2011 through 2013 and is currently working
as Program Supervisor for the Littleton Immigrant Resources Center.
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This Article evaluates the federal protections and Colorado state
protections in place in the context of international human rights stand-
ards. It concludes that while the federal-state partnership has made sig-
nificant strides in supporting this population, there are deficiencies inher-
ent in the system such as the challenges of access to information.
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INTRODUCTION
"[T]here is one universal truth, applicable to all countries, cultures
and communities: violence against women is never acceptable, never
excusable, never tolerable."
United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon (2008)'
"[M]igrant women, like all women, should not be discriminated
against in any sphere of their life ......
General Recommendation No. 26
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
United Nations
2
For the past twenty-five years, there has been a coordinated interna-
tional effort to battle domestic violence worldwide.3 In the United States,
statistics reveal that nearly one quarter of women will experience domes-
tic violence including rape or physical assault at some point in their life-
4time. The chances are even greater in other parts of the world where a
host of factors including existing cultural norms limit progress in this
area.5 Within the population of domestic violence victims, there is a sub-
set that has been identified globally as even more vulnerable. This group
is comprised of unauthorized migrants6 who lack legal status in the coun-
I. U.N. Secretary-General, Remarks to the Commission on the Status of Women in New
York City, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/I1437, WOM/1665 (Feb. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm 1437.doc.htm.
2. Commission on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], General
Recommendation No. 26 on Women Migrant Workers, 1, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/20091WP.I/R
(Dec. 5, 2008), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/GR 26 on women-migrant-workers en.pdf.
3. In a 2005 United Nations (U.N.) World Health Organization (WHO) study, this preemi-
nent health organization reported that "[v]iolence against women is a universal phenomenon that
persists in all countries of the world, and the perpetrators of that violence are often well known to
their victims. Domestic violence, in particular, continues to be frighteningly common and to be
accepted as 'normal' within too many societies." WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO MULTI-COUNTRY
STUDY ON WOMEN'S HEALTH AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: INITIAL RESULTS ON
PREVALENCE, HEALTH OUTCOMES AND WOMEN'S RESPONSES vii (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who-multicountry study/en/.
4. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iii (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/181867.pdf.
The same study reflected that 7.6% of men were raped and/or physically assaulted by a current or
former spouse, cohabiting partner, or dating partner/acquaintance at some time in their lifetime. Id
5. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 3, at 5, 7-8.
6. There are a host of terms used in the common vernacular and in federal immigration law
to refer to this group of individuals. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) refers to unauthor-
ized migrants as "alien[s]," Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(a)(3) (2012)), a term that has been the subject of much debate in recent years. This Article
uses the term "unauthorized migrant" to describe someone who has moved across the U.S. interna-
tional border and who is not a U.S. citizen, has not been admitted for permanent residence, and is not
in a set of specific authorized temporary statuses permitting longer-term residence and work. See
generally Gene Demby, In Immigration Debate, 'Undocumented' vs. 'Illegal' Is More Than Just
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try in which they reside. They are considered to be subject to even great-
er discrimination, and, in the context of domestic violence, are suscepti-
ble to greater victimization.7 They often suffer language and cultural
barriers, compounding their fear that if they come forward, they will be
retaliated against or removed from the county in which they are living
and be separated from their children.8
Legal jurisdiction in all domestic violence cases can span multiple
adjudicatory bodies ranging from criminal courts to family law courts. In
the unauthorized migrant context, an additional component affects out-
comes: the role that federal immigration law plays in terms of both per-
petrators and victims. Some perpetrators of domestic violence, depending
on their immigration status in the United States, may be deportable be-
cause of their conduct.9 In addition, some unauthorized migrant victims
of domestic violence may be eligible for immigration benefits as a result
of the violence.'0 However, the extent to which the law affords victims
immigration protection is dependent upon the nature of their immigration
history, the extent of the domestic violence abuse, and the inclination of
local law enforcement to support such victims.1 In the end, some unau-
thorized migrant victims may be deported depending upon a number of
factors both within and outside of their control.12 Thus, the stakes esca-
late even further in the unauthorized migrant context, where lack of
knowledge about he legal system, the availability and likelihood of re-
ceiving legal protection, and the general uncertainty about outcomes fur-
ther compounds the impediments to these victims seeking protection. In
sum, it is the uneasy confluence of a complex set of factors, exacerbated
by a precarious immigration situation, great uncertainty of outcomes, and
high stakes that may influence victims to remain silent and do nothing
rather than seek state or federal assistance.
The State of Colorado has been focused on improving and refining
its domestic violence laws since 1991.13 Through partnerships with the
Semantics, NPR (Jan. 30, 2013, 5:30 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/01/30/I 70677880/in-immigration-debate-
undocumented-vs-illegal-is-more-than-j ust-semantics.
7. Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,
Vulnerability of Women Migrant Workers, in UNIFEM-CEDAW PANEL ON ADDRESSING WOMEN
MIGRANT WORKERS' CONCERNS 10 (July 2003), available at http://cedaw-
seasia.org/docs/general/CEDAW PANEL-AddrWomenMigrantWorkersConcems.pdf.
8. Id. at 10-11.
9. See, e.g., INA §§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2).
10. See, e.g., id. §§ 101(a)(15)(U), 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), 240(b)(2).
11. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION RESOURCE
GUIDE: FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 3, available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs u visa certificationguide.pdf.
12. For general grounds of inadmissibility and deportability see sections 212 and 237 of the
INA.
13. In 1991, the Colorado legislature passed comprehensive domestic violence legislation
mandating, among other things, the enforcement of domestic restraining orders, see COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3) (2013), and the arrest of a suspect upon "probable cause to believe that a
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federal government, Colorado has created a number of support systems
ranging from advocacy to providing shelter for this vulnerable popula-
tion. 14 As a result, the courts have seen the segment of the county court
docket devoted to domestic violence prosecutions reach 17%, according
to the most recent judicial branch statistics.15 The Congressional Budget
Office reports that there are an estimated 11 million unauthorized mi-
grants in the United States;'6 about 9.7% of the population of Colorado is
foreign born. 17
This Article begins by examining the extent of the domestic vio-
lence problem and provides international, national, and Colorado statis-
tics on unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims. It will describe
the history of domestic violence awareness as a human rights issue spe-
cifically with regard to unauthorized migrant victims. Identifying inter-
national efforts to address the problem, this Article will explore the cur-
rent landscape of protections worldwide. It will analyze the U.S. federal
program to protect this vulnerable population, its local implementation in
Colorado, and create context for key passages contained in the country's
federal domestic violence legislation. This Article will investigate how
both the federal program has changed throughout the past twenty-five
years as it relates to unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims,
examining the various types of federal relief offered to this vulnerable
population. It will explore how Colorado has worked with the federal
government to increase its protections for this group and consider the
ways in which its enhanced state protections have evolved. It will con-
clude by exploring the perceived strengths and weaknesses in the current
system and propose how the system can achieve greater success in pro-
tecting this population.
crime or offense involving domestic violence . . . has been committed," see id. § 18-6-803.6(1)
(20 13).
14. See The Domestic Violence Program, COLORADO.GOV,
http://www.colorado.gov/cdhs/dvp (last visited May 9, 2014).
15. In 2013, the percentage of misdemeanor filings of domestic violence cases in the Colora-
do county courts comprised 17 percent of the yearly docket. COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2013 100 tbl.30 (2013), available at
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/Planning and A alysis/Annual-Statistica
I_Reports/2013/Fiscal%2OYear%/o20201 3%20The%2OAnnual%20Statistical%2OReport.pdf.
16. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A DESCRIPTION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION-2013
UPDATE 15 Exhibit 12B (2013), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44134_Description f ImmigrantPopul
ation.pdf. The CBO further reports that unauthorized migrants are comprised of an estimated 59
percent from Mexico, and an estimated 14 percent from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. Id at
14 Exhibit 12A.
17. The Migration Policy Institute reports that "[i]n 2011, 9.7 percent of Colorado's total
population were immigrants, compared to 8.6 percent in 2000 and 4.3 percent in 1990." State Immi-
gration Data Profiles: Colorado Demographics & Social, MIGRATION POL'Y INST.,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state.cfm?ID=CO (scroll down to the United States
map and click on Colorado) (last visited May 12, 2014). "Of the total immigrant population in Colo-
rado in 2011,48.0 percent were born in Mexico ..... Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Unauthorized Migrant Domestic Violence-A Conceptual Framework
Unauthorized migrant domestic violence matters can implicate at
least six distinct areas of law: (1) international human rights law,' 8 in the
civil rights context; (2) federal civil rights law19; (3) federal domestic
violence criminal law20 ; (4) state domestic violence criminal law21; (5)
state family law 22; and (6) federal immigration law.23 As such, definitions
and understandings can differ depending upon the body of law being
applied.
Under international human rights law, domestic violence has been
framed as an issue of discrimination. In 1979, the U.N. General Assem-
bly adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination against Women (CEDAW), which stands as the primary intema-
tional legal instrument addressing discrimination against women.24 In
1992, the CEDAW Committee passed General Recommendation No. 19
setting forth that "[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimination
that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a
basis of equality with men. 25 Two years later, the United Nations ap-
pointed a Special Rapporteur to address the specific issue of violence
against women as a form of discrimination.26 In 1993, the United Nations
18. See infra notes 64-88.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) prohibits state statutes that are discriminatory on the basis of
alienage and protects noncitizens in the preemption of inconsistent state laws.
20. It is a federal domestic violence crime to: cross state lines or enter or leave Indian country
and physically injure an "intimate partner," 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2012); to cross state lines to stalk or
harass, or to stalk or harass within the maritime or territorial lands of the United States, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2261A (2012); to cross state lines or enter or leave Indian country and violate a qualifying Protec-
tion Order, 18 U.S.C. § 2262 (2012); to possess a firearm and/or ammunition while subject to a
qualifying Protection Order, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012); and to possess a firearm and/or ammuni-
tion after conviction of a qualifying misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)
(2012).
21. See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 90-161 and accompanying text.
24. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW], opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.
25. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19, lth Sess. (1992), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom 19.
26. Commission on Human Rights, Question of Integrating the Rights of Women into the
Human Rights Mechanisms of the United Nations and the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1994/45, at I (Mar. 4, 1994), available at
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage e.aspx?m=106 (go to page 12 of the website to download
document). The Special Rapporteur established procedures to seek information from governments
concerning specific cases of alleged violence through the adoption of the so-called "Optional Proto-
col." The Optional Protocol established a procedure for review of Convention violations by its
signatories, and required the exhaustion of domestic remedies before triggering relief under
CEDAW. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women [CEDAW], G.A. Res. 54/4, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/4 (Oct. 15, 1999), available
at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/54/4&Lang=E; DONNA J.
SULLIVAN, INT'L WOMEN'S RIGHTS ACTION WATCH ASIA PACIFIC, OVERVIEW OF THE RULE
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defined violence against women as "any act of gender-based violence
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private
life. ' 2 7 About a decade later, the United Nations declared domestic vio-
lence to be both a public health policy concern as well as a human rights
concern.28 The United Nations further explained that the violence com-
ponent of domestic violence involves:
[B]eing slapped or having something thrown at you that could hurt
you, being pushed or shoved, being hit with a fist or something else
that could hurt, being kicked, dragged or beaten up, being choked or
burnt on purpose, and/or being threatened with, or actually, having a
gun, knife or other weapon used on you.29
It further defines domestic violence that is sexual in nature as follows:
"[B]eing physically forced to have sexual intercourse when you did not
want to, having sexual intercourse because you were afraid of what your
partner might do, and/or being forced to do something sexual that you
found humiliating or degrading.'30 Acknowledging that the definition of
an intimate partner relationship can vary between settings, the United
Nations defines the relationship broadly as encompassing both formal
and informal temporary relationships, including unmarried sexual rela-
tionships, where the female victim is at least fifteen years of age.3'
As a result of growing concern about rising violent crime rates in
the 1960s and 1970s, and the extent to which women were increasingly
becoming victims of violence, Congress began taking action to address
the issue.32 Following the enactment of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) in 1994, comprehensive federal domestic violence legislation,
the federal government has played a leadership role in identifying model
REQUIRING THE EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO
CEDAW 1 (2008), available at http://www.iwraw-
ap.org/publications/doc/DonnaExhaustionWeb-corrected-version-march%203 I.pdf.
27. G.A. Res. 48/104, at art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm.
28. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: PREVALENCE AND HEALTH EFFECTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND NON-
PARTNER SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 (2013), available at
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85239/1/9789241564 625_eng.pdf.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. The study clarifies that conduct deemed "humiliating and degrading" may be regional-
ly and culturally specific. Id.
31. Id.
32. Murray A. Straus & Richard J. Gelles, Societal Change and Change in Family Violence
from 1975 to 1985 as Revealed by Two National Surveys, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 465, 471-72
(1986); see also LISA M. SEGHETTI & JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42499,
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: OVERVIEW, LEGISLATION, AND FEDERAL FUNDING (2012),
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42499.pdf.
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policies that tend to impact the prevalence of domestic violence.33 The
statute defines domestic violence as:
[F]elony or misdemeanor crimes of violence committed by a current
or former spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by a person with
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is co-
habitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse or in-
timate partner, by a person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim
under the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction receiv-
ing grant monies, or by any other person against an adult or youth
victim who is protected from that person's acts under the domestic or
family violence laws of the jurisdiction.
34
Pursuant to VAWA, the U.S. Department of Justice established the
Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) and conferred upon it grant-
making power to fund programs, policies, and practices for state and
local governments that address the prosecution of domestic violence and
provide a variety of financial and technical resources to help ameliorate
the prevalence of domestic violence.35 OVW provides support aimed at
ending domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking.
36
OVW defines domestic violence as "a pattern of abusive behavior that is
used by an intimate partner to gain or maintain power and control over
the other intimate partner."37 The nature of the violence can be "physical,
sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of ac-
tions that influence another person."
38
There are similarities between the U.N. definition of domestic vio-
lence and the federal government definition in that they each include
physical and sexual abuse. However, the U.S. Department of Justice def-
inition goes further in that it includes the following:
Emotional Abuse: Undermining an individual's sense of self-worth
and/or self-esteem is abusive[, including] . . . constant criticism, di-
minishing one's abilities, name-calling, or damaging one's relation-
ship with his or her children.
33. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 42 U.S.C.).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 13925(a)(8) (2012). The VAWA provisions have been modified three times
in the following legislation: Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.); Violence
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119
Stat. 2960 (2005), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-271, 120 Stat. 750; Violence Against Women Reau-
thorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
35. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT THE OFFICE ON
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Economic Abuse: Is defined as making or attempting to make an in-
dividual financially dependent by maintaining total control over fi-
nancial resources, withholding one's access to money, or forbidding
one's attendance at school or employment.
Psychological Abuse: . . . [C]ausing fear by intimidation; threaten-
ing physical harm to self, partner, children, or partner's family or
friends; destruction of pets and property; and forcing isolation from
family, friends, or school and/or work.
39
The federal government defines the relationship component broadly
ranging from marital unions to domestic partnerships to dating relation-
ships.a
In 2013, the U.S. Congress considered VAWA reauthorization leg-
islation. The bill passed with expanded benefits for, among others, vic-
tims in same-sex unions.41 Thus, VAWA now offers protection from
domestic violence to both opposite-sex as well as same-sex partners, and
in an expanded number of other contextsa2
B. Prevalence-By the Numbers
During the Sixty-Sixth World Health Assembly in May 2013, seven
governments including the United States, declared violence against
women and girls to be "a major global public health, gender equality and
human rights challenge, touching every country and every part of socie-
ty. ' ' 3 Shortly thereafter, the World Health Organization (WHO) released
the first international report measuring the prevalence of domestic vio-
lence globally and regionally and its health effects on women.44 World-
wide, the numbers are staggering. Using credible research methodologies
employed widely in the United States and elsewhere to document the
prevalence of domestic violence, the study reports that domestic vio-
lence, also known as intimate partner violence, is a universal problem
affecting between 23.2% and 36.6% of intimate partners depending on
their country of residence.45 Evidence suggests that women of lower so-
39. Office on Violence Against Women, Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last updated Mar. 2013); see also 42 U.S.C. §
13925(a)(8) (2012).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 13925(a)(8) (2012).
41. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54
(2013) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
42. Id.
43. Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., Addressing Violence Against
Women: Health Impacts and the Role of the Health Sector, 66th World Health Assembly (May
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.who.int/violence injuryprevention/violence/wha outcomestatement.pdf (reading
statement issued by the Assembly's participating nations). The statement was adopted by the gov-
emments of Belgium, India, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, United States of America, and Zambia.
Id.
44. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 28, at 1.
45. See id. at 17.
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cio-economic means are more likely to experience abuse and less likely
to receive medical care.
46
Study respondents residing in the Americas47 reported the second
highest prevalence of domestic violence with approximately 30% of
women reporting lifetime exposure.48 By way of comparison, the WHO
reports that the lifetime prevalence of domestic violence for women in
the United States and other high-income countries is about 23%.
49
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Cen-
ter for Injury Prevention and Control of the Centers for Disease Control,
issued a report in 2011 finding that, in 2010, almost one in five women
and one in seventy-one men in the United States have been raped at some
time in their lives.50 Astonishingly, more than half of these female vic-
tims reported being raped by an intimate partner, and the other 40% re-
ported being raped by an acquaintance.51 More than one third of women
and more than one quarter of men in the United States have experienced
rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner in their
lifetime. Lifetime prevalence of rape, physical violence, and/or stalking
by an intimate partner in Colorado was 32.7% of women, equating to an
estimated 618,000 victims.
53
46. See generally KAREN SCOTT COLLINS ET AL., HEALTH CONCERNS ACROSS A WOMAN'S
LIFESPAN: THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1998 SURVEY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 7-9 (1999), available
at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/1999/May/Health-Concems-
Across-a-Womans-Lifespan--The-Commonwealth-Fund- 1998-Survey-of-Womens-Health.aspx.
47. Respondent countries comprising the statistics for the Americas are: Brazil, Chile, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note
28, at 44.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id.; MC Black & MJ Breiding, Adverse Health Conditions and Health Risk Behaviors
Associated with Intimate Partner Violence - United States, 2005, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (Feb. 8, 2008),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5705al.htm.
50. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2011), available
at http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVSReport201 -a.pdf.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2. The U.S. Bureau of Justice reports that although both men and women suffer
intimate partner violence, women are most often the victims, comprising 85 percent of cases report-
ed. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001(2003).
53. BLACK ET AL., supra note 50, at 74. These statistics are considered to be underestimates
due to the fact that
[i]ncidents of sexual violence, stalking, and intimate partner violence are underreported
as crimes in the United States. Survivors may be reluctant to disclose their victimiza-
tion-whether to law enforcement or to family and friends-for a variety of reasons in-
cluding shame, embarrassment, fear of retribution from perpetrators, or a belief that they
may not receive support from law enforcement. Laws may also not be enforced adequate-
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We are unaware of published statistics that estimate the number of
unauthorized migrants living in Colorado who are victims of domestic
violence. In the absence of a definitive study, we might be able to sur-
mise the existence of the problem if not its extent. To begin, in Septem-
ber 2013, the Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project reported that the
number of unauthorized migrants living in the United States was 11.7
million as of March 2012.54 More than 60% of those individuals live in
the states of California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New York and
Texas.5 At 52%, the majority of them are Mexican citizens5 6
The 2012 census figures report that Colorado's population is about
5.1 million people.57 The number of foreign-born persons estimated to be
living in the state in 2011 was 9.7%. 8 There is no exact figure that has
measured how many individuals in this group are unauthorized migrants,
and how many are foreign born but have acquired legal temporary or
permanent immigration status in the United States. However, according
to 2011 U.S. Census data, more than 20% of the state's population is
Hispanic, and of the total immigrant population in Colorado in 2011,
48.0% were born in Mexico, 3.8% in Korea, and 3.5% in Germany.59 In
Colorado, 35.9% of the foreign-born residents were U.S. citizens in
2011.60
As for general statistics regarding unauthorized migrant domestic
violence victims, 48% of Latinas reported in one scholarly survey that
their partner's violence against them had increased after they had migrat-
ed to the United States.61 Furthermore, in a survey of immigrant Korean
women in New York, the study found that 60% had been battered by
their husbands.62 A 2006 study found that married unauthorized migrant
women experience higher levels of physical and sexual abuse than un-
married unauthorized migrant women, with 59.5% married unauthorized
migrant women being victims of domestic violence as compared to
49.8% of unmarried unauthorized migrant women.63
54. JEFFREY S. PASSEL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., POPULATION DECLINE OF




56. Id. at 7.
57. State and County QuickFacts: Colorado, U.S. DEP'T COM.,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/08000.html (last revised Mar. 27, 2014).
58. Id.
59. 2010 Census Interactive Population Search: Colorado, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=08 (last visited May 9, 2014);
MIGRATION POL'Y INST., supra note 17.
60. MIGRATION POL'Y INST., supra note 17.
61. Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and Ser-
vice Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL'Y 245, 250 (2000).
62. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 4, at 27.
63. Dutton et al., supra note 61, at 259.
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C. International Law Guidance
The impetus to develop a treaty to protect the rights of women
emerged following the First World Conference on Women in Mexico
City in 1975.64 Despite the universality of domestic violence, it was not
until more than five years later that state governments officially recog-
nized this basic human right, and developed standards by which signato-
ry governments would be required to implement protections for this
group of vulnerable crime victims.65 In 1979 the U.N. General Assembly
adopted these standards through the adoption of CEDAW and its com-
panion CEDAW Committee.66 CEDAW includes a mechanism for moni-
toring compliance, and many scholars have hailed the Convention as an
important advance in securing political, cultural, economic, social, and
family life protections for women.
67
Considered a groundbreaking international legal instrument dealing
with the human rights of women, the Convention establishes an interna-
tional bill of rights and standards for combating discrimination against
women, provides a model for how governments can support gender
equality, and imposes state obligations for signatories that fail to meet
their obligations under the Convention.68 Countries that have ratified or
acceded to the Convention are legally bound to adopt and implement
provisions that support the standards outlined therein, including submit-
ting national quadrennial progress reports outlining the steps they have
taken to comply with their treaty obligations.
69
Although the language of CEDAW in its original form does not in-
clude an explicit reference to violence against women, over time the
CEDAW Committee, through the promulgation of general recommenda-
tions and standards for signatory compliance, has expanded the definition
of "discrimination" in Article 1 of the Convention to adequately protect
the rights of women as encapsulated by the Convention.70 For example,
the CEDAW Committee has interpreted discrimination to include gen-
64. See Report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year, June 19-July 2,
1975, Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and
Peace, 1975, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 66/34 (1976).
65. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW], opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm (noting the convention opened
for signature March 1, 1980, and declared women's equality with men to be a requirement for peace-
fil country development).
66. Id. at introduction; id. at pt. V, art. 17.
67. Id. at pt. V, art. 18; Marta R. Vanegas & Lisa R. Pruitt, CEDA W and Rural Development:
Empowering Women with Law from the Top Down, Activism from the Bottom Up, 41 BALT. L. REV.
263, 271 n.30 (2012).
68. The Human Rights of Women, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND,
http://www.unfpa.org/rights/women.htm (last visited May 9, 2014).
69. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW], opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, at art. 18, 24 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.
70. Id. at art. I (internal quotation mark omitted).
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der-based violence, identifying it as a form of "discrimination that seri-
ously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of
equality with men. 71 Moreover, CEDAW has recognized that "special
attention should be given to the health needs and rights of women be-
longing to vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, such as migrant wom-
en.' '7 2 Since human rights principles are inherent to all human beings,
under the U.N. standards migrant women are entitled to a "minimum" of
human rights guarantees such as freedom from violence. Thus, under
CEDAW the United Nations recognizes that unauthorized migrant do-
mestic violence victims should be afforded the same protections as that
of victims with legal immigration status.
To that end, CEDAW has adopted the U.N. Model Framework for
Domestic Violence Legislation73 (U.N. Model Framework), which pro-
vides guidance about the types of provisions that should be included in
any domestic violence legal framework. The U.N. Model Framework
suggests that, at a minimum, the laws should criminalize this type of
violence, ensure the effective prosecution and punishment of perpetra-
tors, empower and support victims of domestic violence, and employ
methods to strengthen prevention.74 They should also recognize domestic
violence as gender-specific violence directed against women that occurs
within families and in intimate relationships.7 5 The framework asks sig-
natories to recognize the seriousness of the offense and provide a range
76
of remedies to provide survivors maximum protections.
The U.N. Model Framework suggests that in an ideal system, the
police, prosecutors, and judges should be trained to support survivors of
domestic violence, and to rehabilitate perpetrators of the violence.77
Moreover, states should find ways to develop greater understanding
within the community of the prevalence of domestic violence as well as
its causes, and encourage community participation in eradicating domes-
tic violence.7 8
Yet, in the context of migrant women, there are a host of other con-
siderations that need to be addressed. Most important is that unauthor-
ized migrant domestic violence victims are fundamentally different be-
71. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19, 1 1th Sess. (1992), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom 19.
72. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24, 20th Sess. (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom24.
73. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, DIV. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN,
HANDBOOK FOR LEGISLATION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1-3 (2010), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/handbook/Handbook%20for%201egislation%20n20vio
lence%20against%20women.pdf.
74. Id. at 2 3.1.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2 3.11-.12.
77. Id. at 10.
78. Id. at 2 T 3.5.
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cause they may be deported for violation of domestic immigration law if
they are brought to the attention of law enforcement.79 Additionally, they
are more vulnerable since in many instances, as the United Nations has
observed:
(1) They migrate with spouses from cultures that value the submis-
sive role of the women in the family;
(2) They have diminished access to justice;
(3) They may be ineligible for free government legal aid;
(4) They might face unresponsive and hostile officials and, at times,
collusion between officials and the perpetrator;
(5) They may lose their right to work upon the report of abuse and
then find themselves unable to amass the funds to remain in the coun-
try for the duration of any trial;
(6) They may not know the language of the country;
(7) They may not know their legal rights;
(8) They may lack physical mobility and the ability to communicate
to seek help due to employment constraints or living sites;
(9) They may have limited ties to support groups, contacts, or cultur-
al associations;
(10) They may not be aware of the services that their embassy can
provide;
(11) They may not have access to their passport if it is held by an
employer;
(12) They may fear reprisal from criminal networks;
(13) Due to their unauthorized migrant status, they may be vulnerable
to exploitation and abuse from employers, and may be subject to
forced labor; and
(14) They may face harassment by the police.
80
Not surprisingly, the U.N. Model Framework "[r]ecommends that specif-
ic legal provisions be enacted to guarantee the rights of immigrant wom-
en who are victims/survivors of violence."8' The U.N. Model Framework
goes further to suggest that an effective system should acknowledge that
violence against women may constitute persecution and that complain-
79. UNIFEM-CEDAW PANEL ON ADDRESSING WOMEN MIGRANT WORKERS' CONCERNS,
supra note 7, at 14.
80. Id.
81. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 73, at 2 3.7.
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ants/survivors of such violence should constitute "a particular social
group" for the purposes of asylum law.
82
Although the United Nations has recognized that domestic violence
can occur against either gender, statistics reveal that victims tend to be
women in the vast majority of the cases, hence the specific appeal within
CEDAW to support this vulnerable group.83 The CEDAW Committee
has concluded that since violence is disproportionately directed against
women, gender-based violence is implicated in the CEDAW discrimina-
tion definition.
84
Today, governments in 189 countries have signed CEDAW, and
187 have ratified the treaty.85 The United States is one of the two coun-
tries that have not yet ratified it.86 Although President Jimmy Carter
signed the Convention in 1980, the U.S. Congress has not yet ratified it,
despite calls by multiple U.S. presidents, congressional leaders, and
community stakeholders over the past twenty-five years to do so.87 Crit-
ics have argued that the United States' failure to ratify this treaty calls
into question its credibility as a world leader on both human rights and
women's rights.
88
82. Id. at 3 3.14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 15.
84. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 19, 6, llth Sess. (1992), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom 19.
85. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
[CEDAW], opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, at tbl. of signatories (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.
86. Id. Article I1, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2. The treaty was presented to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in November 1980. Global Women's Rights. CEDA W, FEMINIST
MAJORITY FOUND., http://www.feminist.org/global/cedaw.html (last visited May 10, 2014). In July
2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to recommend ratification of CEDAW, but the
issue has never come before the full Senate for a vote. Id The other country that has signed but not
ratified the treaty is Palau. The countries that have not ratified the treaty are: Iran, Sudan, South
Sudan, Somalia, and Tonga. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women [CEDAW], opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, at tbl. of signato-
ries (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), available at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.
87. FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., supra note 86; Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the U.N., Statement on the 30th Anniversary of the Convention on the Elimination
of All Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), PRN 2009/319 (Dec. 18, 2009),
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/133840.htm ("The Obama Administration strongly
supports this landmark treaty, and is committed to United States ratification.").
88. Frequently Asked Questions, CEDAW TASK FORCE OF THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON
CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.cedaw201 I.org/index.php/about-cedaw/faq (last visited May
10, 2014); see also Jessica Riggin, Note, The Potential Impact of CEDAW Ratification on U.S.
Employment Discrimination Law: Lessons from Canada, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 541, 542
(2011).
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D. The U.S. System of Protection
In 1994, after acknowledging that the U.S. criminal justice system
had routinely ignored and dismissed domestic violence,89 the U.S. Con-
gress implemented sweeping domestic legislation. The VAWA embodies
many of the provisions of CEDAW's model framework, specifically as it
relates to unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims. While the
United States is not a party to CEDAW, CEDAW is nevertheless instruc-
tive when considering the passage of the VAWA by Congress in 1994 in
the context of international principles as articulated through CEDAW.
The landmark VAWA legislation has enabled the U.S. federal govern-
ment to take a leadership role in combating gender-based violence by
overhauling the criminal justice system's response to domestic violence
at the federal level and in assisting states as they implement new protec-
tions in their individual locales.
90
Unauthorized migrants in the United States are particularly vulnera-
ble.9' Data regarding the number of unauthorized migrants who are do-
mestic violence victims is limited, but a 2005 study of foreign-born
women in New York City revealed that domestic violence homicide vic-
tims were disproportionately represented in the foreign-born popula-
92tion. A recent study of battered unauthorized migrant women in the
United States from thirty-five countries suggests that 18% have fled vio-
lent circumstances in their home countries, whereas 41% emigrated in
search of better economic opportunities.93 Another 34% claimed to have
been motivated to follow their spouses to the United States.94 Those flee-
ing violence sometimes do so in countries undergoing civil unrest where
the violence that they are fleeing is state-sponsored. A variety of factors
ranging from language barriers, de facto and batterer-imposed isolation,
vulnerability of immigration status, religious convictions and country-
specific traditional values, economic dependence on the abuser, lack of
education, lack of a network of family and friends to provide a support
89. JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., TURNING THE ACT INTO ACTION: THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
LAW i (1994), available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/reference/additional-
materials/vawa-legislative-history/violence-against-women-act-hearings-and-reports/vawa-related-
hearings-and-reports-I 994/Senate%2OReport-%200ctober%/ 201993.pdf.
90. Id. at ii-iv.
91. FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN IMMIGRANT




92. Victoria Frye et al., Femicide in New York City: 1990 to 1999, 9 HOMICIDE STUDIES 204,
204 (2005). A similar study for the period 1997 through 2009 of domestic violence homicide victims
in Washington State reflected that almost 20 percent were unauthorized migrants, of which 93 per-
cent were female, in a state where only 12 percent were foreign bom. WASH. STATE COAL. AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WASH. STATE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW, IMMIGRANT AND
REFUGEE VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOMICIDE IN WASHINGTON STATE (2011).
93. Edna Erez et al., Intersections of Immigration and Domestic Violence: Voices of Battered
Immigrant Women, 4 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 32,43 (2009).
94. Id.
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system, and lack of knowledge of the U.S. legal system impedes efforts
to seek support.95 Hispanic unauthorized migrants are reported to be the
least likely to seek help.
96
The support provided under VAWA ranges from rendering unau-
thorized migrants who engage in domestic violence removable97 to
providing financial support for shelters to providing counseling and
training for state and local police, prosecutors, and judges so that they
may provide more effective law enforcement of gender-based violence.
A significant component of VAWA is the mandatory interstate recogni-
tion of protective orders. The legislation also provides funding to states
that promote pro-abusive spouse arrest policies, such as those that: (1)
either encourage or mandate arrest of domestic violence offenders; (2)
discourage dual arrests of victim and abuser; and (3) prohibit the issu-
ance of mutual restraining orders, unless when judicially ordered.
1. Victim Self-Petitioning Relief
VAWA also provides certain unauthorized migrant-specific provi-
sions. VAWA acknowledges that for unauthorized migrant victims to
take action to increase their safety they necessarily run the risk of making
themselves known to law enforcement and potentially subject to removal
given their illegal status. In response, VAWA provides relief for domes-
tic violence victims who are spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citi-
zens and permanent residents. These domestic violence victims can self-
petition for permanent status without their abuser's knowledge. To be
successful in a petition, an unauthorized migrant victim must first estab-
lish the existence of one of the following familial relationships to a U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident:
a. Spouse;
b. Child (unmarried and under age 21);
c. Parent of an abused child (unmarried and under age 21); or
95. Id. at 46; Rupaleem Bhuyan et al., "Women Must Endure According to Their Karma":
Cambodian Immigrant Women Talk About Domestic Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 902,
909-12 (2005); Cynthia F. Rizo & Rebecca J. Macy, Help Seeking and Barriers of Hispanic Partner
Violence Survivors: A Systematic Review of the Literature, 16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 250,
257-58 (2011).
96. Eben M. Ingram, A Comparison of Help Seeking Between Latino and Non-Latino Victims
ofIntimate Partner Violence, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 159, 166 (2007).
97. The INA provides for removability for individuals who have been convicted of various
crimes of family violence, including "crime[s] of domestic violence" against spouses or partners,
stalking, violation of protection orders, and child abuse, abandonment, or neglect. Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 237(a)(2)(E), 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, some domestic
violence-specific crimes may also involve moral turpitude where the offense involves the infliction
of bodily injury. Sanudo, 23 1. & N. Dec. 968, 971 (B.I.A. 2006).
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d. Parent.
98
Furthermore, any claim must establish that the victim was physically
battered and/or subjected to "extreme cruelty" by a U.S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident spouse, parent, or adult child.99 The type of abuse can
range from serious violent physical abuse to threats of violence to verbal
and emotional abuse.100 Abused spouses are also required to establish:
a. That the marriage was entered into in good faith;
b. That the abuse occurred during the marriage, and that the marriage
is still valid or was terminated less than two years prior to self-
petitioning by death or a divorce that is related to the abuse.
c. That the abuse occurred in the United States, and the victim lived
with the abuser.
d. That the self-petitioner has "good moral character."
101
VAWA self-petitioners submit a Form 1-360, "Petition for Amer-
asian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant," with supporting documentation
to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS), and Vermont Service Center.,02 The
Vermont Service Center has designated a special VAWA unit that adju-
dicates these petitions.'0 3 Members of the VAWA unit undergo a unique-
ly rigorous initial training, which is followed by a lengthy period of men-
torship of newer officers by more senior adjudicators. °4 Ongoing train-
ing is provided through more informal in-house meetings, more formal
training sessions and conferences including policy updates from USCIS
staff in Washington, D.C., as well as technical training from private sec-
tor advocacy organizations.
98. INA § 204(a)(I)(A)(iii), (iv), (vii); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICY MEMORANDUM: ELIGIBILITY TO SELF-PETITION AS A
BATTERED OR ABUSED PARENT OF A U.S. CITIZEN; REVISIONS TO ADJUDICATOR'S FIELD MANUAL
(AFM) CHAPTER 21.15 (AFM UPDATE AD 06-32) (2011), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/201 I1/August/VAWA-Elder-Abuse.pdf.
99. INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), (iv), (vii).
100. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(H)(vi), (e)(G)(vi) (2014); Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 834
(9th Cir. 2003).
101. INA § 204(a)(I)(A)(iii).
102. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1-360, PETITION FOR AMERASIAN, WIDOW(ER), OR SPECIAL IMMIGRANT
7-8 (2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-360instr.pdf.
103. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT ON
THE OPERATIONS OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT UNIT AT THE USCIS VERMONT SERVICE
CENTER: REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.uscis.gov[USCIS/Resources/Resources%2fo&r/2OCongress/Congressional %2OReports/
vawa-vermont-service-center.pdf.
104. Id. at ii.
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If a VAWA self-petition is ultimately approved, the recipient is
permitted to apply for lawful permanent residence, and after three years,
he or she can apply for U.S. citizenship. 105
In 1997, the government agency that received and adjudicated these
self-petitions received 2,491 petitions and approved 75% of those
filed.1°6 Over the years, the number of filings has grown incrementally,
and in 2011, the agency received 9,209 self-petitions and approved 68%
of those petitions.'07 There is no numerical limit to the number of peti-
tions that can be granted in a fiscal year.
08
2. VAWA Cancellation of Removal
Unauthorized migrants who have already been placed in removal
proceedings are able to apply for a special type of VAWA relief based on
the domestic abuse that they have suffered at the hands of a U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent.'0 9 Immigration judges,
through the authority delegated to them by the U.S. Attorney General,
have the authority to cancel the removal of an otherwise unauthorized
migrant on account of domestic abuse through a special type of VAWA-
based cancellation of removal (VAWA Cancellation of Removal)."0
Like the VAWA self-petitioner, the VAWA Cancellation of Removal
applicant must establish that he or she was physically battered and/or
subjected to "extreme cruelty" by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident spouse, parent, or adult child."' In addition, to be eligible for
relief the domestic violence victim must have been physically present in
the United States for a continuous period of not less than three years pri-
or to applying and must be a person of good moral character who has not
been convicted of various types of criminal conduct."12 The removal
must result in extreme hardship to the victim, the victim's child, or if the
victim is the child, then to the victim's parent."
3
3. The U Visa
Individuals who provide assistance to law enforcement in a criminal
prosecution may be eligible for temporary immigration status under the
105. INA § 319(a).
106. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42477, IMMIGRATION PROVISIONS OF
THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (VAWA) 4 (2012), available at
http://ww-w.fas.org/sgp/crs/miscfR42477.pdf.
107. Id. at5.
108. Id. at 19, 23-24 (explaining that the VAWA self-petition process is equivalent to the
immediate relative process which grants lawful permanent residence to foreign national spouses of
U.S. citizens without numerical limitation); INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii).
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U nonimmigrant visa provisions.1 4 A victim, such as a domestic vio-
lence victim, must establish that he or she has been the victim of a crime,
has suffered substantial mental or physical abuse, and is willing to assist
law enforcement and government officials in the investigation or prose-
cution of the criminal activity. 115 First, the U visa benefits state and local
law enforcement in the investigation and prosecution of cases of domes-
tic violence and other crimes." 6 Second, it assists law enforcement to
better serve victims of crimes.'17 Finally, it offers a temporary legal sta-
tus to its recipients.' 18
Congress has imposed a numerical limit of 10,000 visas that can be
issued per year."9 When petitions are over-subscribed, the federal gov-
ernment is unable to continue processing and approving the pending re-
quests. 12  Another important distinction is that the VAWA battered
spouse petition requires an affirmative showing of good moral character,
while a U visa petition does not.' 21 This difference can be useful for a
domestic violence victim who has a criminal record herself that is unre-
lated to the domestic abuse.
In order to establish eligibility for this relief, an applicant must have
suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a
victim of a qualifying criminal activity. The individual must be
deemed to have information concerning that criminal activity, which is
viewed as being helpful in the investigation or prosecution of that activi-
ty under a law of the United States.23 A petition for U nonimmigrant
status must also contain a certification of helpfulness from a certifying
agency whereby law enforcement determines whether the individual "has
been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful" in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of the criminal activity.124 The list of law enforcement
114. Id. § 101(a)(15)(U).
115. Id.
116. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA), Pub. L. No. 106-
386, § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.); see New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant
Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53014 (Sept. 17, 2007) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 103, 212, 214, 248, 274a, 299).
117. VTVPA 114 Stat. 1464; New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity, 72 Fed.
Reg. 53014.
118. INA § 101(a)(15)(U).
119. Questions & Answers: Victims of Criminal Activity, U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-
other-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/questions-answers-victims-criminal-
activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (last updated Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Victims of Criminal Activi-
ty].
120. Id.
121. Compare INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), with id. § 101(a)(15)(U).
122. Id. § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(1), (iii); see also Victims of CriminalActivity, supra note 119.
123. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i), (iii); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., U VISA LAW
ENFORCEMENT CERTIFICATION RESOURCE GUIDE FOR FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND
TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 1-2, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs u visa certificationguide.pdf.
124. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(111).
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agencies that are authorized to certify a U visa petition is broad, includ-
ing all authorities responsible for the investigation, prosecution, convic-
tion, or sentencing of the qualifying criminal activity, including, but not
limited to, the following entities:
* Federal, State and Local law enforcement agencies;
* Federal, State and Local prosecutors' offices;
" Federal, State and Local Judges;
* Federal, State, and Local Family Protective Services;
* Equal Employment Opportunity Commission;
* Federal and State Departments of Labor; and
* Other investigative agencies.
125
In some circumstances, the perpetrator of domestic violence is no
longer in the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency, has been de-
ported under federal immigration law, or for some other reason an arrest
or prosecution is not likely. Since there is no statute of limitations on the
signing of the law enforcement certification, a law enforcement agency
can still issue a certification. 126
U nonimmigrant status cannot exceed four years. 27 However, ex-
tensions are available upon certification by a certifying agency that the
foreign national's presence in the United States is required to assist in the
investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity.1 28 Na-
tionwide, the number of U visa petition filings has been on the rise.129 In
Fiscal Year 2009 there were 6,835 applications filed.1 30 Three years later
that number had nearly quadrupled to 24,768.131 Thus, the exponential
increases in applications combined with a 10,000-visa annual cap, has
left demand far exceeding availability. 32 Indeed, the fiscal year 2014 cap
was reached on December 11, 2013, marking the fifth straight year that
USCIS has reached the statutory maximum in accepting U visa applica-
125. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 123, at 2-3.
126. Id. at4.
127. Victims of Criminal Activity, supra note 119.
128. Id.
129. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., FORM 1-914 - APPLICATION FOR T
NONIMMIGRANT STATUS, FORM 1-918 - PETITION FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS RECEIPTS,
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tions.133 USCIS will not be available to issue U visas again until October
1, 2014.134
A benefit to U visa petitioners is that their derivative family mem-
bers such as spouses, children, or other qualifying family members who
are accompanying the principal victim are also eligible for derivative
relief. For unauthorized migrants who fear the impact of coming forward
to law enforcement on their close family members, this feature is appeal-
ing.
4. Asylum, Restriction on Removal, and Relief Under the Conven-
tion Against Torture
In addition to the immigration-specific relief that was enacted
through VAWA, there are a few other types of federal domestic violence
immigration protections. Unauthorized migrants who fear domestic vio-
lence in their home country and who have suffered substantial domestic
violence there can apply for asylum protection in the United States. To
be eligible for that relief, they must establish that they have been unsuc-
cessful in gaining protections from their own government and that they
have a well-founded fear of persecution. To establish a well-founded fear
of persecution, the domestic violence victim must establish that the harm
he or she suffered was on account of his or her political opinion, religion,
nationality, race/ethnicity, or membership in a particular social group.'
35
There have been some successful asylum claims based on political opin-
ion or religion, but a majority of victims seek to establish that their harm
was on account of their membership in a particular social group.'36 This,
however, is more difficult for a victim of domestic violence as one can-
not define the social group by the harm they suffered or fear suffering.
37
Until recently, a social group based on gender violence had not been
recognized in a decision that had the force of established precedent.'38 As
133. USCIS Approves 10,000 U Visas for 5th Straight Fiscal Year, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVS., (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-approves-10000-u-visas-
5th-straight-fiscal-year.
134. Id.
135. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(42), 66
Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012)).
136. See S-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1328, 1328, 1333 (B.I.A. 2000) (finding that a woman with
liberal Muslim beliefs established a well-founded fear of persecution on account of religious beliefs
where her father who inflicted the harm was an orthodox Muslim); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 962
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that dress and conduct rules pertaining to women may amount to persecu-
tion if a woman's refusal to comply is on account of her religious or political views); Lazo-Majano
v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that an alien who was a domestic servant of a
sergeant established the harm she continuously suffered while working for him was on account of
her political opinion), overruled on other grounds by Fisher, 79 F.3d 955.
137. See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006).
138. See R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 906 (B.I.A. 2001), remanded by 23 1. & N. Dec. 694
(B.I.A. 2005), vacated, 24 1. & N. Dec. 629 (B.I.A. 2008). Until August 2014, there were no pub-
lished precedent decisions in which a domestic violence victim had been found to be eligible for
relief based on a protected ground. However, the advocacy community had noted that in a factually
similar domestic violence-based case, the Department of Homeland Security filed a brief asserting
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such, a person seeking asylum based on domestic violence must show
that they belong to a cognizable social group. This is no easy task as it
requires an immutable characteristic that is particularized and socially
visible.139 Without an already recognized social group, victims of domes-
tic violence have been left to articulate a social group that is not defined
by the harm, but is still a narrow and specific enough definition to be
accepted as a particular social group under current law. However, in a
recent precedent-setting decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals
issued a landmark holding recognizing that women who have experi-
enced domestic violence may be deemed a "member of a particular so-
cial group" in some circumstances.14 If successful, a grant of asylum
leads to lawful permanent residence and eventually citizenship. 
141
Applying a similar analysis as that for asylum eligibility, a domestic
violence victim can also apply for restriction on removal. 42 The standard
for eligibility is higher than that of asylum, and a victim needs to estab-
lish that the future harm would be more likely than not to occur in the
victim's home country.143 Individuals who are ineligible for asylum due
to a disqualifying criminal conviction or a delayed filing of their applica-
tion for relief usually pursue restriction on removal. 144
The benefits to a grant of restriction on removal are not as expan-
sive as those related to asylum.45 While an individual who is granted
restriction on removal cannot be removed from the United States to the
country she was fleeing, she can be removed to a third country if one is
available.'46 While the individual may not adjust her status to legal per-
manent residency, she can obtain work authorization while living in the
United States.
147
The United States is a signatory to the U.N. Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
that domestic violence victims could adequately meet the current requirements for social group
membership if they articulate their proposed group by identifying the specific characteristics that the
persecutor targets in choosing the domestic violence victim as well as provide evidence of societal
abuse in that country towards that characteristic. In addition, the victim would need to establish that
the harm feared is "serious enough to constitute persecution"; that the fear is well-founded such that
a victim is unable to relocate within the country; and that the state is unwilling or unable to protect
the victim. Brief for Department of Homeland Security, In re L-R-, available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief/20on%20PSG.pdf.
139. S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579, 583 (B.I.A. 2008); A-M-E-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (B.I.A.
2007); Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N.
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
140. A-R-C-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 388, 392-393 (B.IA. 2014); see supra note 138.
141. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 209, 66 Stat. 163
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2012)).
142. Id. § 241(b)(3).
143. Id.; see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,444 (1987).
144. See INA § 208(a)(2), (b)(2).
145. See id. § 241(b)(3).
146. Id.
147. 8 C.F.R. § 1274a.12(10) (2013).
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ment (Convention Against Torture).148 If a domestic violence victim is
able to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured if returned to the proposed country of removal by or at the insti-
gation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity, then Article 3 of the Convention
Against Torture may be applied to withhold his or her removal.
149
5. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
Domestic violence victims who meet the definition of juvenile un-
der U.S. law and who are deemed to be special immigrants such that they
have been declared dependent on a U.S. juvenile court, or who have been
placed under the custody of a state agency, and whose reunification with
one or both of the immigrant's parents is not viable and would not be in
the juvenile's best interest due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment, are
eligible for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status.'50 Upon application to the
USCIS, a domestic violence victim may have this status conferred upon
him or her.'51 This status permits a juvenile to apply for permanent resi-
dence in the United States.'
52
6. Removal of Conditions on Permanent Residence
Migrants who marry a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident,
and who apply for lawful permanent residence status less than two years
before their second-year anniversary, are granted conditional Permanent
Residence Status.153 In order to make that conditional status permanent,
the petitioning spouse and the beneficiary are required to file a joint peti-
tion requesting that the conditions on status be removed.154 In the case of
an abused spouse, however, federal law permits a waiver of the joint
petition requirement and permits a victim to self-petition to remove the
conditions. 55 To establish eligibility for a waiver of the joint petition
requirement, the unauthorized migrant domestic violence victim must
establish that the marriage was entered into in good faith but legitimately
148. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(b),
112 Stat. 2681-822, (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012)); Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess. Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984). Some have argued that this relief may be
viable given the fact that victims need not establish a nexus to a particular social group. See, e.g.,
Barbara Cochrane Alexander, Comment, Convention Against Torture: A Viable Alternative Legal
Remedyfor Domestic Violence Victims, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 895, 914 (2000).
149. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), .17, .18 (2013). Contrast this relief with permanent residence
available under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
150. INA § 101(a)(27)(J). This section was added by section 153 of the Immigration Act of
1990. The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008
(TVPRA), enacted on December 23, 2008, clarified and expanded the definition to juveniles. Pub. L.
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7701).
151. INA § 101(a)(27)(J).
152. Id. § 203(b)(4).
153. Id. § 216.
154. Id. § 216(c).
155. Id. § 216(c)(4)(C).
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terminated before the end of the two-year conditional period. 56 This law
enables a battered immigrant to leave the abusive relationship since the
victim need not rely on the abusive spouse to receive the waiver. In order
to be successful in waiving the joint petition requirement, the conditional
resident must establish that she was subject to battering or extreme cruel-
ty by the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse during the
course of the marriage. 1
57
7. Prosecutorial Discretion
Unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims have the right to
request that they be considered for prosecutorial discretion in immigra-
tion enforcement actions.158 This policy enables law enforcement to fo-
cus limited resources on higher priority cases, and permits the compas-
sionate and humanitarian use of law enforcement tools, when deemed
appropriate.59 In June 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) further clarified the cir-
cumstances under which prosecutorial discretion and enforcement poli-
cies should be employed in cases involving victims and witnesses to
crimes.'60 The memo instructs that "[a]bsent special circumstances or
aggravating factors, it is against ICE policy to initiate removal proceed-
ings against an individual known to be the immediate victim or witness
to a crime. ' 61 This document refers specifically to domestic violence
victims. If an unauthorized migrant has already been ordered removed,
ICE may grant a stay of removal or deferred action.'62 However, these
types of relief do not confer any legal status on an unauthorized mi-
grant. 163
II. COMPARISON OF VAWA AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
A. The Nation's Report Card
The U.N. Model Framework provides guidance on the types of pro-
visions that, from its perspective, should be included in state domestic
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. JOHN MORTON, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, MEMORANDUM:
EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION CONSISTENT WITH THE CIVIL IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES OF THE AGENCY FOR THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND REMOVAL
OF ALIENS 4 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-
discretion-memo.pdf, JOHN MORTON, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
MEMORANDUM: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: CERTAIN VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND PLAINTIFFS 1-2
(2011) [hereinafter PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: CERTAIN VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND PLAINTIFFS],
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/certain-victims-witnesses-
plaintiffs.pdf.
159. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: CERTAIN VICTIMS, WITNESSES, AND PLAINTIFFS, supra
note 158, at 2.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1.
162. Id. at2.
163. Id.
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violence legislation 64 In this Part, we will examine some of the key
components of that construct specifically as they relate to unauthorized
migrants, in light of the United States domestic violence legal frame-
work.
First, one of the key recommendations in the U.N. Model Frame-
work is that domestic violence be recognized as "gender-specific vio-
lence directed against women, occurring within the family and within
interpersonal relationships. ' 165 In this respect, VAWA departs from the
United Nations' guidance even though there is ample language in the
legislative history acknowledging the disproportion between male and
female victims. 66 The provisions of VAWA are gender-neutral and thus
apply equally to men and women.67 This legal construct runs counter to
CEDAW principles and the U.N. Model Framework.
Second, in the United States, unauthorized migrant victims of do-
mestic violence are able to self-petition for immigration relief, based on
the domestic violence itself, and receive temporary legal status based on
the support they provide to law enforcement in prosecuting the criminal
conduct. VAWA provides protection and support to all victims of vio-
lence regardless of whether they have legal immigration status. This
structure clearly embodies the spirit of the U.N. Model Framework. In
fact, the U.N. Model Framework cites directly to the self-petitioning
rights afforded under VAWA and VAWA Cancellation of Removal as
examples of best practices. 1
68
Third, the U.N. Model Framework recommends that domestic vio-
lence law enforcement systems recognize the seriousness of domestic
violence as an offense, and the provision of a range of remedies to pro-
vide survivors maximum protections.69 Through the enactment of
VAWA, and the ripple effect that has occurred in state and local gov-
164. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 73, at iii.
165. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Commission
on Human Rights, A Framework for Model Legislation on Domestic Violence, U.N. Doc,
E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2 (Feb. 2, 1996).
166. Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family Matter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime &
Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1-3 (1994).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(8) (2012) ("[Nonexclusivity:] Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to prohibit male victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking
from receiving benefits and services under this subchapter."); NAT'L TASK FORCE TO END SEXUAL
& DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT VAWA AND
GENDER, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/FAQVAWA%20and%20Gender.pdf (In ex-
plaining the titling of VAWA, then-Senator Biden said in 2005: "The reality is that the vast majority
of victims of domestic violence are women and children, and most outreach organizations take those
demographics into consideration when providing services ... The bottom line is-violence is vio-
lence no matter what gender the victim. Because of that, the Violence Against Women Act applies to
all victims of domestic violence, irrespective of their gender. Nothing in the act denies services,
programs, funding or assistance to male victims of violence." (omission in original) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
168. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, supra note 73, at 34.
169. Id. at 2 3.11-.12.
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ernments throughout the United States strengthening domestic violence
legislation, a strong argument can be made that the U.S. government has
taken the issue seriously and has devoted substantial resources to reduc-
ing domestic violence.
As of September 30, 1996, the INA had added a separate charge of
removability for perpetrators of domestic violence.170 Any unauthorized
migrant who is convicted of a crime of domestic violence, is remova-
ble.17 1 The term "crime of domestic violence" means any crime of vio-
lence as defined in Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 16, and is
applicable in the context of an expansive definition of spouses including
current or former spouses, common law spouses, or domestic partners.
172
Moreover, INA Section 237(a)(2)(E)(ii) renders removable any unau-
thorized migrant who is enjoined under a protection order and who is
found by a court to have violated a portion of that protection order in a
manner that involves protection against credible threats of violence, re-
peated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom
the protection order was issued. 173
An order of removal is the most severe application of immigration
law that is embodied in the federal system. The consequence for an unau-
thorized migrant being found inadmissible in a removal proceeding is
that he or she will generally be removed and thus barred from the United
States for ten years.174 Domestic violence offenses for which an unau-
thorized migrant was sentenced to imprisonment of one year or more,
and for which a sentence of at least one year was imposed, are deemed
aggravated felonies. Unauthorized migrants who have been removed
apropos of an aggravated felony offense are generally unable to return to
the United States for life unless the U.S. Attorney General authorizes
special permission to return.175 In the case of a second or subsequent
removal, an individual will be barred from the United States for twenty
years. 76 Individuals convicted of a domestic violence offense and re-
moved from the United States as an aggravated felon who later enter or
attempt to enter the United States without authorization will be subject to
federal prosecution for illegal reentry and lengthy prison sentences of up
to twenty years.
77
Fourth, the U.N. Model Framework recommends that police, prose-
cutors, and judges be trained to support survivors of domestic violence
170. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 237(a)(2)(E)(i),
66 Star. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012)).
171. Id.
172. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. § 237(a)(2)(E)(ii).
174. Id. § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii).
175. Id. § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), (iii).
176. Id. § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), (ii).
177. Id. § 276.
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and to rehabilitate perpetrators of the violence.178 Moreover, the U.N.
Model Framework recommends that any legal framework should find
ways to develop greater understanding within the community of the
prevalence of domestic violence as well as its causes and encourage
community participation in eradicating domestic violence.'
1 79
Pursuant to its grant-making power, the OVW funds programs and
develops policies and best practices for state and local governments that
address the prosecution of domestic violence, including matters involv-
ing unauthorized migrants.180 In addition, the OVW provides a variety of
financial and technical resources to help ameliorate the prevalence of
domestic violence especially in this vulnerable community.
181
Since 2000, the OVW has provided extensive reporting to the U.S.
Congress about grants made under the program and their effectiveness in
the communities they serve.182 Currently, the OVW administers twenty-
four grant programs.1 83 In general, those grant programs that are targeted
directly toward unauthorized migrant victims are the following:
(a) Legal Assistance for Victims Grant Program;
(b) Coordinated Community Response Grant Program;
(c) Community Education and Public Awareness Activities Grant
Program;
(d) Historically Underserved Populations Grant Program; and
(e) Culturally and Linguistically Specific Services Grant Pro-
grams.
178. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 73, at 2 3.12.
179. Id. at 2 3.5.
180. See OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GRANT PROGRAMS
TO. END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2011), available at http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/ovw-
grant-program-factsheet.pdf (describing the 21 grant programs offered by OVW).
181. Id.
182. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1003,
114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
183. Grant Programs: About OVW Grant Programs, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/ovwgrantprograms.htm (last updated Apr. 2012) (listing the grant that
OVW currently administers as: Campus Grant Program; Children and Youth Exposed to Violence
Grant Program; Court Training and Improvements Program; Culturally and Linguistically Specific
Services for Victims Program; Education, Training and Enhanced Services to End Violence Against
and Abuse of Women with Disabilities; Engaging Men; Services, Training, Education and Policies
to Reduce Domestic Violence, Dating Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking in Secondary Schools
Grant Program (STEP); Tribal SASP; Sexual Assault Service Program-Cultural; Enhanced Training
and Services to End Violence and Abuse of Women Later in Life Program; Grants to Encourage
Arrest Policies and Enforcement of Protection Orders; Grants to Indian Tribal Governments Pro-
gram; Grants to Tribal Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Coalitions; Legal Assistance for
Victims Grant Program; Rural Grant Program; Safe Havens: Supervised Visitation and Safe Ex-
change Grant Program; Services to Advocate for and Respond to Youth Grant Program; Sexual
Assault Services Program; State Coalitions Grant Program; STOP (Services, Training, Officers, and
Prosecutors) Violence Against Women Formula Grants to States; and Transitional Housing Grant
Program).
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OVW issues a variety of statistics measuring the effectiveness of
these grant programs that are based, in part, on grantee reporting. The
Biennial Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of Grant Programs
Under the Violence Against Women Act in 2012 (OVW 2012 Report to
Congress) identifies key data regarding how these grant programs impact
unauthorized migrants.1 84 The Legal Assistance for Victims (LAV) Grant
Program supports state and local government civil and criminal legal
assistance programs for unauthorized migrants who seek relief in legal
matters arising out of their domestic violence. It can include the provi-
sion of legal services in connection with immigration-specific relief, as
well as support in the family law context. In 2012, OVW's total grants
awarded were greater than $400 million, of which about 8% was devoted
to LAV programs.185
In the early 2000s, the Coordinated Community Response Grant
Program (CCR) focused on creating reforms within the criminal legal
system, including the revision of policies, procedures, and rules that
guide the practice of law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges, and
court personnel.186 This effort resulted in a number of reforms, including
the issuance of protective policies and the development of practice
guides.187 However, more recently, CCR grant programs have become
cross-disciplinary collaborations, fostering formal interagency relation-
ships to improve coordination and collaboration.88 OVW requires most
discretionary grantees to develop and/or participate in a CCR to address
violence against women in their community. OVW reports that the most
effective CCR grant programs are those that engage all sectors of the
criminal legal system and victim advocacy/service agencies in local,
cross-disciplinary teams for purposes of examination and, in some cases,
revision of current policies.'
89
In the OVW 2012 Report to Congress, OVW reported that in
Brooklyn, New York, and in California, CCR grants have been effective
in promoting greater utilization of the criminal justice system by unau-
thorized migrants since they have instituted policies that make the system
less threatening.190 Changes can include same-day release of police re-
ports to victims, and at no cost, where there were previously significant
delays and costs associated with the release of reports.'91 Moreover, CCR
184. OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2012 BIENNIAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GRANT PROGRAMS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN ACT 91 (2012) [hereinafter OVW, 2012 BIENNIAL REPORT], available at
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/2012-biennial-report-to-congress.pdf.
185. See Fiscal Year 2012 OVW Grant Awards by Program, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/fy20l2-grant-program.htm (last updated Jan. 2014).
186. OVW, 2012 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 184, at 17.
187. Id. at 18.
188. Id. at 19.
189. Id. at 261.
190. Id. at 20.
191. Id. at22.
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grantees report that as a result of these collaborations there are faster
responses to requests for needed documentation for U visa petitions.,
92
The OVW 2012 Report to Congress refers specifically to success through
a CCR grant to the Denver Domestic Violence Triage Review Team be-
tween City and County of Denver law enforcement and community rep-
resentatives.1 93 Through this program, representatives from the criminal
justice system and community-based agencies have collaborated in im-
proving the assessment and outreach with domestic violence victims in
the early stages of the criminal justice process. 94 There was a joint "ride-
along" with community partners and law enforcement shift officers as
they responded to a variety of police calls, followed by discussions about
how to better serve the needs of domestic violence victims.
95
One of the most successful CCR grant programs has been one that
focuses on VAWA training for a wide range of professionals who are
likely to come in contact with victims who are unauthorized migrants.
96
For the years 2011 and 2012, OVW reports that it awarded grants to
1,191 grantees and supported the training of 661,263 professionals,
which were comprised of:
• law enforcement officers: 93,241
• victim advocates: 86,211
o. healthcare professionals: 42,405
• attorneys and law students: 36,575.97
The Community Education and Public Awareness Activities Grant
Programs support general education a d public awareness activities that
are aimed at discovering the root causes of domestic violence, including
finding ways to change community norms.198 The programs support
training to help law enforcement better understand the importance of
fostering policies within their police department hat better serve several
types of victims, including domestic violence victims. 99 Moreover, these
grants support outreach efforts to marginalized communities including
unauthorized migrant families in, for example, rural areas.200
Culturally and Linguistically Specific Services Grant Programs un-
derscore the Community Education and Public Awareness Activities
Grant Program and provide services that are tailored linguistically, reli-





196. Id. at 29.
197. Id. (emphases omitted) (footnotes omitted).
198. Id. at 32.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 36.
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grant population group.20 1 Between 71% and 89% of the victims served
through this program had been victimized by a current or former spouse
202or intimate partner. Female victims of Asian and Hispanic ethnicity
between the ages twenty-five and fifty-nine were the predominate groups
that accessed these services.20 3
The Historically Underserved Populations Grant Program serves, in
part, unauthorized migrants and refugees that need support in pursuing
legal advocacy, as well as several other vulnerable populations.204 The
funds under this program specifically focused on unauthorized migrants
and refugees, including about 34,000 victims/survivors per year who
were immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers.20 5
Finally, the U.N. Model Framework states that any legal framework
should recognize that unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims
are fundamentally different and more vulnerable, and that specific legal
provisions be enacted to guarantee the rights of immigrant women who
are victims of violence.20 6 It suggests that unauthorized migrant victims
should not be deported or subjected to other punitive actions related to
their immigration status when they report such violence to police or other
authorities, and that the system should permit immigrants to confidential-
ly apply for valid immigration status independent of their abuser.207 The
U.N. Model Framework goes further to suggest that an effective system
should acknowledge that "violence against women may constitute perse-
cution and that complainants/survivors of such violence should constitute
'a particular social group' for the purposes of asylum law." 20 8
B. Areas for Improvement
In Part II above, this Article detailed the provisions put in place
through VAWA as well as other measures that are in effect which ad-
dress the unique challenges that unauthorized migrants face. In many
respects, as has been detailed above, these provisions meet the U.N.
Model Framework recommendations. However, despite the success that
our system has experienced, critics have identified limitations.
First, there are fees associated with the filing of some immigration
petitions. While there are no fees associated with the filing of a VAWA
201. Id. at 10.
202. Id. at 196.
203. Id. at 197. For the period July 2009 through June 2011, the number of victims served that
received support in connection with immigration matters rose steadily, culminating in 618 victims
being served during the period January 2011 through June 2011. Id. at 200. Support was provided in
a range of immigration applications including VAWA Self-Petitioners, VAWA Cancellation of
Removal, U Visas, asylum, and others. Id.
204. Id. at 78.
205. Id. at 79.
206. U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 73, at 34 3.7.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 3 3.14 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Self-Petition, a U visa petition, an SIJS Petition, or an Application for
Asylum, Withholding of Removal, or Convention Against Torture, ad-
ministrative costs in some other types of applications can be significant.
The current cost to file an application for lawful permanent residence is,
at a minimum, $1070.209 A petition to remove conditions on residence
has a fee of $590.210 Moreover, the fee for filing VAWA Cancellation of
211Removal is $185. Unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims can
apply for a waiver of any fees associated with immigration applications
and petitions.
212
Second, under the U.S. legal framework, victims of domestic vio-
lence at the hands of U.S. and lawful permanent residents are able to
apply independently to legalize their status through a VAWA Self-
Petition, VAWA Cancellation of Removal, or a Self-Petition to Remove
Conditions on Lawful Permanent Residence.t 3 If successful, the victim
would not be subject to other punitive actions related to his or her immi-
214gration status. Moreover, the victim can apply for this relief confiden-
215tially. However, success in each of these three contexts requires a
demonstration of battery or extreme cruelty.216 This is a high standard to
meet. Furthermore, if the victim is subject to domestic violence by an
unauthorized migrant perpetrator who is neither a U.S. citizen nor a law-
ful permanent resident, the victim is not eligible to pursue these types of
relief.
217
Third, the domestic violence victim may pursue a U visa as a crime
victim. 218 However, success will require in part a demonstration to law
enforcement of helpfulness.219 A common concern about the U visa pro-
cess is this "helpfulness" certification requirement.220 Critics charge that
209. 1-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence of Adjust Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/i-485 (last updated Aug. 8, 2013). This fee includes the
cost of required biometrics fees. Id.
210. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PETITION TO REMOVE CONDITIONS ON RESIDENCE: USCIS FORM 1-751, at 4
(2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/defaultfiles/files/form/i-751instr.pdf. This fee in-
cludes the required biometrics fees. Id.
211. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, APPLICATION FOR
CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL AND ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS FOR CERTAIN NONPERMANENT
RESIDENTS: OMB#I 125-0001 (2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42b.pdf.
212. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET:
USCIS FEE WAIVER GUIDANCE (2004), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/FeeWaiver03_29_04.pdf.
213. See supra Part I.D. 1-6.
214. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 240A(b), 66 Stat.
163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2012)).
215. Id. § 245A(c)(5).
216. Id. § 240A(b)(2).
217. See supra Part I.D.I, 2, 6.
218. See supra Part .D.3.
219. See supra Part .D.3.
220. Jamie R. Abrams, The Dual Purposes of the U Visa Thwarted in a Legislative Duel, 29
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 373, 390, 396 (2010).
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this requirement has proven to be controversial in practice as individual
law enforcement entities are able to establish their own criteria for defin-
ing helpfulness.221 And, not surprisingly, the application of the definition
reflects the range of views and proclivities of the individual certifying
authorities.222 Law enforcement certification is issued at the discretion of
the individual law enforcement agency, and any such agency cannot be
compelled to issue such certification. Thus, differences in the policies
and procedures can lead to disparity in the issuance of certifications.223
Given that discretionary element and the lack of uniformity across juris-
dictions, an unauthorized migrant domestic violence victim may choose
not to seek redress.224
Fourth, an unauthorized migrant may pursue an application for asy-
lum. However, it is not enough to show just that the victim suffered
harm; he or she must also show that the harm was on account of mem-
bership of a cognizable social group or other protected ground.225 More-
over, if the victim is applying for asylum more than one year after arrival
in the United States, there is a heavy burden to prove that the delay was
caused by an exceptional circumstance or a change in conditions, such as
to excuse the delay. Generally, lack of knowledge about the filing dead-
line is not an excuse for failure to timely file as there is no exception in
226
the statute or the regulation for this purpose. Further, any argument
that there was a change in the domestic violence victim's circumstances
or an extraordinary circumstance that was directly related to the failure to
timely file and which the victim did not intentionally create through her
action or inaction, could be undercut by evidence of ongoing abuse that
predated the one-year period.227 In addition to these challenges, the ap-
plicant also needs to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
home government would not be supportive in protecting the victim, and
that the victim could not relocate to safety within the home country.228
Fifth, a claim to relief based on restriction on removal requires a
showing that it is more likely than not that the victim would be persecut-
ed on account of a cognizable social group.229 The burden is a heavy evi-
dentiary one that requires an unauthorized migrant to establish roughly a
230
51% likelihood of persecution if returned to one's home country. A
221. Id. at 396.
222. Id. at 395.
223. Id. at 395-96.
224. See id.
225. See Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 208(b)(1)(B)(i),
66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § I 158(b)(I)(B)(i) (2012)).
226. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE: DENYING PROTECTION TO THE
PERSECUTED AND UNDERMINING GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY 4-5 (2010), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/afd.pdf.
227. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A), (a)(5) (2013).
228. Id. § 208.13(b)(3).
229. See supra notes 144-46.
230. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(iii) (2013).
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claim under the Convention Against Torture is even more tenuous be-
cause success would require a demonstration, in part, that a public offi-
cial in the home government acquiesced in the domestic violence that
must meet the federal definition of torture, and thereafter breached his or
her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.
231
Sixth, individuals who meet the federal definition of juvenile can
seek Special Immigrant Juvenile Status.232 However, the process is
lengthy, involving multiple state and federal government agencies that
can be daunting to a juvenile.233 Moreover, juveniles do not have a right
to government-provided legal representation in pursuing federal immi-
gration benefits.234 Given their age, this cumbersome process can be par-
ticularly daunting considering that: (a) a guardianship must be estab-
lished at the state government level; (b) a state juvenile court must make
a series of findings about dependency and neglect; and (c) an application
must be submitted to USCIS requesting both SIJS status and lawful per-
manent residence.
235
Finally, prosecutorial discretion is available at the discretion of the
DHS. Implicit in any discretionary determination is a measure of uncer-
tainty, which can impact an unauthorized migrant's decision to seek it.
236
In sum, the United States has in place a wide variety of measures
designed to support domestic violence victims. Nevertheless, varying
levels of uncertainty are inherent in each. This uncertainty can hinder an
unauthorized migrant domestic violence victim's decision to seek assis-
tance.
III. FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PROTECTIONS
A. Statutory Protections
In Colorado, government officials and non-governmental entities
have been working to improve and refine domestic violence laws for
more than twenty years. The trend started in 1994, immediately follow-
ing the enactment of VAWA, when the Colorado General Assembly vot-
ed to strengthen civil and criminal laws and procedures to protect victims
231. Id. § 208.18(a)(7) (2013).
232. See supra notes 150-52.
233. See CENTER FOR HUM. RTS. & CONST. L., SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE STATUS
MANUAL 38-54, available at http://immigrantchildren.org/documents/FinalManual.pdf (last visited
May 24, 2004).
234. See Safe Passage Immigration Project, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: A Step-by-Step
Guide for the Safe Passage Immigration Project: Volunteer Attorneys, JUST. ACTION CENTER
N.Y.L. ScH. 4, http:// http://www.safepassageproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/1l /Safe-Passage-
SIJS-Manual.current-as-of-I 1.02.13.pdf (last updated Nov. 2, 2013).
235. CENTER FOR HUM. RTS. & CONST. L., supra note 233, at 39-44.
236. KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42924, PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2013).
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of domestic violence, including codifying amplified domestic abuse pro-
tections in the form of issuance and enforcement of restraining orders.237
The enabling legislation, known as the Victim Rights Act, became effec-
238
tive in January of 1995. The Victim Rights Act provides victims of
crime an active role in the criminal justice process.239 This system of
rights applies to all victims regardless of their immigration status in the
United States.
Colorado Revised Statute 18-6-800.3 defines domestic violence as
an act or threatened act of violence upon a person with whom the ac-
tor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship. 'Domestic vio-
lence' also includes any other crime against a person, or against
property, including an animal, or any municipal ordinance violation
against a person, or against property, including an animal, when used
as a method of coercion, control, punishment, intimidation, or re-
venge directed against a person with whom the actor is or has been
involved in an intimate relationship.
240
The Colorado Revised Statutes further define an intimate relation-
ship as "a relationship between spouses, former spouses, past or present
unmarried couples, or persons who are both the parents of the same child
regardless of whether the persons have been married or have lived to-
gether at any time."241 As recently as the 2013 legislative session, the
Colorado General Assembly continued in its efforts to further strengthen
protections for domestic violence victims, and it recently approved a law
that requires abusers who are subject to a qualifying protection order or
convicted of a qualifying crime involving domestic violence to surrender
their firearms.
242
Over the past twenty years, domestic violence cases prosecuted in
Colorado county courts have been increasing dramatically. For the period
2006 to 2008, the number of domestic violence convictions in the county
courts alone reached 14,000 misdemeanor domestic violence convic-
tions, and excluding municipal violations, represents 22 percent of the
county courts' dockets.24 3
237. See H.B. 94-1090, 59th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1994); Melody K. Fuller & Janet
L. Stansberry, 1994 Legislature Strengthens Domestic Violence Protection Orders, 23 COLO. LAW.
2327, 2327 (1994). In adopting this legislation, Colorado joined a nationwide movement of imple-
menting "mandatory arrest" statutes. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for
the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1657, 1670 (intemal quotation marks
omitted).
238. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-301 to -304 (2013).
239. Id.
240. Id. § 18-6-800.3(1).
241. Id. § 18-6-800.3(2).
242. S.B. 13-197, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013).
243. Colorado Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Fact Sheet: Domestic Violence,
http://www.ccadv.org/media/documents/DV%20Fact%20Sheet%202012(1).pdf (last visited Oct. 1,
2013).
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B. Pro- Victim Focus
Colorado's domestic violence laws and protections apply to all in-
dividuals present in the state, whether legally present or not. Moreover,
by comparison to other states, the laws can be described as pro-victim
and are more stringent than those of many other states.244 Across the na-
tion, we are seeing some states enacting statutes that require mandatory
arrest when there is probable cause to believe that an act of domestic
violence has been committed or there is a violation of a protective order.
In other states, arrest in the domestic violence context is at the officer's
245discretion. In Colorado, there is a mandatory arrest policy stating an
officer shall arrest when there is probable cause to believe that a crime
involving domestic violence was committed.246 Thus, by comparison to
other states, Colorado's protections are considered pro-arrest/pro-victim
laws.247 When an officer encounters a law enforcement scenario in which
both parties mutually accuse one another of violence, the officer is not
required to arrest both parties, but can do so at his or her discretion.
C. State and Federally Funded Community Service Programs
For the past two decades, the Colorado Department of Human Ser-
vices, Office of Children, Youth, and Families, Domestic Violence Pro-
gram (DVP) has been working to ensure that domestic violence issues
are addressed adequately in the delivery of human services in the state.248
Their activities include providing resources and funding to domestic vio-
lence crisis centers throughout the state, developing effective collabora-
tions with other state and county offices, as well as with non-profit and
community groups to support domestic violence victims. 249 With a grant
budget of about $3 million annually in revenue from five state-funding
244. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2013); ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST POLICIES BY STATE (2011), available at
http://search.americanbar.org/search?q=domestic+violence+arrest+policies+by+state&client=default
frontend&proxystylesheet=default-frontend&site default collection&output=xml no dtd&oe=UT
F-8&ie=UTF-8&ud=l (follow link to first search result entitled Domestic Violence Arrest Policies
by State).
245. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 244. The ABA Report assembled
the domestic violence arrest statutes in force at that time, and concluded that 23 states employ a
discretionary arrest policy, where police officers may arrest a person in a domestic violence context.
Id. In 18 of the states and the District of Columbia, there is a mandatory arrest policy. Id. In the
remaining nine states, there is often a pro-arrest policy where arrest is considered the "preferred"
action, and/or certain conditions are delineated in which arrest is considered mandatory, such as
where there has been an infliction of physical injury, threatened use of a deadly weapon, and/or a
violation of a restraining order. Id.
246. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.6 (2013).
247. See ABA COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 244.
248. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROGRAM: OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH, & FAMILIES, COLO.
DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2012), available at
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey-id
&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251885459376&ssbinary-true.
249. ld. at 1.
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sources, DVP provides leadership, guidance, and awareness within gov-
ernment agencies and oversees grant-funded programs.
DVP issues an annual report in which it provides comprehensive in-
formation on the state's efforts to support programs addressing domestic
violence.2 5' This report reflects that the state provides support for a wide
variety of programs, including advocacy support to victims with immi-
gration issues, community education, and assistance to law enforce-
ment. 2 In 2012, DVP administered funds to forty-four domestic vio-
lence crises centers throughout the state, which provide crises interven-
tion, advocacy, and other support services for victims, as well as provide
education aimed at prevention in local communities. The crises centers
addressed more than 63,000 calls, and served more than 26,000 victims
and their dependents.25 3 Many of the crisis centers provide legal advoca-
- 254cy, and some do so specifically for immigration.
In addition, OVW funds a variety of programs in Colorado on a bi-
yearly basis. In 2012, OVW granted state agencies and non-profits serv-
ing the Colorado community $6,437,596.255 Historically, the largest grant
awarded is to the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice (CDCJ) in Den-
ver as a Services, Training, Officers, and Prosecutors Violence Against
Women (STOP) grant.256 In 2012, CDCJ was awarded $2,228,188 to be
administered and distributed through the CDCJ Crime Victim Services
Advisory Board. 7 According to the CDCJ's 2010 annual report con-
cerning the expenditures of STOP grant funds, white females between
the ages of twenty-five and fifty-nine were most likely to comprise the
7,662 victims served during 2010.258 By far, the second largest ethnicity
250. Id at 22.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. Id. at 9.
254. Legal Advocacy Services, COLO. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://ccadv.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/1 l DV-Fact-Sheet-2012.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
255. Office on Violence Against Women, FY 2012 OVW Grant Awards by State: Colorado,
U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/grant2012.htm#co (last updated Nov. 2013) [hereinaf-
ter FY 2012 OVW Grant Awards by State: Colorado]. In 2012, OVW grants to Colorado state and
local governments, as well as Colorado organizations, represented 1.6 percent of the Office on
Violence Against Women grant awards for that year. See id. The following table provides data on







Office on Violence Against Women, Awards: Grant Awards by State, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/grantactivities.htm (last updated Feb. 2014) [hereinafter OVW, Grant
A wards by State].
256. See OVW, Grant Awards by State, supra note 255.
257. FY 2012 OVW Grant Awards by State: Colorado, supra note 255.
258. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS INITIATIVE, COLO. Div. OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN FORMULA GRANTS 6 (2011) [hereinafter
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served were Latinos at 29.9%.259 In total, 428 individuals were classified
as immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers, representing 5% of the indi-
viduals receiving services.260 The statistics reported in 2010 did not differ
markedly from those presented above for 2011, except that fewer immi-
grants, refugees, or asylum seekers received services. 26 CDCJ reported
that 260 individuals, representing 3.4% of the victims served, were clas-
sified as immigrants, refugees, or asylum seekers.262
The remainder of the amount awarded by OVW in 2012 was to
eleven Colorado agencies and organizations in amounts ranging from
about $80,000, awarded to the Colorado Coalition on Domestic Vio-
lence, to about $837,000, awarded to the Denver Division of Criminal
Justice to encourage arrest policies and enforcement of protection orders
program.263 These programs were classified as the following types of
programs: state coalitions, sexual assault services, transitional housing,
arrest, safe haven, technical assistance, and rural.2 4
An important development in Colorado was the creation of a Do-
mestic Violence Benchbook for use by members of the legal community
who handle cases involving domestic violence.265 Developed in concert
with judges, lawyers, and advocates as well as the Family Violence Pro-
gram of the Colorado Bar Association, the Benchbook devotes an entire
chapter to discussing immigration options for domestic violence vic-
tims.
266
D. Unauthorized Migrant Victims in Colorado
In the United States, studies have shown that foreign-born individu-
als present in the United States suffer a higher incidence of domestic
267violence. Moreover, individuals from specific nationalities are particu-
larly affected. Among these, women of Hispanic origin are reputed to
suffer some of the greatest levels of domestic violence, with 48% report-
ing that their partner's violence against them had increased after emigrat-
ing to the United States.268 These statistics are concerning for the state of




261. STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN GRANTS, supra note 258, at 6.
262. Id.
263. FY 2012 OVW Grant Awards by State: Colorado, supra note 255.
264. Id.
265. Colorado Domestic Violence Benchbook, COLO. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.cobar.org/repository/DV%20Benchbook%2OFinal%20 10_2011 .pdf (last visited May 11,
2014).
266. Id. atch. 12.
267. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, FEMICIDE IN NEW YORK CITY:
1995-2002, at 5 (2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/ip/femicide 1995-
2002_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 1,2013).
268. Dutton et al., supra note 61, at 250, Moreover, married immigrant women experience
higher levels of physical and sexual abuse than unmarried immigrant women, 59.5 percent compared
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Colorado, where the foreign-born population residing in the state be-
tween 2008 and 2012 reached 9.7 percent, and in 2012, 21 percent of the
population was Hispanic.269 Given the high percentage of foreign-born
Latinas in Colorado, the number of unauthorized migrant domestic vio-
lence victims could be statistically significant.270
Other states have observed this tendency. In a 2000 study, 48% of
Latinas reported that their partner's violence against them had increased
since they immigrated to the United States.27' A study focused on unau-
thorized migrants in New York City found that 51% of intimate partner
homicide victims were foreign-born.27 2 A similar national study demon-
strated that married unauthorized migrant women experienced higher
levels of physical and sexual abuse compared to unmarried unauthorized
migrant women at 59.5% compared to 49.8%, respectively.
273
Yet, even with a variety of important rights secured through the
Victim Rights Act, in the context of unauthorized migrants, a critical
aspect in the decision to come forward to seek help from law enforce-
ment has been reported to be whether, by doing so, a victim will be re-
ferred to ICE for prior immigration violations.274
Colorado's recent history on ICE referrals in the context of domes-
tic violence victims has been varied. In 2006, the Colorado State Legisla-
ture passed Senate Bill 90 (SB 90) requiring police officers to report sus-
pected undocumented foreigners who are arrested on a criminal offense
to ICE.27' Later, Colorado entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
to 49.8 percent, respectively. Id. at 259; see also The Facts on Immigrant Women and Domestic
Violence, FUTURES WITHOUT
VIOLENCE, http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Children and Families/Immigrant.p
df (last visited May 12, 2014).
269. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A DESCRIPTION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION: AN
UPDATE 16-17 (2011), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/08000.html. Mexican
citizens comprise 62 percent of immigrants present in the United States illegally, and another 24
percent are from other Latin American countries. Id. The population is predominantly of working
age with 71 percent estimated to be between the ages of 25 and 54. Id. The DHS reports that in 2009,
about 4 percent of the total U.S. population of 307 million consisted of unauthorized migrants. Id.
Three quarters of them reside in 10 states, mostly on the East and West Coasts of the United States.
Id.
270. There are about five million people living in Colorado, of which 9.9 percent are estimated
to be foreign-bom individuals. Id. at 11.
271. Dutton et al., supra note 61, at 250.
272. N.Y.C. DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 267, at 5 tbl.3.
273. Dutton et al., supra note 61, at 259; see also The Facts on Immigrant Women and Domes-
tic Violence, supra note 268.
274. See NATALIA LEE ET AL., NAT'L IMMIGRANT WOMEN'S ADVOCACY PROJECT, AM. UNIV.
WASH. COLL. OF LAW, NATIONAL SURVEY OF SERVICE PROVIDERS ON POLICE RESPONSE TO
IMMIGRANT CRIME VICTIMS, U VISA CERTIFICATION AND LANGUAGE ACCESS 39 (2013), available
at http://www.niwap.org/reports/Police-Response-U-Visas-Language-Access-Report-4.6.13.pdf;
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, AND COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 3
(2011) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT], available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure-communities-moa/colorado-sc-moa.pdf.
275. S.B. 06-090, 65th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006).
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(the ICE-Colorado MOA) with ICE to have state and local law enforce-
ment officers voluntarily check the fingerprints of every person booked
by law enforcement officers against a DHS database for immigration
violations.276 Critics advanced concerns about the impact that it would
have on domestic violence victims.
77
In August 2011, the concerns about the ICE-Colorado MOA was
rendered moot because ICE terminated its MOAs with all states, includ-
ing Colorado, stating that the MOAs were not necessary and that ICE
would continue to expand the program unilaterally.278 DHS clarified that
all jurisdictions would be required to participate in Secure Communities
by 2013.279 In the midst of mounting concerns, a series of public officials
and community stakeholders charged that it would severely impact the
willingness of domestic violence victims to come forward and seek law
enforcement help.280 The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC)
composed of leaders from state and local government, first responder
agencies, the private sector, and academia, provides advice and recom-
mendations to the Secretary on matters related to homeland security.
281
The HSAC convened a task force to address concerns about Secure
Communities.282 Created as a subcommittee of the HSAC, the so-called
Task Force on Secure Communities issued a report of its findings and
recommendations in September 2011 (Task Force Findings and Recom-
mendations Report).283 The Task Force Findings and Recommendations
Report identified five areas of concern, specifically identifying that the
Secure Communities program had had unintended consequences, includ-
ing: (1) Disruption of relations between law enforcement and the com-
munities they serve; (2) The possible increase in the levels of crime ris-
ing out of victim's fears about the consequences of reporting; and (3)
276. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 274, at 2.




278. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE RESPONSE TO THE TASK FORCE ON
SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3-4 (2012) [hereinafter ICE RESPONSE
TO TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/hsac-sc-
taskforce-report.pdf, ICE, Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/secure communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited May 12, 2014).
279. RIAH RAMLOGAN, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, MEMORANDUM:
SECURE COMMUNITIES - MANDATORY IN 2013, at 1 (2010), available at
http://images.politico.com/global/2012/01/icefoiaoptoutdocs.pdf.
280. COLO. IMMIGRANT RIGHTS COAL., SECURE COMMUNITIES - POSITIONS BY ELECTED
OFFICIALS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS & COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS
(2011), available at
http://www.leg.state.co.us/Clics/Clics201 I A/commsumm.nsf/b4a3962433b52fa787256e5f00670a7 I
/c 74e95285f39e52872578370070a27e/$FILE/0214HseLocalAttachG.pdf.
281. HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, TASK FORCE ON SECURE COMMUNITIES: FINDINGS
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The possible reduction in public safety.284 Furthermore, the Task Force
Findings and Recommendations Report stated that "[e]very effort must
be made to ensure that crime victims and witnesses, particularly in do-
mestic violence cases, are protected against unwarranted immigration
enforcement actions, as outlined in Director Morton's June 17, 2011
memo."285 The Task Force Findings and Recommendations Report fur-
ther recommended that ICE "[e]nsure that protections exist for crime
victims and witnesses, and victims of domestic violence. Much of the
fear within immigrant communities stems from concerns that immigrants
are putting themselves or their family members in danger of deportation
if they contact authorities to report crimes as victims or witnesses.,
286
This national report further hailed ICE's work with Colorado to monitor
the consequences of the Secure Communities policies around the state as
a national prototype for determining if Secure Communities were suc-
cessfully targeting law enforcement's high-priority criminals.2 87
In April 2012, ICE issued its response in the so-called ICE Re-
sponse to the Task Force on Secure Communities Findings and Recom-
mendations report. 28 In it, ICE reiterated that it "is against ICE policy to
initiate removal proceedings against an individual known to be the im-
mediate victim or witness to a crime, absent special circumstances," and
it "direct[ed] all ICE officers, special agents, and attorneys to exercise
appropriate discretion to ensure that victims of and witnesses to crimes
and individuals involved in non-frivolous efforts related to the protection
of their civil rights and liberties are not penalized by removal.289 ICE
also reported that it was developing training tools to help law enforce-
ment officers better identify vulnerable victims, better assist prosecutors
in handling victim-related cases, and offer better protection to victims in
those cases.290 Finally, ICE declined to support further implementation of
federal-state joint monitoring of enforcement actions related to Secure
Communities, arguing that "[immigration enforcement is a federal law
enforcement function, and Secure Communities stems from a congres-
sionally mandated information sharing partnership between two federal
agencies," and that it "would be unduly burdensome.2 91
With this period of upheaval as a backdrop, in its Spring 2013 legis-
lative session, the Colorado State Legislature passed the Community and
Law Enforcement Trust Act, effectively repealing SB-90 which had im-
posed a state-level mandatory reporting requirement regarding suspected
284. ld. at 24.
285. ld. at 26 (emphasis added).
286. Id. at 24.
287. Id. at 21; Nancy Lofholm, Colorado's Pact with ICE Becoming National Template, DENV.
POST, Aug. 13, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_18673491.
288. ICE RESPONSE TO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 278.
289. Id. at 15.
290. Id. at 15-16.
291. Id at 13.
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unauthorized migrants.292 However, the federal policies discussed above
remain in place, and some have argued that these policies do not go far
enough in protecting unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims.
293
IV. COLORADO'S ROAD FORWARD
Unauthorized migrant domestic violence victims have been identi-
fied internationally, federally, and at the Colorado state level, as a partic-
ularly vulnerable victim population. Their language and cultural barriers
are compounded by fear associated with their precarious immigration
status, which can hinder their desire to seek support. The federal gov-
ernment and its Colorado counterpart have a strong record of action over
the past twenty years, in trying to improve and refine domestic violence
laws and to provide support for this group.
The U.N. Model Framework recommends that unauthorized migrant
victims of domestic violence should be able to self-petition for immigra-
tion relief, based on the domestic violence itself, and receive temporary
legal status based on the support they provide to law enforcement in
prosecuting the criminal conduct.2 94 Not only is this relief available, but
also stakeholders in the Colorado legal community have detailed and up-
to-date information about these types of relief, as they are included with-
in the Colorado Domestic Violence Benchbook. In addition, Colorado
has sophisticated systems in place to provide advocacy support for needy
victims.
Colorado's domestic violence law enforcement systems are pro-
arrest/pro-victim. In substance and in practice, the model recognizes the
seriousness of domestic violence as an offense, as is recommended by
the U.N. Model Framework. Moreover, the state has allocated substantial
funds to train police, prosecutors, judges, and supported collaborations
with non-profit groups on how best to support survivors of domestic vio-
lence.
However, there are a number of factors endemic to the system that
may be impacting the extent to which unauthorized migrants are seeking
help. First, financial support for programs that assist this population has
diminished. This year, Americans witnessed a political battle in the U.S.
Congress about what direction the United States should take in the fight
against domestic violence.295 With VAWA funding up for renewal, Con-
gressional leaders had significant concerns about how much funding to
292. H.B. 13-1258, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013).
293. See Another Missed Opportunity: How the Long-Awaited S-Comm "Reforms" Are De-
signed to Fail, NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CENTER (May 2012), http://www.nilc.org/scommresponse.html.
294. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, supra note 73, at 2-3.
295. Norma Espinosa, The Fight to Reauthorize the Violence Against Women Act: Protecting
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allocate for support prevention and protection policies, as well as wheth-
er to support domestic violence protections in the same-sex relationship
context and on tribal lands.296 While they ultimately did reach an agree-
ment, critics point out that funding levels represent a 17% decrease from
2005 funding levels, and that it took more than two years for Congress to
ultimately agree on a compromise during which there was no funding for
297
these programs.
Second, there is wide degree of uncertainty that is associated with
immigration referrals by state law enforcement as well as in the chal-
lenge of meeting the high burdens associated with applying for federal
immigration relief. Given the high stakes surrounding these decisions
that victims must navigate, reluctance to seek help seems inevitable.
U.S. Census data reflects that 9.7% of the Colorado population is
foreign born.298 Of that group, the vast majority are Hispanic, who seek
help less often.299 Given the population estimates and research about the
prevalence of domestic violence in the Hispanic community, it is possi-
ble that the number of potentially affected individuals is significantly
greater than what has been addressed through existing support systems.
In the coming years, we will have more data from which to assess
whether the current system is meeting the needs of an increasing number
of unauthorized migrants than it has been able to support over the past
two decades.
296. See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. E217-03 (Feb. 28, 2013) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee
in support of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013).
297. See Senate Judiciary Comm. Majority Staff, Why the Violence Against Women Act Mat-
ters, http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/042612VAWA-WhyVAWAMatters-OnePager.pdf
(last visited May 12, 2014).
298. MIGRATION POL'Y INST., supra note 17.
299. Dutton et al., supra note 61.

PEERING INTO THE CORPORATE SOUL: HOBBYLOBBY
STORES, INC. V. SEBELIUS AND How FOR-PROFIT
CORPORATIONS EXERCISE RELIGION
ABSTRACT
Amidst the storm of legal challenges to the Affordable Care Act and
its contraceptive mandate, religious business owners have unearthed an
entirely novel question of constitutional law: are for-profit corporations
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause? The answer to this contentious question raises issues involving
several fundamental areas of law, such as of statutory interpretation, cor-
porate structure and governance, and First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Circuit Courts of Appeals are split over how to answer it, and recent-
ly the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve it. In Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, the Tenth Circuit held that for-profit corporations
are entitled to free exercise rights. Its opinion articulates the one of the
most detailed and thorough analyses on this issue, which will likely play
a significant role in the Supreme Court's decision.
This Comment argues that he majority opinion in Hobby Lobby cor-
rectly held that for-profit corporations are capable of exercising religion
and are entitled to free exercise rights. However, the Comment contends
that the majority failed to adequately distinguish between the religious
exercise of the corporation and its constituents, and it proposes a test to
assist courts in identifying a corporation's religious beliefs.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) l and
contraceptive mandate2 promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has prompted a flurry of challenges and litiga-
tion from both religious and nonreligious entities alike.3 These challeng-
ers allege that the contraceptive mandate forces them to violate their sin-
cerely held religious belief that life begins at conception.4 They believe
that providing contraceptives that act as abortifacients, such as Plan B
and Ella, is a sin.5 After HHS adopted the contraceptive mandate, it es-
tablished several exemptions for "religious employers" but did not ex-
6tend an exemption to for-profit corporations.
As a result, the ACA and contraceptive mandate have unearthed an
entirely novel question in constitutional law: whether for-profit corpora-
tions and entities can exercise religion and thus receive the protection of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Free Exercise
Clause.7 Not only is this issue novel, but the circuits are currently split
regarding how to resolve it.
8
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius9 is the Tenth Circuit's inter-
pretation of this issue and is currently one of the most thorough analyses
supporting the claim that for-profit corporations are: (1) capable of exer-
cising religion and (2) entitled to protection under RFRA and the Free
Exercise Clause.10 Sitting en banc, the Tenth Circuit delivered an opinion
1. 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
2. See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(l)(iv)(A) (2013).
3. During the publication of this Comment, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and deliv-
ered an opinion on June 30, 2014. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
However, the information in this Comment focuses on the Tenth Circuit opinion and is current as of
February 24, 2014.
4. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
5. See, e.g., id.
6. Id. at 1123-24.
7. See, e.g., id. at 1120-21.
8. See Jonathan T. Tan, Comment, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and
the HHS Mandate: Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA 's Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV.
1301, 1332 (2013).
9. 723 F.3d 1114(1Oth Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
10. Id. at 1]29.
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in Hobby Lobby that provides an in-depth analysis of the proper statutory
interpretation of RFRA, the constitutional free exercise precedent, and
the basic law of corporations."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in November 201312 and will
likely release a decision in June 2014. Based on the Court's controversial
decision Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission3 in 2010,
which expanded corporations' First Amendment free speech rights, there
is a strong possibility that the Court will affirm the Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion.'4
This Comment provides a detailed analysis of Hobby Lobby and as-
sociated decisions, and ultimately concludes that the majority opinion in
Hobby Lobby correctly decided that for-profit corporations are entitled to
free exercise rights. However, it asserts that the majority opinion failed
to adequately distinguish between the religious beliefs of the corporation
and the beliefs of its constituents. In order for the corporation to receive
free exercise protection and for courts to uphold the fundamentals of
corporate law, it is imperative that courts identify which religious beliefs
and actions belong to the corporation and which beliefs belong to the
individuals who own and operate them. Finally, this Comment proposes
a test, based on the basic tenets of corporate law, for identifying a corpo-
ration's religious beliefs.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Free Exercise Clause, Smith, and RFRA
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."'15 The Free Exercise Clause pro-
tects religious beliefs and the exercise thereof and prohibits the govern-
ment from regulating or coercing action contrary to those beliefs. 16 This
protection extends to individuals 7 as well as organizations, corporations,
and associations that exercise religion.'
8
11. See generally id. at 1129-46.
12. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
13. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
14. However, the Supreme Court also granted certiorari to hear Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir.
2013), a Third Circuit case, and consolidated the appeals. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). In Conestoga, the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the government.
724 F.3d at 417. Consequently, it remains unclear how the Court will resolve this issue.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. GEORGE BLUM ET AL., 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 443 (2013).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982) (addressing whether payment of
Social Security tax for employees substantially burdens an individual Amish employer's religious
beliefs).
18. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423
(2006) (affirming claim brought by a religious entity on its own behalt).
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Prior to 1990 and the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Di-
vision v. Smith,'9 the Court reviewed free exercise claims with strict scru-
tiny: if the plaintiff proved that the government law or regulation sub-
stantially burdened its sincere religious belief, the burden shifted to the
government to demonstrate a compelling state interest for the law.
20
However, Smith overruled the "compelling interest" test and held that "a
valid and neutral law of general applicability" is sufficiently constitu-
tional, even if it burdens a sincere religious belief.
2z
In response to the Smith decision, Congress enacted RFRA in
1993.22 RFRA restored the compelling interest test, stating:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of re-
ligion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability
... [unless] it demonstrates that application of the burden to the per-
son-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling govemmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
23
Thus, if a plaintiff proves that the government substantially bur-
dened the exercise of a person's sincere religious belief, RFRA shifts the
burden of proof to the government to establish that its action furthers a
compelling government interest using the least restrictive means. Signifi-
cantly, RFRA does not define the word "person.24
B. For-Profit Corporations and First Amendment Jurisprudence
The enactment of the ACA and the HHS contraceptive mandate
prompted the circuit courts of appeals to address a novel issue: whether
for-profit corporations have First Amendment free exercise rights.25 Alt-
hough the Supreme Court had not addressed this issue until it granted
26certiorari in this case, it has extended First Amendment free speech
rights to for-profit corporations in the past.
One of the foundational cases establishing corporate free speech
rights is First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.2 7 The corporations in
19. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as recognized in Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).
20. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012) (finding that RFRA's enactment responded to the Smith
decision and intended "to restore the compelling interest test" in Sherbert); see also Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b) (2012).
24. Id. § 2000bb-2.
25. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (Sotomayor, Circuit
Justice 2012) ("This Court has not previously addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims
brought by closely held for-profit corporations and their controlling shareholders alleging that the
mandatory provision of certain employee benefits ubstantially burdens their exercise of religion.").
26. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
27. 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978).
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Bellotti wanted to publish their opposition to a proposed amendment to
the state constitution imposing a heightened personal income tax.28 How-
ever, a Massachusetts criminal statute prohibited corporations from mak-
ing expenditures to influence a vote that did not materially affect the
corporation's business.29 The corporations challenged the statute, arguing
that it impermissibly infringed upon their free speech rights.30 The Su-
preme Court held that the Massachusetts criminal statute was unconstitu-
tional.3' The majority ruled:
The court below framed the principal question in this case as
whether and to what extent corporations have First Amendment
rights. We believe that the court posed the wrong question. The Con-
stitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seek-
ing their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves sig-
nificant societal interests. The proper question therefore is not wheth-
er corporations "have" First Amendment rights and, if so, whether
they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the ques-
tion must be whether [the challenged statute] abridges expression that
the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.
32
Because the purpose of the Free Speech Clause is not dependent on the
identity of the speaker, the Court held that a restriction on speech based
solely on the speaker's corporate identity was unconstitutional.33
The Court acknowledged that the rights and liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution are not automatically guaranteed to corporations.34 To
determine whether a particular constitutional guarantee applies to corpo-
rations, the Court created the "purely personal" test.35 The Court first
articulated this test in a footnote in Bellotti, stating that "[c]ertain 'purely
personal' guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations .... Whether or
not a particular guarantee is 'purely personal' or is unavailable to corpo-
rations for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose
of the particular constitutional provision."36 In Bellotti, the Court held
that corporations are entitled to free speech rights because the purpose of
those rights is to afford the general "public access to discussion, debate,
and the dissemination of information and ideas," as well as to encourage
individual free speech.37 Therefore, the identity of the speaker is irrele-
28. Id. at 769.
29. Id. at 767-68.
30. Id. at 770.
31. Id. at 776.
32. Id. at 775-76.
33. Id. at 777-78, 784-85.
34. Id. at 778 (stating that "corporations 'cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees' (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925))).
35. See id at 778 n.14.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 783.
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vant to the purpose of free speech rights; in other words, the rights are
not purely personal.
In 2010, the Supreme Court reaffirmed corporate free speech rights
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.38 Citizens United
centered on campaign and political expenditures.39 The Citizens United
court examined the reasoning in prior precedent, which held that because
a corporate entity is not a natural person and has been granted "special
advantages-such as limited liability [and] perpetual life," it has there-
fore given up its First Amendment rights.40 However, relying on Bellotti,
the Citizens United Court "rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations hould be treated differently under the
First Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural per-
sons."'4 1 The Court's decision in Citizens United played a significant role
in the Hobby Lobby majority decision, as it formed the Tenth Circuit's
basis for recognizing corporate free exercise rights under the First
Amendment.4 2 Like the Citizens United Court, the Hobby Lobby court
rejected the government's argument that by using the corporate form, the
corporate plaintiffs gave up First Amendment free exercise rights.43
C. Circuit Court Treatment of For-Profit Corporations' RFRA Challeng-
es
Six circuit courts of appeals have considered for-profit corpora-
tions' RFRA challenges to the ACA contraceptive mandate, and so far
the circuits are split.44 The Third and Sixth Circuits have affirmed the
trial courts' decisions to deny the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary
injunction, holding that the corporate and individual plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.45 However, the Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits reversed the district courts' denials and found
that the corporate plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on
38. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43 (2010).
39. See id at 318-20.
40. Id. at 350-51 (quoting Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59
(1990)).
41. Id. at 343 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776).
42. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Because
Hobby Lobby and Mardel express themselves for religious purposes, the First Amendment logic of
Citizens United, where the Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right of for-profit
corporations to express themselves for political purposes, applies as well. We see no reason the
Supreme Court would recognize constitutional protection for a corporation's political expression but
not its religious expression." (citation omitted)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
43. Id. at 1135.
44. See generally Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2013); Hobby Lobby, 723
F.3d at 1120-21; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 380-81 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Autocam Corp. v.
Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 2013); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733
F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Annex Med., Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025,
at *1, *3 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013).
45. See, e.g., Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 388-89; Autocam, 730 F.3d at 625-26, 628.
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the merits.46 Finally, the D.C. Circuit held that the corporate plaintiff
failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its RFRA and free exer-
cise claims.47 However, the D.C. Circuit granted the injunction on the
grounds that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the indi-
vidual plaintiffs' religious beliefs.48 Finally, the Eighth Circuit granted
the injunction pending appeal without discussion.49
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of United States
Department of Health & Human Services50 reached the opposite conclu-
sion of Hobby Lobby. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Con-
estoga case and consolidated the appeal with Hobby Lobby.5 Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. (Conestoga) is a closely held corporation that
manufactures wood cabinets and employs 950 employees.52 The Hahn
family owns all "of the voting shares of Conestoga.' '53 "The Hahns prac-
tice the Mennonite religion" and believe that the "taking of life which
includes anything that terminates a fertilized embryo is intrinsic evil and
a sin against God .... ',' The plaintiffs offered two theories on the cor-
poration's entitlement to free exercise rights: (1) directly, based on Citi-
zens United or (2) under a "pass through" theory, where the sharehold-
ers' beliefs pass through to the corporation.55 The plaintiffs' pass through
theory is based on the Ninth Circuit's decisions in EEOC v. Townley
Engineering & Manufacturing Co.
56 and Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky,
57
which held "that for-profit corporations can assert the free exercise
claims of their owners.
58
The Conestoga court rejected both theories.59 It determined that for-
profit corporations are not entitled to free exercise protection because the
right to free exercise of religion is a purely personal right and Free Exer-
cise Clause jurisprudence has never recognized such a right for for-profit
corporations.60 The court distinguished the case from Citizens United.61 It
held that Citizens United was supported by a long line of case law, which
affirmed that the right to free speech was not a purely personal right.
62
46. See, e.g.,Korte, 735 F.3dat682, 687;Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3dat 1121, 1147.
47. See generally Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215, 1224.
48. Id. at 1216, 1224.
49. Annex Med., 2013 WL 1276025, at *3; O'Brien v. U.S. Health & Human Servs., No. 12-
3357, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26633, at *4 (8th Cir. Nov. 28, 2012).
50. 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
51. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 134
S. Ct. 678 (2013).
52. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 381-82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 387.
56. 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
57. 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
58. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 386-87.
59. Id. at 387-88.
60. Id. at 384-85.
61. Id. at 384-86.
62. Id. at 383-84.
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The court also pointed out that the Free Speech Clause and the Free Ex-
ercise Clause have always been interpreted independently.63 Finally, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' pass through theory, holding that the Town-
ley and Stormans decisions disregarded "the very nature of the corporate
form," which is a "distinct legal entity ... from those of the natural indi-
viduals who" incorporated it. 64 The court could not find a reason to ig-
nore that distinction.65 Having rejected both the direct and pass through
theories, the Conestoga court held that the plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate a likelihood of success on the merits of their RFRA and free exer-
cise claims.
66
The Sixth Circuit adopted the Conestoga court's reasoning in Auto-
cam Corp. v. Sebelius67 and Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius.68 Autocam
Corporation and Autocam Medical, LLC (collectively Autocam) are
closely held for-profit corporations owned by the Kennedys, a Roman
Catholic family.69 Autocam manufactures products "for the automotive
and medical industries. '70 Eden Foods, Inc. (Eden) is a natural foods
corporation owned and operated by Michal Potter, also a Roman Catho-
lic. 71 Both the individual family-owners and their corporations chal-
72lenged the ACA contraceptive mandate. In both cases, the Sixth Circuit
held that the individual shareholder plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a
RFRA claim due to the corporation's distinct legal identity.73 The court
further held that the corporate plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood
of success on the merits because, according to the court's statutory inter-
pretation of RFRA, for-profit corporations are not persons under
RFRA . 4
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, held that for-profit corpora-
tions are persons under RFRA in the consolidated cases Korte v. Sebe-
Iius,75 and Grote v. Sebelius.76 K & L Contractors, a construction compa-
ny owned by the Korte family, and Grote Industries, a vehicle safety
manufacturing company owned by the Grote family, are closely held
corporations.77 Both families are Catholic and object to providing aborti-
63. Id. at 386.
64. Id. at 387 (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 388.
66. Id. at 389.
67. 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013).
68. Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2013); Autocam, 730 F.3d at
628.
69. Autocam, 730 F.3d at 620.
70. Id.
71. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 629.
72. Id. at 630; Autocam, 730 F.3d at 620.
73. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 632-33; Autocam, 730 F.3d at 622-23.
74. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 632; Autocam, 730 F.3d at 628.
75. 735 F.3d 654, 659, 682 (7th Cir. 2013).
76. Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 852 (7th Cir. 2013) (granting injunction pending appeal
and consolidating appeal with Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013)).
77. Korte, 735 F.3d at 662-63.
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facient contraceptives based on their Catholic beliefs.78 The Seventh Cir-
cuit held, "The government's proposed exclusion of secular, for-profit
corporations finds no support in the text or relevant context of RFRA or
any related statute.79
Finally, in Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Ser-
vices, the D.C. Circuit added yet another potential solution to the for-
profit corporation RFRA conundrum.81 The court held that the secular,
for-profit corporate plaintiffs, Freshway Foods and Freshway Logistics
(collectively Freshway), did not have a free exercise right because the
"'nature, history, and purpose' of the Free Exercise Clause ... militat[es]
against the discernment of such a right., 82 The court also refused to adopt
the Ninth Circuit pass through theory, although it found the argument
"logically and structurally appealing.,83 Yet, it did decide that the Gilardi
brothers who own Freshway demonstrated a likelihood of success on
their RFRA claim, and stated:
If the companies have no claim to enforce-and as nonreligious cor-
porations, they cannot engage in religious exercise-we are left with
the obvious conclusion: the right belongs to the Gilardis, existing in-
dependently of any right of the Freshway companies. Thus, the Gi-
lardis' injury-which arises therefrom-is "separate and distinct,"
providing us with an exception to the shareholder-standing rule.
84
Freshway is the entity that is required to comply with the contraceptive
mandate, not the Gilardis.85 Therefore the direct injury, either financial or
moral, is to the corporation. 86 It is unclear from the court's analysis how
it makes the leap from an injury to Freshway to an injury to the Gilardis
without addressing that Freshway and Gilardi are distinct legal entities.
II. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. V. SEBELIUS
A. Facts and Procedural History
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby Lobby) is a retail arts and crafts
chain incorporated under Oklahoma law.87 Hobby Lobby is a closely
held S-corporation owned and operated by David and Barbara Green and
their three children.88 The Green family also owns and operates Mardel,
78. Id. at 662-64.
79. Id. at 679.
80. 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
81. See id at 1212-16.
82. Id. at 1214.
83. Id. at 1214-15.
84. Id. at 1216.
85. See id. at 1210-11.
86. See id.
87. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Verified Complaint at 7, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), (No. CIV-12-1000-HE).
88. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122.
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Inc., a Christian bookstore chain.89 Hobby Lobby has over 500 stores
nationwide with about 13,000 full-time employees; Mardel has 35 stores
nationwide with around 400 employees.
9
0
Both Hobby Lobby and Mardel are operated according to express
Christian principles.9' Hobby Lobby's statement of purpose reads,
"[H]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner
consistent with Biblical principles.,92 Hobby Lobby and Mardel are both
closed on Sundays, and "Hobby Lobby buys hundreds of full-page
newspaper ads inviting people to 'know Jesus as Lord and Savior."'
93
Mardel only sells Christian books and materials.94 Hobby Lobby and
Mardel are operated through a management trust, which requires each
trustee to sign an agreement that "requires them to affirm the Green
family statement of faith. 95 A principal tenet of the Green's faith is the
belief that life begins at conception and that "it is immoral ... to facili-
tate any act that causes the death of a human embryo."96 Hobby Lobby
and Mardel's current employment-based group health plan does not cov-
er certain contraceptives, such as Plan B and Ella, which prevent a ferti-
lized zygote from implanting in the uterine wall.
97
One of the provisions of the ACA requires employment-based
group health plans to provide preventative health services for women.
98
HHS adopted the recommendation of the Institute of Medicine to require
such health plans to include twenty FDA-approved contraceptives.99 This
requirement has come to be known as the contraceptive-coverage re-
quirement or the contraceptive mandate.1° Four of these methods "can
function by preventing the implantation of a fertilized egg."' 
0 1
HHS has established exceptions to this contraceptive mandate for
"religious employers," certain nonprofit organizations, "grandfathered"
plans, and "businesses with fewer than fifty employees."' 0 2 According to
HHS regulations, an organization is a religious employer if it satisfies all









97. Id. at 1124-25.
98. Id. at 1122 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1185d (2012)).
99. Id. at 1123.
100. See id. at 1123-24.
101. Id. at 1123; see also id. at 1123 n.3 ("There is an ongoing medical debate as to whether
some of the contraceptive methods relevant to this case act by preventing implantation or fertiliza-
tion." (emphasis omitted)).
102. Id. at 1123-24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (identifying the entities exempt from the
contraceptive mandate).
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(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organiza-
tion.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the reli-
gious tenets of the organization.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious
tenets of the organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in sec-
tion 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code .... 103
If an organization's employment-based group health plan does not fall
under one of the exemptions and fails to comply with the contraceptive
mandate, the organization will be taxed "$100 for each day in the non-
compliance period with respect to each individual to whom such failure
relates.' ' I ra
Hobby Lobby and Mardel do not qualify for any of the current HHS
exemptions from the contraceptive mandate. As for-profit organizations,
they cannot qualify as religious employers or for the other nonprofit-
based exemptions.10 5 They also do not "qualify for the 'grandfathered'
status exemption because they elected not to maintain grandfathered sta-
tus" before the contraceptive mandate was proposed.10 6 Therefore, if the
term "individual" in the regulation refers to each individual covered by a
health plan, Hobby Lobby and Mardel's failure to provide the required
contraceptive coverage for its 13,000 full-time employees would result in
a $1.3 million dollar fine per day.'
0 7
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and the Greens filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Western Oklahoma and moved for a preliminary
injunction, arguing that the HHS contraceptive mandate violated the Free
Exercise Clause and RFRA.1°8 The district court denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction, holding that secular, for-profit corporations do
not have constitutional free exercise rights'0 9 and are not persons under
RFRA. 10 The plaintiffs then filed an application to the Tenth Circuit for
an injunction pending appellate review, which the court denied."' Justice
Sotomayor, sitting as the Circuit Justice for the Tenth Circuit, also de-
103. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2013).
104. 26 U.S.C. § 4980D (2012).
105. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d atl 124.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1125.
108. Id.
109. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1287-88 (W.D. Okla. 2012),
rev'd, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
110. Id. at 1291-92.
111. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302, at *3 (10th Cir.
Dec. 20, 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 641 (Sotomayor, Circuit Justice 2012).
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nied the plaintiffs' application to the United States Supreme Court for an
injunction pending appellate review because Hobby Lobby's claims did
not meet the "indisputably clear" standard required for a Justice to grant
the injunction.' Justice Sotomayor noted that "[t]his Court has not pre-
viously addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims brought by
closely held for-profit corporations and their controlling shareholders"
and left the door open for a petition for certiorari following a final judg-
ment. '13
Following Justice Sotomayor's denial of an injunction pending ap-
peal, the Tenth Circuit heard the Hobby Lobby appeal en banc.14 The
resulting decision covered a variety of complex issues. In addition to the
majority opinion, there were three concurring opinions, one dissenting
opinion, and one opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part."
5
This Comment addresses only how for-profit corporations exercise reli-
gion and whether the First Amendment, RFRA, or both protect such ex-
ercise. The remaining issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
B. Tymkovich Majority Opinion: The Case for Corporate Religious Ex-
ercise
Judge Tymkovich, writing for the majority, focused on the merits of
Hobby Lobby and Mardel's RFRA claim.116 The primary issue was
whether for-profit entities constituted persons capable of exercising reli-
gion.' 7 The government argued that secular, for-profit entities are not
persons entitled to RFRA protection because the RFRA term person car-
ries forward a for-profit/nonprofit distinction from similar statutes, such
as civil rights statutes and labor laws, and that this distinction is "rooted
in the Free Exercise Clause."" 8 Hobby Lobby countered that the plain
language of the statute supports the inclusion of corporate entities.,'9 It
also asserted that the Supreme Court has already applied RFRA to some
corporate entities, not just to individuals.' 
20
The majority began by addressing the statutory interpretation of the
word person in RFRA. Because RFRA does not specifically define the
112. Hobby Lobby, 133 S. Ct. at 642-43 (quoting Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 542 U.S.
1305, 1306 (2004)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
113. Id. at 643.
114. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120, 1120 n. * (10th Cir.
2013) (noting that Judge Jerome A. Holmes recused himself), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
115. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
116. See id.
117. Id. at 1128.
118. Id. at 1128-29.
119. Reply Brief for Appellants, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th
Cir. 2013) (No.12-6294), 2013 WL 1399593, at *18.
120. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129.
121. Id
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term, Judge Tymkovich began by looking at the Dictionary Act.122 The
Dictionary Act states, "[U]nless the context indicates otherwise . . . the
word[] 'person' . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations,...
as well as individuals."'' 23 The majority asserted that, because the plain
language of the statute includes corporations, it "could end the matter
[t]here," especially because neither RFRA nor the Dictionary Act ex-
presses a for-profit/nonprofit distinction.
24
Although the majority asserted that it could end the discussion at the
Dictionary Act and plain meaning of the statute, it continued to examine
whether RFRA's legislative context, such as its legislative history and
other statutes providing religious exemptions, indicated a different inter-
pretation of the word person.125 It decided that it did not.126 The govern-
ment pointed to similar statutes that only provide religious exemptions to
nonprofit organizations, religious organizations, and religious employ-
ers. 27 The government argued that these statutes' exemptions indicate
Congress's intent to limit religious exemptions to nonprofit, religious
entities rather than for-profit entities, and that Congress "carried for-
ward" this interpretation into the definition of person in RFRA.12' The
court refused to accept the government's argument, instead finding that
the religious exemptions in similar statutes "show that Congress knows
how to craft a corporate religious exemption, but chose not to do so in
RFRA. ' ' 129 As a result, the court concluded that "when the exemptions
are not present, it is not that they are 'carried forward' but rather that
they do not apply."' 30
The court also rejected the government's argument that the case law
from the time RFRA was drafted indicated that Congress intended to
incorporate a for-profit/nonprofit distinction into the term person.131 The
government cited Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,132 a Title VII case in which a non-
profit run by the Mormon Church fired employees who did not adhere to
religious behavioral standards.33 In Amos, the government argued that
allowing religious discrimination for for-profit, nonreligious jobs would
violate the Establishment Clause.'34 Thus, according to the government,
there is a for-profit/nonprofit distinction in free exercise jurisprudence
122. Id.
123. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
124. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at'l 129.
125. Id. at 1129-30.
126. Id. at 1130.
127. Id.
128. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1131.
132. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
133. SeeHobbyLobby, 723 F.3d at 1131.
134. Id. (citing Amos, 483 U.S. at 331).
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that denies protection to for-profit entities.1 35 However, the Amos court
found that the activities in question were not for-profit; therefore, the
issue of whether for-profit entities could receive the protections of the
Free Exercise Clause was still an open question.'36 Because the Supreme
Court had not decided this issue when Congress drafted RFRA, the court
reasoned that a for-profit/nonprofit distinction could not be implied in
Congress's use of person in RFRA based on case law alone.1 37 The court
also found that the cases cited by the government indicated only that for-
profit/nonprofit status is one relevant factor in determining whether
RFRA applies but did not indicate that it was dispositive.138 Furthermore,
these cases were decided after RFRA was enacted; therefore, their for-
profit/nonprofit distinctions could not have influenced Congress's intent
in drafting RFRA139
Having disposed with the statutory issue, Judge Tymkovich next
addressed the First Amendment issue.'40 The majority began by noting
that groups, as well as individuals, have rights under the First Amend-
ment's Free Exercise Clause.141 In support of this position, the majority
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Roberts v. United States Jay-
cees,142 which states: "An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and
to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vig-
orously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative free-
dom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaran-
teed.'' 143 Thus, First Amendment protection extends not only to individu-
als; it also extends to the organizations or corporations they participate in
to exercise their First Amendment rights.144 The court also cited to Citi-
zens United, which extended First Amendment protection to corpora-
tions. 45 Because the Supreme Court has extended Free Exercise Clause
and First Amendment protection to associations and nonprofit corpora-
tions, "the Free Exercise Clause is not a "'purely personal" guarantee[]
... unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the "his-
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Amos, 483 U.S. at 337); Amos, 483 U.S. 345 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Amos, 483 U.S. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1132.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1133.
141. Id.
142. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
143. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1133 (emphasis omitted) (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622). The
United States Jaycees is a nonprofit membership corporation whose purpose is to promote civic
organizations for young men. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612-13.
144. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 ("(W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others
in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.").
145. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1133 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43
(2010)).
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toric function" of the particular [constitutional] guarantee has been lim-
ited to the protection of individuals."1
46
Having established that free exercise jurisprudence extends free ex-
ercise rights to incorporated entities, the majority next addressed whether
a corporation's for-profit/nonprofit status affects its free exercise
rights.147 Judge Tymkovich noted that the Free Exercise Clause protects
more than religious beliefs; it also protects religiously motivated con-
duct, including religious expression. 148 Such religious conduct can be
exercised by individuals and corporations alike, regardless of nonprofit
status.149 Although Hobby Lobby and Mardel are for-profit corporations,
according to the majority they express themselves religiously by publish-
ing hundreds of proselytizing ads. 50 The court concluded that:
Because Hobby Lobby and Mardel express themselves for religious
purposes, the First Amendment logic of Citizens United, where the
Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right of for-profit
corporations to express themselves for political purposes, applies as
well. We see no reason the Supreme Court would recognize constitu-
tional protection for a corporation's political expression but not its re-
ligious expression.
151
Judge Tymkovich argued that the exercise of religion and the pur-
suit of profit are not mutually exclusive.152 A person, such as a kosher
butcher, may choose to incorporate to take advantage of limited liability
protections or tax rates while still engaging in business practices in-
formed by her religion.1
5 3
The court was also troubled by the notion of tying Free Exercise
rights to a congressional definition of "nonprofit.'', 54 "What if," the ma-
jority hypothesized, "Congress eliminates the for-profit/non-profit dis-
tinction in tax law? Do for-profit corporations then gain Free Exercise
rights? Or do non-profits lose Free Exercise rights?"' 5 As a result, the
majority rejected "such a bright-line rule" that extended free exercise
rights only to religious organizations. M
Judge Tymkovich acknowledged that the holding of this case could
potentially "raise difficult questions of how to determine the corpora-
146. Id. at 1133-34 (alterations in original) (omission in original) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978)).
147. Id. at 1134.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1135.





156. Id. at 1136.
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tion's sincerity of belief."'' 57 However, he declined to address those ques-
tions because the sincerity of Hobby Lobby's, Mardel's, and the Green's
beliefs were not in dispute.58 The Tenth Circuit held that the corpora-
tion's explicitly Christian mission, proselytizing activity, and adherence
to Christian standards provided sufficient evidence that Hobby Lobby's
and Mardel's religious beliefs were sincere, and therefore qualify for
RFRA protection.59 Thus, the majority explicitly avoided deciding what
factors are necessary to determine the sincerity of a corporation's reli-
gious beliefs.
160
C. Hartz Concurrence: An Examination of a Corporate Right to Exercise
Religion'
61
Judge Hartz agreed with Judge Tymkovich that the Free Exercise
Clause and RFRA protect for-profit corporations.162 He outlined three
characteristics of corporations that could weigh against corporations hav-
ing free exercise rights: "(1) [the corporation] is for profit, (2) it has
adopted a corporate form, and (3) it is a group activity.'' 63 He then as-
serted that none of these features disqualify corporations from First
Amendment protection and free exercise rights.'
64
The first feature, profit-seeking, fails to disqualify for-profit corpo-
rations because the Supreme Court previously extended free exercise
protection to individual profit-seekers in Braunfeld v. Brown165 and Unit-
ed States v. Lee.166 Even though profit-seeking may not be a religious
exercise, those who seek profits may still be required by their religious
convictions to participate in, or to refrain from, certain activities when
operating their businesses.67 Judge Hartz stated, "The Constitution does
not require compartmentalization of the psyche, saying that one's reli-
gious persona can participate only in nonprofit activities.", 
68
The second feature, use of the corporate form, also fails to disquali-
fy for-profit corporations from free exercise protection. While the gov-
ernment may require special obligations from individuals who use the
corporate form or place limitations on a corporation's constitutional
157. See id. at H136-37.
158. Id. at 1137.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Because the scope of this Comment is limited to the issue of whether and how a for-profit
corporation can exercise religion, I will only address the concurring opinions that discuss this issue.
Therefore, the concurring opinions of Judge Gorsuch and Judge Bacharach are not discussed in this
Comment.
162. Id. at 1147 (Hartz, J., concurring).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
166. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1148 (Hartz, J.,
concurring) (citing Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601; Lee, 455 U.S. at 254).
167. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1148 (Hartz, J., concurring).
168. Id.
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rights, Judge Hartz argued that these obligations and limitations that the
government imposes "must relate to use of the corporate form."' 69 The
use of the corporate form to limit personal financial liability has no con-
nection to a corporation's decision to form its business practices around
religious beliefs.170 Furthermore, "First Amendment jurisprudence is
based on the substance of the constitutional protections, not matters of
form."'17 1 Thus, the use of the corporate form should not be dispositive of
a corporation's claim for First Amendment protection.
Judge Hartz addressed the third feature of the corporate form, the
"group-activity feature," and similarly concluded that this feature does
not disqualify a corporation from free exercise protection.172 One could
argue that "group-activity" diminishes the constitutional right to free
exercise because a group itself cannot "believe" and the group may not
reflect each constituent's beliefs.173 Judge Hartz responded by asserting
that although organizations do not "have souls[,] . . . it does not follow
that people must sacrifice their souls to engage in group activities
through an organization."'74 He further asserts that the rights of an organ-
ization are distinct from rights of group members, because "one who acts
through a group loses a measure of personal autonomy .... The group
may say something that is anathema to one of its members or do some-
thing contrary to the religious faith of a member."'' 75 According to Judge
Hartz, the religious speech or conduct only needs to represent an official
position of the corporation to gain free exercise protections.76 He reiter-
ated his claim that "[o]ne who wants to have a prosperous business, but a
business that still does nothing contrary to one's faith, can reasonably
decide that the best way to accomplish this is to join with like-minded
persons, perhaps as partners, perhaps as fellow shareholders."'
177
He dismissed the argument that for-profits are not entitled to free
exercise protection because there is no precedent for the principle that
for-profit corporations are persons under RFRA.1 78 He pointed out that
the Supreme Court has never ruled one way or the other on the issue;
therefore, there is no precedent that for-profit corporations do not have
the right to the free exercise of religion.1
79
Judge Hartz finally addressed two of dissenting Chief Judge Bris-





173. See id. at 1148-49.
174. Id. at 1148.
175. Id. at 1149.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1150.
179. Id.
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advantage of ... government rule[s] or requirement[s]" based on the
"exercise of religion ' 80 and (2) the fear that granting free exercise rights
to for-profit corporations would "open[] the floodgates to RFRA litiga-
tion.' ' 81 As to the first concern, Judge Hartz argued that a corporate
plaintiff must prove that its religious belief is sincere in order to be pro-
tected by RFRA, and "sincerity questions with respect to corporations
should not be unmanageable."' 82 According to Judge Hartz, the court
could determine the sincerity of the corporation's belief through factors
such as (1) the consistency of the corporation's beliefs with its history
and (2) the recognition of who has authority to speak and act for the enti-
ty. 
183
Addressing the dissent's second concern about opening the RFRA
litigation floodgates, Judge Hartz countered, "[I]t makes no sense under
RFRA to refuse to grant a merited exemption just because others may
also seek it. How ironic if a burden on religious objectors can be justified
because 'too many' objectors find a law repugnant."'84 He concluded that
Congress rejected a similar argument expressed in Smith when it enacted
RFRA. 185
D. Briscoe Dissent: Lack of Evidence, Lack of Precedent, Lack of
Right
1 86
Chief Judge Briscoe's dissent focused on three deficiencies.187 First,
she argued that the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence regarding
how the corporate plaintiffs exercise religion.1 88 Second, she asserted that
the majority imposed the plaintiffs' burden of persuasion on the defend-
ants.189 Finally, she claimed that there is no precedent that supports the
plaintiffs' RFRA claims or "the new class of corporations effectively
recognized by the majority."'
' 90
180. Id. at 1165 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
181. Id. at 1174.
182. Id. at 1150 (Hartz, J., concurring).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1150-51 (citing Emp't Div., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885, 888 (1990), superseded by
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, as recognized in Sossamon
v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011)).
186. Id. at 1163 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Judge Briscoe
agrees, along with every other judge, that the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply to the RFRA claims
in this appeal. Id. at 1164. She dissents from the majority's opinion that the plaintiffs have demon-
strated a substantial likelihood of success on its RFRA claim, and she would affirm the district
court's denial of injunctive relief. Id. at 1163-64.
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At the beginning of her opinion, Chief Judge Briscoe pointed out
that the evidentiary record on appeal was scant.19' The "plaintiffs pre-
sented no evidence of any kind" during the preliminary injunction hear-
ing, and at the time of the appeal the defendants had not even filed an
answer to the complaint.92 As a result, Chief Judge Briscoe asserted that
the "plaintiffs presented no evidence attempting to demonstrate whether
or how Hobby Lobby and Mardel hold religious beliefs, and whether or
how these corporate plaintiffs . . . exercise religion.", 93 Because the
plaintiffs failed to meet their evidentiary burden, the district court cor-
rectly denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. 94 Chief Judge
Briscoe was also concerned about how eager the majority was to reach
the merits of the plaintiffs' claims when the evidentiary record was so
deficient. 195
Chief Judge Briscoe next addressed the merits of the corporate
plaintiffs' RFRA claims, asserting that the majority made "a number of
critical mistakes" in concluding that the corporate plaintiffs were persons
within the meaning of RFRA.19 6 Chief Judge Briscoe noted that "Hobby
Lobby and Mardel are, in a nutshell, for-profit businesses focused on
selling merchandise to consumers" rather than "faith-based compan[ies]"
or organizations with "religious mission[s].' 9 7 Although Hobby Lobby's
statement of purpose reflects a commitment to Christian religious princi-
ples, Chief Judge Briscoe concluded that such a purpose does not alter
the companies' for-profit status or place them in a "unique class for pur-
poses of RFRA.''198 By labeling Hobby Lobby and Mardel "'faith-based
companies' and businesses with a 'religious mission,"' the dissent argued
that the majority had created an unprecedented "new legal category of
for-profit corporation[s] .
The dissent next criticized the majority's analysis of the definition
of person under RFRA, claiming that RFRA's legislative history does
not support a definition that includes for-profit entities.200 The legislative
history indicates that Congress enacted RFRA to restore the compelling
interest test for free exercise challenges, the test that the Supreme Court
overruled in Smith.20 1 However, Congress did not intend to expand the
202scope of free exercise rights. As a result, the Free Exercise Clause caselaw in existence at the time RFRA was passed serves as the relevant con-




195. Id. at 1164-65.
196. Id. at 1165.
197. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1122, 1128 (majority opinion)).
198. Id. at 1165-66.
199. Id. at 1166.
200. Id. at 1166-67.
201. Id. at 1167.
202. Id.
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text for interpreting the meaning of person in RFRA.203 Chief Judge
Briscoe asserted that the plaintiffs failed to provide pre-RFRA precedent
to support their claim that RFRA covers for-profit corporate entities
"[n]ot because they have overlooked precedent ... [b]ut rather because
none exists.,,204 Because the Supreme Court has never addressed whether
for-profit corporations have free exercise rights, Chief Judge Briscoe
concluded that the Supreme Court considers such rights as confined to
religious non-profits and individual practitioners.°5
Having dispensed with the majority's RFRA analysis, Chief Judge
Briscoe next turned to its Free Exercise Clause analysis.20 6 She first ar-
gued that there is no precedent to support the conclusion that for-profit
entities can exercise religion separate from the individuals who incorpo-
rate them.2 °7 A basic tenet of corporate law is that the corporation is a
new legal entity, distinctly separate from the natural individuals who
create it. 20 8 Chief Judge Briscoe claimed that the majority had impermis-
sibly conflated the religious beliefs of the Green family with the religious
beliefs of the corporations209 resulting in "a radical revision of First
Amendment law, as well as the law of corporations.'" 210 She pointed out
that the majority had failed to answer several key questions in its analy-
sis, such as "whether corporations can 'believe,"' how courts should de-
termine what a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs are, and how the
rights associated with such beliefs are distinct from the corporation's
constituents' rights.211 As a result, the majority had "opened the flood-
gates to RFRA litigation," and "entangle[d] the government in the im-
permissible business of determining whether for-profit corporations are
sufficiently 'religious' to be entitled to protection under RFRA.'2
E. Matheson Dissent
213
Judge Matheson, while agreeing with Chief Judge Briscoe that the
corporate plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing a likelihood of
success on their RFRA claim, declined to conclude that RFRA and Free
Exercise Clause cannot apply "to any for-profit corporation[s]. '1 4 He
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1167-68.
205. Id. at 1168.
206. Id. at HI70.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1171 (citing Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001)).
209. Id. at 1173-75.
210. Id. at 1172.
211. Id. at 1174.
212. Id. at 1174-75.
213. Id. at 1178 (Matheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Matheson
agrees with the majority that Hobby Lobby and Mardel have Article IlI standing. Id. at 1121 (majori-
ty opinion). He further concludes that the Greens have standing. Id. He also "reaches the merits of
the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Claim, concluding that it does not merit "preliminary injunctive relief."
Id.
214. Id. at 1179 (Matheson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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was reluctant to "attempt a final answer on such a novel and significant
question until [the Court had] to" and simply stated that "the plaintiffs
have not met their burden at this point.
' 215
According to Judge Matheson, "[t]he majority and the plaintiffs...
ignor[ed] the corporate form and imput[ed] the religious beliefs of the
Greens to the corporations."2 16 He acknowledged that courts may "'dis-
regard the corporate form' or 'pierce the corporate veil' under limited
circumstances even though corporations and their constituents are dis-
217tinct entities. However, courts only pierce the corporate veil "reluc-
tantly and cautiously,,218 and they "require evidence" to do so but "plain-
tiffs have presented none.,219 He made no judgment regarding the suc-
cess of such an argument in the future.22 °
III. PEERING INTO THE CORPORATE SOUL: How CORPORATIONS
EXERCISE RELIGION
A. For-Profit Corporations Should Not Be Per Se Excluded from RFRA
and Free Exercise Clause Protections
The Tenth Circuit's holding that Hobby Lobby and Mardel demon-
strated a likelihood of success on their RFRA and Free Exercise Clause
claims was the correct result for two reasons. First, the question of
whether for-profit corporations can exercise religion has never been de-
cided by the Supreme Court; therefore, a lack of precedent directly sup-
porting free exercise protection of a for-profit corporation does not indi-
22cate that such rights do not extend to for-profits. 21 Second, the right to
free exercise of religion is not a purely personal constitutional right, and
222
therefore it extends to both corporate entities and natural persons.
Chief Judge Briscoe's dissent in Hobby Lobby, as well as the major-
ity opinions in Conestoga nd Autocam, found the lack of precedent per-
suasive proof that for-profit corporations do not have free exercise
rights.223 However, the Supreme Court has specifically left open the issue
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1181-82.
217. Id. at 1182 (quoting Floyd v. IRS, 151 F.3d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1998)).
218. Id. (quoting Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Greater Kan. City Roofing, 2 F.3d 1047, 1051
(10th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
219. Id. at 1183.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 1133-35 (majority opinion).
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1168-69 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Djuring the
200-year span between the adoption of the First Amendment and RFRA's passage, the Supreme
Court consistently treated free exercise rights as confined to individuals and non-profit religious
organizations."); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 626 (6th Cir. 2013) ("While the Su-
preme Court has recognized the rights of sole proprietors under the Free Exercise Clause during this
period, it has never recognized similar rights on behalf of corporations pursuing secular ends for
profit."); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 384-85 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[W]e are not aware of any case preceding the commencement of
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of whether for-profit activity can constitute a protectable exercise of reli-
gion.224 An issue that the Court has left open is not the same as an issue
that has no precedent to support it.
Chief Judge Briscoe's dissent specifically highlighted the dearth of
precedent "during the 200-year span between the adoption of the First
Amendment and RFRA's passage" supporting the concept that for-
profits can exercise religion. 22  However, there is a similar dearth of
precedent explicitly denying for-profit free exercise rights. Even though
the courts have not addressed the issues of for-profit religious activity,
corporations and other for-profit entities have historically pursued public,
social, or religious activities beyond profit-making.226 As early as the
development of Roman societates, organizations formed to share the
burden of guaranteeing taxes collected for public purposes, "bestowing
legal personality on the corporation has been understood to go hand-in-
hand with rendering corporations accountable for the fulfillment of social
purposes., 227 During the Vietnam War era, the corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) movement gained traction as reformers "sought to make the
corporation more responsible to other constituencies [besides sharehold-
ers]" and address broader social issues.228 Religion, as well as social is-
sues, has also factored in to for-profit activity. Investors who wish to
invest their money in accordance with their religion can invest in specifi-
cally faith-based mutual or hedge funds, such as LKCM Aquinas Funds
and Ava Maria Funds (Catholic), Amana Mutual Funds (Islamic), and
Guidestone Funds (Protestant), which invest in companies according to
religious principles.229 For example, these mutual funds may not invest in
"sin stocks," such as "alcohol, pornography[,] or gambling."230 These
mutual or hedge funds, as corporations, observe and apply religious prin-
litigation about the [m]andate[] in which a for-profit, secular corporation was itself found to have
free exercise rights."), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
224. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 345 n.6 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is ... conceivable that some for-
profit activities could have a religious character."); id at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[U]nder
the holding of the Court,... the question of the constitutionality of the [Title VII section] as applied
to for-profit activities of religious organizations remains open.").
225. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1168 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibil-
ity: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1144-45 (2012) ("Prior to the nineteenth
century... many corporations were charged with carrying out public-serving functions, but this was
not a requirement of business more generally. This public-service dimension seems not to have been
an express legal prerequisite to corporate formation but instead reflected in practice a shared belief
about the proper focus of corporate activity." (footnote omitted)).
227. MICHAEL KERR ET AL., CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 63
(Chip Pitts ed., 2009).
228. Jerome J. Shestack, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Changing Corporate World, in
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21 ST CENTURY 97, 99
(Ramon Mullerat ed., 2005).
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ciples in deciding where to invest their client's funds.23 1 In doing so, they
arguably are exercising religion. According to Lake Lambert III in his
book, Spirituality, Inc., during the 1990s:
[The traditional] "firewall" between spirituality and business ... was
a barrier that was breaking down as both individuals and organiza-
tions undergo a spiritual awakening. Individuals are seeking to bring
their whole selves to the workplace, including their spirituality, and
businesses today are dependent upon the creativity that only "con-
sciousness" and spirituality can provide.
232
There has also been a particularly explicit effort among evangelical
Christians "to align business practices with Christian principles" and
create "Christian companies.,233 In 1991, seventy-three percent of com-
panies that were members of an organization called Fellowship of Com-
panies for Christ reported that they sought "to proselytize customers.234
Because proselytizing is a form of religious exercise, it follows that for-
profit corporations can, and to some extent do, exercise religion. The
majority in Hobby Lobby pointed out that Hobby Lobby and Mardel en-
gage in such proselytizing activity.
235
Because for-profit corporations can, at least to a certain extent, ex-
ercise religion, the next question is whether the Constitution extends free
exercise protection to for-profit corporations. In Conestoga, the Third
Circuit held that corporations, although entitled to some constitutional
rights, are not entitled to constitutional rights that are "purely personal"
based on the "historic function" of the right as described by the Supreme
Court in a footnote in Bellotti.236 The Conestoga court relied on the lack
of precedent as support for the proposition that the historic function of
the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle for-profit corporations to its
237protection. This argument misinterprets the reasoning of Bellotti, as
well as the history surrounding corporate constitutional rights.
While the Third Circuit focused only on the Bellotti footnote ex-
cluding corporations from the protection of purely personal rights, the
main text of the majority opinion in Bellotti illuminates the correct con-
text of corporate constitutional rights. The Bellotti Court reasoned, "The
Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seek-
231. Id.
232. LAKE LAMBERT III, SPIRITUALITY, INC.: RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 2
(2009).
233. Id. at 54.
234. Id. at 54-55 (citing Nabil A. Ibrahim et al., Characteristics and Practices of "Christian-
Based" Companies, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 123, 128 (1991)).
235. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
236. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724
F.3d 377, 383 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14
(1978)), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
237. Id. at 384-85.
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ing their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves signifi-
cant societal interests .... If the speakers here were not corporations, no
one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.
238
The appellee's argument in Bellotti seems to parallel the government's in
Hobby Lobby.239 The government in Hobby Lobby argued that free exer-
cise rights should only extend to explicitly religious entities, such as
churches or religious nonprofit organizations, just as the government in
Bellotti argued that full free speech rights should only extend to explicit-
240ly speech-related entities, such as the press. Yet the Bellotti Court re-
jected this argument. 24 It emphasized that although the press has a "spe-
cial and constitutionally recognized role," the press "does not have a
monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten."242 It
follows that, although churches and religious nonprofit organizations
have a special, constitutionally recognized role in free exercise jurispru-
dence, those entities do not have a monopoly on the exercise of religion
or the protection of the First Amendment.
Despite this parallel, one could distinguish Bellotti on the grounds
that, although a long line of case law demonstrates that the press does not
have a monopoly on corporate free speech, case law is silent on for-
profit, corporate religious exercise rights. One could argue that this lack
of precedent demonstrates that the rights do not exist. However, this ar-
gument has been discussed in detail and found to be insufficient.
243
Bellotti also raised the following concern:
If a legislature may direct business corporations to "stick to busi-
ness," it also may limit other corporations-religious, charitable, or
civic-to their respective "business" when addressing the public.
Such power in government to channel the expression of views is un-
acceptable under the First Amendment.
244
Drawing the parallel to the case of free exercise rights, allowing the leg-
islative or executive branch to limit free exercise rights only to natural
persons, churches, or religious nonprofit organizations also constitutes an
impermissible channeling of religious exercise.
238. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77.
239. Compare id. at 781-83 ("[A]pellee suggests that First Amendment rights generally have
been afforded only to corporations engaged in the communications business or through which indi-
viduals express themselves .... But the press does not have a monopoly on either the First Amend-
ment or the ability to enlighten."), with Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135-36 ("We are also troubled-
as we believe Congress would be-by the notion that Free Exercise rights turn on Congress's defini-
tion of 'non-profit.' What if Congress eliminates the for-profit/non-profit distinction in tax law? Do
for-profit corporations then gain Free Exercise rights? Or do non-profits lose Free Exercise rights?").
240. Compare Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781, with Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1136.
241. Belloti, 435 U.S. at 781-84.
242. Id. at 781-82.
243. See supra pp. 21-22.
244. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785.
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In contrast to the Third Circuit's assertion that free exercise rights
are purely personal, Hobby Lobby pointed out that the Supreme Court
has recognized the free exercise rights of groups, associations, and cor-
porations. The Supreme Court has held that "[a]n individual's freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of
grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the
State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those
ends were not also guaranteed.,245 One could argue that such freedoms
are only afforded to group efforts insofar as they promote protected indi-
vidual freedoms. Because the primary reason corporations engage in
"group effort" is to pursue profit, not to exercise religion, one could ar-
gue that they are not entitled to Free Exercise Clause protection. Howev-
er, while pursuing profit may be the primary aim of a corporation, it need
not be its only aim. This is especially true if the religious activity and the
pursuit of profit align. For example, if a kosher butcher's primary market
is a religious community,246 it is possible that adherence to kosher prac-
tices results both from sincere religious conviction and the desire to run a
prosperous business. The exercise of religious belief need only be sin-
cere, and the First Amendment will protect it whether it occurs individu-
ally or as part of a group.
The Tenth Circuit also observed that he Supreme Court has recog-
nized individuals' exercise of religion through their for-profit business-
es. 247 In Lee, the Court recognized that the requirement for an Amish
employer to pay Social Security taxes violated the employer's religious
belief, although the Court found that the requirement furthered a compel-
ling government interest.248 Similarly, Braunfeld addressed a free exer-
cise claim brought by Orthodox Jewish merchants challenging the state's
Sunday closing laws.2 49 The Court held that the law's indirect burden on
the merchants' religious exercise was not substantial enough to invali-
250date the laws °. Although both cases were ultimately decided in favor of
25the government, the cases were not decided based on the profit-
seeking aspect of the plaintiffs' activities and seem to imply that individ-
uals can exercise religion in the course of for-profit activity.2 2
245. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
246. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
247. Id. at 1134.
248. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-59 (1982).
249. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600-01 (1961).
250. Id. at 605-06.
251. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260-61; Braunfeld, 366 U.S at 609-10.
252. The Braunfeld Court never addressed whether the burdened religious exercise was that of
the merchants' businesses or the individual owners. In fact, it never identified whether the merchants
had incorporated. It is possible they operated as sole proprietors or in general partnerships. Either
way, the Court treated the burden on the businesses and the burden on the owners as one and the
same. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
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The Hobby Lobby court reasoned that if "individuals may incorpo-
rate for religious purposes and keep their Free Exercise rights, and unin-
corporated individuals may pursue profit while keeping their Free Exer-
cise rights," then for-profit activity and religious exercise cannot be con-
sidered mutually exclusive.253 To decide otherwise could lead to poten-
tially bizarre results. Adopting the majority's example of the kosher
butcher: a butcher operating a for-profit business as a sole proprietor, a
nonprofit promoting kosher butchering practices, or a synagogue selling
kosher meats could all receive free exercise and RFRA protection. How-
ever, an incorporated butcher who relies on the same kosher practices, or,
as an extreme example, a large corporation similar to Hebrew National,
would not receive protection for the same religious activity based on the
same religious beliefs simply because it is a corporation. The determina-
tion would turn on the identity of the believer rather than on the sincerity
of the belief or the burden on the religious exercise.
The majority was also troubled by the idea that if they followed the
government's reasoning that only nonprofit religious organizations are
entitled to free exercise protection, then Congress's definition of "non-
profit" would determine an entity's free exercise rights.254 For example,
the majority hypothesized that if the government decided to eliminate
"the for-profit/nonprofit distinction in tax law," then entities would arbi-
trarily gain or lose free exercise rights.255
The Free Exercise Clause protects religiously motivated conduct,
both of individuals and of corporations and organizations alike, from
impermissible government intrusion. 6 Allowing the government to de-
cide which individuals and entities are entitled to protection would un-
dermine the purpose of the right. This was the Court's reasoning in Bel-
lotti.257 Furthermore, the right to exercise religion should not be confined
to the church, the home, or the religious organization. In Lee and Braun-
feld, the Court addressed situations where individuals took their religious
beliefs to the workplace.258 Yet the cases were not decided based on the
relationship between the religious belief and business activity; they were
decided based on compelling government interests or the nature of the
burden. 9 As the Korte court reasoned, if the for-profit nature of the ac-
tivity precluded free exercise protection, the Court would have explicitly
253. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1134 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. grant-
ed, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
254. Id. at 1135.
255. Id.
256. See BLUM ET AL., supra note 16, § 443.
257. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
258. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
601 (1961).
259. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-59 (holding that mandatory enforcement of social security
system was a compelling governmental interest); Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 605-06 (holding that, be-
cause Sunday closing law did not make religious conduct unlawful, the indirect financial burden was
not substantial enough to merit free exercise protection).
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said so. 26° However, "[i]t did not.",261 For these reasons, as well as those
discussed above, for-profit corporations should not be per se excluded
from free exercise protection.
B. How For-Profit Corporations Exercise Religion: A Proposed Test
Although the Hobby Lobby court correctly held that for-profit cor-
porations can exercise religion and receive protection under RFRA and
the Free Exercise Clause, the court was not as clear as it should have
been in distinguishing between the religious exercise rights of the corpo-
ration and that of its owners. Both the Tenth Circuit and other circuit
courts deciding similar cases have confused the line between the reli-
gious beliefs and activities of the corporation and that of the corpora-
262tion's constituents. One of the fundamental principles of corporate law
is that a corporation is "a distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obliga-
tions, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individu-
als who created it, who own it, or whom it employs.2 63 An individual or
group of individuals may choose to incorporate to gain the legal ad-
vantages of the corporate form such as limited liability and perpetual
264existence. However, the individual who incorporates also gives up
certain legal rights and takes on additional legal obligations.265 For ex-
ample, directors and officers of corporations take on fiduciary duties
such as the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.266 A shareholder relin-
quishes, among other rights, the right to "direct legal action to redress an
injury to him as primary stockholder in the business.267
Yet, while individuals may give up certain legal rights when they
choose to incorporate, those individuals, acting as the corporation's di-
rectors and officers, still retain a vast amount of control over the purpos-
268es of the corporations and how it will operate. Although it is a distinct
legal entity, a corporation can only act through its duly authorized
agents.269 The board of directors of a corporation sets the overall goals
260. Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 680 (7th Cir. 2013).
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1134-35, 1137 (10th Cir.
2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
263. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001).
264. See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Hu-
man Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013) (listing limited liability as one of the advantages of the
corporate form), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (discussing how perpetual existence is one of the "most important"
objectives of a corporation).
265. See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, I TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 7:3 (3d ed. 2013).
266. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS §§ 10:1, :11 (3d ed. 2013).
267. Kush v. Am. States Ins. Co., 853 F.2d 1380, 1384 (7th Cir. 1988).
268. See, e.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 266, § 9:5; see also Cox & HAZEN, supra note 265,
§ 8:2.
269. E.g., Cox & HAZEN, supra note 265, § 8:1.
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and objectives of the corporation.270 The officers implement those goals
and objectives and oversee the corporation's daily operations.27' Fur-
thermore, a corporation is governed by its articles of incorporations, by-
laws, and board resolutions, which define the powers and limitations of
its constituents and, in many cases, the corporation's purpose for exist-
ence.272 These documents allow the incorporators and the board of direc-
tors to determine the purpose of the corporation and dictate its overall
273operations. Furthermore, a corporation can be formed for almost any
274lawful purpose. A corporation can be formed as a tire manufacturer, a
grocery store, a school, a church, a restaurant, a homeless shelter, a hos-
pital, an arts and crafts store, or for hundreds of other purposes as long as
those purposes are lawful.
Because a corporation's duly authorized constituents act on the cor-
poration's behalf and play a significant role in determining the purpose
of the corporation,2 75 the constituents' views and goals can be reflected in
the organization and management of the corporation. The line between
the corporation and its constituents becomes even thinner in closely held
corporations such as Hobby Lobby and Mardel where the shareholders,
board of directors, and officers are essentially the same people.276 In
some situations, a single person may serve as the sole shareholder, direc-
277tor, and officer of a corporation.
A major obstacle to the validity of corporate religious exercise and
CSR as a whole is the theory of shareholder wealth maximization articu-
lated in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,278 which asserts:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself .... 279
This theory limits directors and officers to making decisions based pri-
marily on the decision's impact on maximizing profits and shareholder
wealth. However, thirty-three states have a version of "constituency stat-
utes," which permit directors to consider interests other than the interests
270. E.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 266, § 9:5.
271. E.g., Cox & HAZEN, supra note 265, § 8:2.
272. See id. §§ 4:1, :12.
273. Seeid. §4:1.
274. See id.
275. E.g., COX & HAZEN, supra note 266, § 9.5.
276. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
277. See, e.g., Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 629 (6th Cir. 2013) (identifying
Michael Potter as "the founder, chairperson, president, and sole shareholder of Eden Foods, Inc.").
278. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
279. Eden Foods, 733 F.3d at 684.
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of its shareholders when making decisions for the corporation.280 Direc-
tors can make those decisions so long as those interests are what they
reasonably believe are in the best interest of the company. 281 Although
"permissive constituency statutes only create the option (and not the re-
quirement) for directors to consider interests of constituencies other than
shareholders," they open the door for directors and officers to consider
interests such as societal interests, employee interests, and, for the pur-
poses of this comment, religious interests.282
The Tenth Circuit and other circuit courts have muddied the waters
by failing to adequately distinguish between the religious beliefs and
activity of the corporate entity and the beliefs and exercise of its constit-
uents. By doing so, the courts have sidestepped the foundational corpo-
rate law doctrine that a corporate entity is separate and distinct from its
constituents. The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby frequently referred to
religious individuals taking advantage of the corporate form yet still re-
taining their religious beliefs.283 For example, the Hobby Lobby court
used the example of an individual kosher butcher who wishes to incorpo-
rate to take advantage of the limited liability of the corporate form.284
The court feared that, if the butcher incorporated, the individual butcher
would lose his free exercise protections simply because he incorpo-
rated.285 It did not address how Kosher Butcher, Inc. could exercise reli-
gion separately and distinctly from the individual.
If courts are going to recognize free exercise rights for corporations
and still comply with the fundamentals of corporate law, then it is imper-
ative to identify the corporation's religious beliefs and how it exercises
religion. It is not enough to impute an individual constituent's beliefs to
280. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2014);
FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-
221 (b) (2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1602 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (2013); IND. CODE
§ 23-1-35-1(d) (2013); IOWA CODE § 490.1108A (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4)
(2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 831 (2013); MD. CODE
ANN., CORPS. & ASs'NS § 2-104(b)(9) (West 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (2013); MINN.
STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2013); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (2013); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.347
(2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2432(2) (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(4) (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:6-1(2) (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (2013); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(McKinney 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(F)
(West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2013); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715(a) (2013); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204
(2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I IA, § 8.30(a) (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (2013); WIS. STAT. §
180.0827 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(g) (2013).
281. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 26-27 (1992).
282. WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 10 (Jan. 18, 2013), available at
http:/Ibenefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Benecit CorporationWhite Paper 1_18 2013.pdf.
283. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1135 (10th Cir. 2013),
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the corporation; the corporation itself must demonstrate religious exer-
cise to gain First Amendment and RFRA protection. There are a few
factors, grounded in basic corporate law, which can aid courts in deter-
mining the religious beliefs and actions of the corporate entity. In other
words, these factors help identify how a corporation exercises religion.
The first set of factors focuses on the organizational aspects of the corpo-
ration; the latter focuses on the operational aspects.286 These factors are
not exclusive, and they can be evaluated on a sliding scale.
The organizational factors include looking at the corporation's arti-
cles of incorporation or organization, bylaws, and board resolutions.
Documents such as articles of incorporation are already utilized in other
areas of the law to define the purpose of an organization for tax or regu-
latory reasons.287 Furthermore, they provide a relatively straightforward
mechanism for the incorporators to impute their religious beliefs to the
entity while still adhering to the formalities of corporate law. The articles
of incorporation, bylaws, or board resolutions could authorize or even
mandate that the directors and officers consider religion when making
decisions for the entity. For example, Hobby Lobby's purpose statement,
"[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner
consistent with Biblical principles," directs the company's constituents to
operate according to religious principles.
2 88
Particular corporate forms also may be a factor in determining how
a corporation exercises religion.289 For example, nineteen states and the
District of Columbia have passed legislation creating a new class of cor-
porations called "benefit corporations.'" 290 Benefit corporations were cre-
ated to "address the unique needs of for-profit mission-driven business-
286. This test is meant to reflect the broad strokes of the organizational and operational test set
out in the Internal Revenue Code for 501(c)(3) organizations. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2014).
While the 501(c)(3) test focuses on private inurement and exclusive exempt purposes, this test fo-
cuses more on identifying the religious purpose of a for-profit organization that empowers it to
exercise religion.
287. See, e.g., id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2014); COX & HAZEN, supra note 265, § 4:1.
288. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122 (alteration in original).
289. Some courts have considered particular corporate forms in their analyses already, albeit
without much discussion on why the distinctions matter. See id. at 1136-37 ("The government
nonetheless raises the specter of future cases in which, for example, a large publicly traded corpora-
tion tries to assert religious rights .... But that is not an issue here. Hobby Lobby and Mardel are
not publicly traded corporations; they are closely held family businesses with an explicit Christian
mission as defined in their governing principles .... It is hard to compare them to a large, publicly
traded corporation, and the difference seems obvious."). Furthermore, in a concurring opinion to
Gilardi, Judge Randolph "emphasize[d] the importance of the Freshway Corporations' election to be
taxed" as an S-corporation. Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1225
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He suggests that
because "[s]ubchapter S disregards the corporate form" for income tax purposes, allowing income to
pass through to shareholders, it makes sense to allow a similar pass through theory for RFRA pur-
poses. Id. Although his argument is relatively strained, consideration of a particular corporate form
certainly may be relevant in determining how a corporation exercises religion.
290. See State by State Legislative Status: Enacted Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER,
http://benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited May 5, 2014).
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es.' '291 They must have a "purpose to create a material positive impact on
society and the environment."292 Unlike constituency statutes, the direc-
tors of benefit corporations are required to consider non-financial inter-
293ests when making decisions for the corporation. A benefit corporation
whose mission has a religious component would be required to consider
religious interests in it decision-making,294 which makes determining the
corporation's religious exercise much more straightforward.
Courts should also consider operational factors in determining a
corporation's religious beliefs and exercise. These operational factors
include: the kinds of products or services the corporation provides, such
as products or services that promote a certain religion or have religious
aspects; the percentage of the corporation's funds allocated for religious
purposes, such as donations to a particular church or religious organiza-
tion or, as in Hobby Lobby and Mardel, funds the corporation spends on
its own religious activity; the branding and marketing of the corporation,
such as whether the corporation holds itself out as a religious or faith-
based business to the general public; and the corporate culture.
By examining these organizational and operational factors, the court
can more easily determine the sincerity of a corporation's religious be-
liefs. Although the Briscoe dissent expressed concern that allowing for-
profit corporations free exercise rights would "entangle the government
in the impermissible business of determining whether for-profit corpora-
tions are sufficiently 'religious' to be entitled to protection," using these
factors does not entangle the government any more than it is entangled
295for an individual person. Take, for example, an incorporated butcher
that suddenly adopts kosher butcher practices only to avoid complying
with FDA regulations requiring butchers to use more expensive, non-
kosher techniques. It would be no more difficult to determine the merits
of the butcher's free exercise claim than that of an individual who sud-
denly adopts a religion advocating pacifism only to avoid being drafted
in a war. As Judge Hartz pointed out, "[S]incerity questions with respect
to corporations should not be unmanageable. It should not be hard to
determine who has authority to speak or act for the corporation. And
sincerity can be measured by consistency of the present stated belief with
the history of the enterprise.296
291. CLARK ET AL., supra note 282, at 14.
292. Id. at 15.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 2013) (Briscoe,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
296. Id. at 1150 (Hartz, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
First Amendment rights stand as a bedrock of our civil liberties.
They prevent the government from imposing upon the thoughts, speech,
and actions of its citizens, which are often of central and vital signifi-
cance to their autonomy and well-being. They also preserve the cultural
richness of a diverse society by protecting minority views and beliefs
from being silenced and smothered by majority will. The First Amend-
ment protects both the purely personal liberties of the individual as well
as the societal interest in a diverse and varied citizenship. It serves both
personal and communal interests.
The Hobby Lobby decision preserved both of these personal and
communal interests by finding that corporations, even for-profit corpora-
tions, are entitled to First Amendment protection. It gave individuals the
opportunity to carry their religious beliefs with them into the marketplace
without having to sacrifice the protections of the corporate form. In the
particular case of Hobby Lobby, if the court had held otherwise, the fami-
ly that owns and operates the corporations would have faced the decision
to either compromise their religious beliefs or sacrifice the business,
which employs over 13,000 employees. This is exactly the kind of gov-
ernmental coercion that the Free Exercise Clause is meant to protect
against.297 In order to adhere to corporate law, it is important for the cor-
porations seeking free exercise protection to maintain the corporate for-
malities. Yet the sole fact that a corporation operates for a profit should
not exclude it from the protections of the Free Exercise Clause. The fac-
tors discussed above can help both courts and corporations seeking free
exercise protection identify corporate religious exercise within the
bounds of corporate law. Although the Hobby Lobby court should have
provided more guidance on how to distinguish the religious beliefs of the
corporation from its constituents, it ultimately reached the correct deci-
sion because it respected the spirit of the Free Exercise Clause and the
First Amendment.
Brittany Limes*
297. See id. at 1139-41 (majority opinion); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222-23 (1963).
* J.D. Candidate, 2015. My heartfelt gratitude goes out to Denver University Law Review
editorial board and to the senior and staff editors who worked on this Comment. Your expertise,
professionalism, and tireless work took this Comment to a higher level of scholarship than I could
have ever achieved by myself. I also want to thank Professor Michael R. Siebecker for his thoughtful
comments and insights. Finally, I want to give special thanks to my mother and role model, Connie
Stevinson. Your dedication to running your business according to your faith not only inspired this
Comment, but also continues to inspire me and so many others to treat one another with love and
respect and to strive to make the world a better place.
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UNITED STATES V. HATCH: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
ABSTRACT
For decades, courts have struggled with the controversy over the
appropriate scope of congressional power. The battle between a broad,
deferential view and a narrow, limited view is the focus of many cases
interpreting grants of congressional authority by the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment is not commonly found
in contemporary legal analysis; however, power offered by the Amend-
ment, and the cases interpreting it, has noteworthy potential in our mod-
em society. Because the history and specificity of the Thirteenth
Amendment is so different from the Fourteenth Amendment, arguments
drawing strict correlation between the two should be scrutinized. Overly
restrictive limits on congressional power carry consequences and should
be carefully considered. Limitations to the Fourteenth Amendment have
brought criticism that must be analyzed when approaching similar action
with regard to the Thirteenth Amendment. Learning from, and avoiding
repeating, past mistakes i  a sign of a sophisticated and evolving society.
Such caution must be central to the imminent discussion of congressional
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
of America sought o rid the nation of its dark history of slavery and in-
voluntary servitude.1 Though the Amendment stands for the end of slav-
ery in the United States and a new direction after a brutal war, it is not
common to hear legal arguments or opinions today which revolve around
the powers inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment.2 Throughout our na-
tion's legal history, the Thirteenth Amendment's grant of power has been
a focal point of the struggle between broad and narrow interpretations of
congressional powers.3 And recently, the Tenth Circuit opened the door
for the Supreme Court to step in and answer the question of how far the
Thirteenth Amendment's power should extend.4 Does this portend a revi-
talization of the Thirteenth Amendment and invite a new avenue for
Congress to assert its power in the wake of recent decisions that chip
away at it?5 Is it fodder for the Supreme Court to step in to prevent such
a result? Or is it just a unique case about a unique law that will eventual-
ly fade away? This Comment examines these possibilities.
The Thirteenth Amendment returned as a source of congressional
power to enact the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act 6 (the Hate Crimes Act) when three white men tortured
and branded a Navajo man for seemingly no reason other than the fact
that he was Navajo.7 The Hate Crimes Act has recently become a focal
point of criticism of Congress's power to regulate private action.8 Federal
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist
within the United States."); see Thirteenth Amendment, HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/topics/thirteenth-amendment (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) ("The [Thirteen]th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution officially abolished slavery in America, and was ratified on
December 6, 1865, after the conclusion of the American Civil War.").
2. See Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 310 (2004) (explaining that the Thirteenth Amendment, even
though ratified in 1865, is only just coming into the light of American jurisprudence).
3. The Court at the end of the nineteenth century initially interpreted the enforcement power
broadly-that it included the power to act against any "badges or incidents of slavery." The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). Then the Court cut back and limited the congressional power to
enforce against slavery and involuntary servitude. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 19 (1906),
overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). More recently, the Court
again adopted a more broad interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment's power to include the
power to enforce against the badges and incidents of slavery. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439.
4. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013). Hatch filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari on October 1, 2013. No. 13-675: William Hatch v. United States, CERTPOOL,
https://certpool.com/dockets/13-6765 (last updated June. 25, 2014). The Supreme Court denied the
petition on Mar. 24, 2014. Id.
5. Supreme Court decisions in the past two decades have shown a tendency toward tighten-
ing congressional powers. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552
(1995).
6. Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. E., 123 Stat. 2838 (2009) (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C.
§ 249 (2012)).
7. United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (D.N.M. 2011), affd sub nom. Hatch,
722 F.3d 1193.
8. See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1195.
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hate-crime statutes serve as a battleground between federal power to pro-
tect people targeted because of an aspect of their person and private in-
terests in limiting federal regulation of activities without state action. A
conflict arises when laws like hate-crime statutes are enacted but infringe
on other perceived protected freedoms.9
This Comment presents the recent revitalization of the Thirteenth
Amendment in modem jurisprudence and seeks to analyze the conflict
inherent in the expansion and retraction of congressional powers. Part I
of this Comment presents an overview of statutes prohibiting hate
crimes. It then attempts to provide a historical and legal background for
the protections guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part II of
this Comment outlines the Tenth Circuit's approach to the constitutional-
ity of a hate-crime statute and demonstrates the modem analytical ap-
proach to revive the Thirteenth Amendment. It also outlines the facts,
procedural posture, and analysis used by the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. Hatch.10 Part III of this Comment addresses the
battle over the scope of congressional authority granted by enforcement
provisions similar to the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement provision
at issue in Hatch. Finally, Part III discusses the controversy surrounding
the Supreme Court's treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment and argues
that extra caution should be taken when the Court is presented with the
task of imposing limits on the Thirteenth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
To fully understand the history leading to the Tenth Circuit's utili-
zation of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is necessary to look back to the
origins of our nation. From there, this Part moves quickly through history
to the addition of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and its
historical interpretation and application. Finally, a brief introduction and
discussion of hate-crime statutes and presentation of the evolution of the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment are both necessary to show how the
Amendment became central to the Tenth Circuit's opinion.
9. Hate-crime statutes have been challenged as infringements on protected speech and asso-
ciation. See infra note 70. These statutes have also been discussed as possible impermissible pun-
ishment of thoughts, also protected under the First Amendment. See Anne B. Ryan, Comment,
Punishing Thought: A Narrative Deconstructing the Interpretive Dance of Hate Crime Legislation,
35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 123, 132-33 (2001). Though these constitutional challenges are important,
they have been discussed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Carter T. Coker, Note, Hope-Fulfilling or
Effectively Chilling? Reconciling the Hate Crimes Prevention Act with the First Amendment, 64
VAND. L. REV. 271, 283-95 (2011). This Comment, therefore, focuses primarily on the constitution-
al challenges discussed by the Tenth Circuit, including the Thirteenth Amendment and federalism
challenges raised by Hatch. See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1201.
10. 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013).
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A. Historical Application of the Thirteenth Amendment
The Declaration of Independence adopted John Locke's idea that all
men are endowed with certain inalienable rights." Among these inalien-
able rights was a guarantee of liberty.'2 After the Declaration, some
Americans considered that the Constitution's protection of liberty em-
bodied protections sufficient to rid the nation of slavery.13 However, it is
well-understood that the original Constitution failed to live up to the
Declaration's promise of liberty and equality in one major way-its
treatment of slavery. "4 It was not until the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment that the Constitution came more closely in line with the
Declaration. With the Thirteenth Amendment, the nation showed a re-
newed focus on equality, specifically on ending slavery in the United
States.'
5
Arising at the culmination of the bloodiest war ever fought on Unit-
ed States soil, 16 the Thirteenth Amendment was the first of the so-called
"Reconstruction Amendments" which were aimed specifically at ending
an era of slavery in the United States and preventing its return forever.'
7
The Thirteenth Amendment states, "Neither slavery nor involuntary ser-
vitude... shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction."' 8 It further provides that "Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."'9 The Thirty-eighth
Congress adopted the Thirteenth Amendment to end the long history of
slavery in the United States, but the early treatment of the powers of the
Thirteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court defined its grant of power
narrowly-no more than the abolition of slavery and power to prevent its
return.
20
The decades following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment
show the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to fully adopt its provi-
11. Tsesis, supra note 2, at 315.
12. Id. at 316.
13. See id. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part
that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
14. See Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence,
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1993) (explaining that the
Founders deliberately left the doctrine of equal rights embodied in the Declaration of Independence
out of the Bill of Rights because of fear that it would prevent the institution of slavery).
15. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley's Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1697, 1697 (2012).
16. American Civil War, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war (last
visited Apr. 16, 2014) ("[T]he Civil War proved to be the costliest war ever fought on American soil,
with some 620,000 of 2.4 million soldiers killed, millions more injured and the population and
territory of the [American] South devastated.").
17. See Tsesis, supra note 2, at 309 ("The historical context of the Thirteenth Amendment is
the abolitionist movement and the nation's decision to throw off its racist past.").
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
20. Tsesis, supra note 2, at 328.
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sions.21 The Court's analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment powers in the
Civil Rights Cases22 shows the demise of the usefulness of the Amend-
ment as a prohibition against historical infringement of civil rights and
liberties.23 The Civil Rights Cases analyzed the Thirteenth Amendment
in its discussion of the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.24
The Supreme Court considered important principles of Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence; however, it ultimately concluded that the
Thirteenth Amendment did not suffice as constitutional grounds for the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.25 Specifically, the Court made special refer-
ence to the enforcement provision of the Thirteenth Amendment and
noted that "it is assumed that the power vested in Congress to enforce the
article by appropriate legislation[] clothes Congress with power to pass
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United State[s]. 26 The Court, however, restricted the pow-
ers of the Thirteenth Amendment by holding that the Amendment did not
grant power to Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act.27 The Court's
language regarding the "badges and incidents of slavery" would resur-
face in later cases as a foundation of powers inherent in the Thirteenth
Amendment.28
After the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was
again presented with the question of the scope of power under the Thir-
teenth Amendment in Hodges v. United States.29 The Supreme Court in
Hodges resolved whether the Thirteenth Amendment provided sufficient
21. Id. at 329 ("In the years following Reconstruction, the U.S. Supreme Court undermined
the [r]adical ideals of universal freedom and, eventually, interpreted the [Thirteenth] Amendment so
narrowly that its holdings came to resemble the reasoning of congressmen who had voted against
[it].").
22. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases is a conglomeration of the cases challenging
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Id. The opinion is commonly referenced for its
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 476
(1968). This Comment focuses on the Court's use of the Thirteenth Amendment.
23. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Recon-
structed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1000 (2002) (stating that "the Civil Rights
Cases[] operated as a judicial vice that squeezed the Thirteenth Amendment into a doctrinal sliver."
(footnote omitted)).
24. 109 U.S. at 9, 21.
25. Id. at 20, 24 (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment "is undoubtedly self-executing with-
out any ancillary legislation" and that "the Thirteenth Amendment may be regarded as nullifying all
State laws which establish or uphold slavery").
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id. at 25 ("On the whole, we are of opinion that no countenance of authority for the pas-
sage of [the Civil Rights Act of 1875] can be found in ... the Thirteenth ... Amendment of the
Constitution."); see Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 588-89 (2012) ("[T]he Civil Rights Cases marked a critical moment for under-
standing the scope of Congress's Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. The majority articulat-
ed what has become the authoritative view of the appropriate targets of congressional ac-
tion[,] ... however, the Civil Rights Cases embraced a view of the 'badges and incidents of slavery'
that substantially cabined Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power for the eighty-five years that
followed.").
28. See, e.g., United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2013).
29. 203 U.S. 1, 6 (1906), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
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power to enable Congress to enact legislation preventing, among other
things, private threats at victims' places of employment.30 Focusing its
analysis on the powers granted to Congress by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, the Court noted that "any congressional egislation directed against
individual action which was not warranted before the [Thirteenth]
Amendment must find authority in it." 3 1 Examining the language of the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Court concluded that the Amendment de-
nounced slavery and involuntary servitude and that Congress was grant-
ed the power to denounce both.32 The Court noted that the expansion of
the Thirteenth Amendment beyond the prevention of slavery and invol-
untary servitude was contrary to how the nation decided to approach
emancipation at the close of the Civil War.33 With that analysis in place,
the Court struck down the challenged laws as an unconstitutional use of
congressional power and outside the scope of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, which the Court refused to interpret any further beyond the exact
language of the Amendment.
34
B. Regeneration of the Badges and Incidents of Slavery
The narrow holdings from the Civil Rights Cases and Hodges held
their places until 1968, when, in the wake of evolving social values in the
United States,35 the Supreme Court abandoned its narrow Thirteenth
Amendment construction and paved the way for the Thirteenth Amend-
ment powers we see in effect today.3 6 The shift in treatment came with
the Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.37 There, the Court
changed its view and held that Congress's enforcement power under the
Thirteenth Amendment extended to eliminate all racial barriers to renting
and purchasing property.38 The Jones Court made specific note of the
language in the Civil Rights Cases regarding Congress's power to legis-
late to prevent the badges and incidents of slavery.39 The Court discussed
the debate that occurred at the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
and ultimately decided that it was for Congress "rationally to determine
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and ... to translate that
30. See id. The indictment arose from Sections 1977 and 5508 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States. Id. at 14.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 19 (noting that the nation gave the freed slaves the Fourteenth Amendment to make
them citizens, the Fifteenth Amendment to allow them to vote, and the Thirteenth Amendment to
ensure that slavery and involuntary servitude never existed again within the limits of the land).
34. Id. at 20. The Court's approach to the Thirteenth Amendment in Hodges represents the
height of narrow construction of the powers granted by the Amendment. See Mason McAward,
supra note 27, at 589 ("The Court held that Section 2 [of the Thirteenth Amendment] permitted
Congress to legislate regarding the actual condition of slavery, but not its badges and incidents.").
35. See Civil Rights Movement, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/civil-rights-
movement (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
36. See Mason McAward, supra note 27, at 590; Tsesis, supra note 2, at 339.
37. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
38. Id. at 444.
39. Id. at 439.
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determination into effective legislation."A0 This shift toward judicial def-
erence to Congress's determination of what the badges and incidents of
slavery actually are is central to the Jones decision and ultimately dictat-
ed the outcome of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hatch.41
The Jones Court followed the line of cases flowing from the Su-
preme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,42 in which the Court
adopted a test for appropriate legislation by holding, "Let the end be le-
gitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.43 The Jones Court found that the Act in question,
42 U.S.C. § 1982,44 encompassed a legitimate end reached by legitimate
means.45 The Court upheld the law as appropriate legislation under Con-
gress's power to rationally determine the badges and incidents of slavery
and to legislate against them.46 Further, by upholding such an act, the
Court in Jones expanded the scope of congressional power under the
Thirteenth Amendment by holding that Congress's power extended to
legislate against purely private action.47
Cases that followed upheld the Jones interpretation of Thirteenth
Amendment power. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,48 the Supreme Court re-
lied on Jones to uphold a federal law targeting private action.49 The
Court outlined the Jones holding and found that the enforcement provi-
sion of the Thirteenth Amendment, when coupled with the holding in
Jones, gave Congress the power to protect African-American citizens
from private racist actions taken against hem.50 More recently, in United
40. Id. at 440.
41. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013).
42. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
43. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443-44 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (providing the original
source of the quotation).
44. The Act provided equal access to rental and purchase of property. Jones, 392 U.S. at 420-
22 (explaining that § 1982 prohibited "all [racial] discrimination... in the sale and rental of proper-
ty-discrimination by private owners as well as ... public authorities.").
45. Id. at 444.
46. Id.
47. William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profil-
ing, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 90 (2004).
48. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
49. Id. at 105. The Court upheld the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which, as the
Court explained, fully encompassed the conduct of private persons. Id. at 96. The Act itself criminal-
ized the conspiracy of two or more individuals who "go in disguise on the highway.., for the pur-
pose of depriving.., any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 92
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 104-05. In Griffin, Defendants, who were Caucasian, stopped the African-American
victims on a highway and detained, assaulted, beat, and injured them. Id. at 90-91. The Court deter-
mined that the right to travel by way of the interstate highways was a privilege of national citizen-
ship and concluded that Congress was within its power granted by the Thirteenth Amendment when
it created "a statutory cause of action for [African-American] citizens who have been the victims of
conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that
the law secures to all free men." Id. at 105-06.
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States v. Nelson,51 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied a similar
analysis in upholding a federal hate-crime statute protecting individuals
from private criminal activity targeting victims because of race, color,
52religion, or natural origin. The Second Circuit presented a detailed his-
tory of the evolution of Congress's power to enact laws under Section
Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.53 The court employed the Jones test
to decide whether Congress could have rationally determined that the
acts of violence delineated in the federal statute constituted a badge or
incident of slavery.54 Comparing the case to Griffin and Jones, the Se-
cond Circuit found that the statute in question "stop[ped] well short of
creating a general, undifferentiated federal law of criminal assault and
instead restricts its attention to acts ... [involving] discriminatory rela-
tionships with the victim. '55 The Second Circuit also found that under
Jones' badges and incidents language, the law was a constitutional exer-
cise of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment due to the
narrow application of the law to the discriminatory relationship.
56
With this modem approach to the badges and incidents of slavery,57
and with Jones's holding that it is the duty of Congress to rationally de-
termine the badges and incidents, the Thirteenth Amendment has been
effectively reinvented in contemporary American jurisprudence as a tool
to combat societal inequalities that still linger.
C. Hate-Crime Prevention Statutes
A hate crime is an attack on a person that is motivated by a charac-
teristic of the victim such as race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity.58 Following findings of increased bias-motivated crimes
throughout the country, the federal government enacted multiple statutes
aimed at curbing these types of criminal behavior.59 Hate-crime preven-
tion statutes come in four main forms: institutional vandalism, sentence
enhancement, substantive offenses, and data collection.6 ° Usually, these
statutes seek to punish the motive behind a crime and impose heightened
51. 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002).
52. Id. at 181-91.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 185.
55. Id. at 189.
56. Id. at 191.
57. For additional examples of decisions utilizing the post-Jones approach to the Thirteenth
Amendment, see, for example, United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-29 (1981); Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 179 (1976); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971).
58. Ben Gillis, Note, Understanding Hate Crime Statutes and Building Towards a Better
System in Texas, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 199 (2013) (citing Project, Crimes Motivated by Hatred:
The Constitutionality and Impact of Hate Crime Legislation in the United States, I SYRACUSE J.
LEGIS. & POL'Y 29, 31 (1995)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 201 (providing an in-depth explanation of each type of hate-crime statute).
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punishment for the crime. The requirements are generally summed up
to mean that hate-crime statutes seek to punish offenders who commit
crimes "because of' an animus against the individual victim.
62
Hate-crime legislation made its first entry into contemporary crimi-
nal law following the Civil Rights Act of 1968.63 The Act punished
threats or use of force to intimidate, injure, or interfere with any individ-
ual because of a characteristic like race, color, or religion.64 The next
modernization came in the 1990s when Congress passed the Hate Crime
Statistics Act65 and the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act,66 both
of which paved the course for the hate-crime statutes in effect today.
67
After the bias-motivated murders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd,
Jr., Congress passed its most recent hate-crime legislation.68 The Hate
Crimes Act is now codified in federal law and provides in relevant part:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes
bodily injury to any person or, through use of fire, a firearm, a dan-
gerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to
cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, or natural origin of any person.., shall be im-
prisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title,
or both .... 69
The Hate Crimes Act targets criminal activity that is focused on an indi-
vidual because of a characteristic of that person.70 It is in this fashion that
modern criminal law has evolved to prevent such bias-motivated action.
61. Id. at 205; Margaret K. O'Leary, Note, Have No Fear (of "Piling Inference upon Infer-
ence'): How United States v. Comstock Can Save the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 931, 942-43 (2012) ("Hate-crime laws general-
ly... impose steeper penalties because bias is the motive for the crime. Numerous rationales have
been offered to support the passage of special hate-crime legislation. These rationales include deter-
rence, the necessity to differentiate such crimes because of their severity, and the imperative to
signal to potential offenders society's strong disapproval of such conduct." (footnote omitted)).
62. Gillis, supra note 58, at 207-08 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. This Act was enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012));
O'Leary, supra note 61, at 943 n.94.
67. See O'Leary, supra note 61, at 943.
68. Id. (citing Troy A. Scotting, Comment, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger Federal
Legislation, 34 AKRON L. REV. 853, 873-75 (2001)). In 1998, Matthew Shepard, a college student at
the University of Wyoming, died after he was kidnapped, robbed, pistol-whipped, and left tied to a
fence for eighteen hours in near-freezing temperatures because he was gay. James Brooke, Gay Man
Dies from Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A1. In 1998, James
Byrd, Jr. died after he was picked up by three white men in his town in Texas, taken into the woods,
beaten, chained to the back of a pickup truck, and dragged behind the truck for two miles because he
was black. Carol Marie Cropper, Black Man Fatally Dragged in Possible Racial Killing, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A16.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012).
70. These laws have been the targets of constitutional challenges on a number of fronts in-
cluding the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468
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II. UNITED STATES V. HATCH
Recently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals furthered the revival
of the Thirteenth Amendment in United States v. Hatch. The case exem-
plifies a continuing place in modem criminal jurisprudence for the Thir-
teenth Amendment and at the same time, presents an argument for the
restriction of congressional power under the Amendment.7' Following
the decision of the Tenth Circuit and its call to the Supreme Court to
address the arguments for and against the current Thirteenth Amendment
framework, Hatch filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court.72 Below is a presentation of the facts, procedural posture, and
analysis from Hatch followed by a discussion of the ramifications of
different Supreme Court treatment of Thirteenth Amendment power.
A. Facts
V.K., the victim, is a mentally disabled Navajo man.73 In April
2010, he went into a McDonald's restaurant in Farmington, New Mexi-
co, where Paul Beebe was working.74 Beebe took the victim to his home
where William Hatch and Jesse Sanford met them.75 At Beebe's resi-
dence, defendants-Hatch, Beebe, and Sanford-assaulted and humiliat-
ed the victim. 76 Defendants shaved a swastika into the hair on the back of
the victim's head and wrote "White Power" and "KKK" into the shaved
lines.77 They then heated a wire hanger on the stove and branded a swas-
tika into the victim's right bicep.78 Next, the defendants told the victim
they would draw "feathers" and "native pride" on his back.79 Instead,
they drew lewd images, vulgar comments, and a pentagram labeled
"666" on the victim's back.80 The defendants made cell phone video re-
cordings of the branding and drawings.81
(2000) (presenting a challenge that he New Jersey hate-crime statute violated Defendant's Four-
teenth Amendment right to due process); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (holding that
Wisconsin's hate-crime statute did not violate Defendant's First Amendment rights); Glenn v. Hold-
er, 690 F.3d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 2012) (presenting a challenge to the Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act as a violation of the rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment). The challenge presented to the Tenth Circuit, however, was different-it concerned the extent
of federal authority to legislate in this area at all. See United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1195
(10th Cir. 2013).
71. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1201-05.
72. A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on October 1, 2013 and denied on Mar. 24,
2014. Supra note 4.
73. United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (D.N.M. 2011) (referring to the
victim only as "V.K."), aff'd sub nom. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193.




77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
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B. Procedural Posture
Defendants were originally charged under state law with kidnap-
ping, aggravated battery, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping and ag-
gravated battery.82 While the state prosecution was pending, the federal
government indicted the defendants for violating, and conspiracy to vio-
late, a portion of the federal Hate Crimes Act,83 which makes it a federal
crime to subject a person to violence because of race.84 Hatch was con-
victed of conspiracy to commit aggravated battery in the state court pro-
ceedings.85 In May 2011, the federal district court rejected defendants'
motion to dismiss the federal indictment.86 Hatch entered a conditional
guilty plea on the federal charge of conspiracy to violate the Hate Crimes
Act and preserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the fed-
eral statute on appeal.87 After Hatch was sentenced in both the state and
federal proceedings, he appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that the portion of the Hate Crimes Act under which he was con-
victed, § 249(a)(1), is beyond any enumerated power of the federal gov-
ernment, including the Thirteenth Amendment."
C. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis in Hatch
The panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hatch unani-
mously upheld the constitutionality of § 249(a)(1), concluding that Con-
gress acted within its power in enacting that portion of the Hate Crimes
Act.8 9 Judge Tymkovich wrote the opinion, joined by Judges Murphy
and O'Brien, and affirmed the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico.90
The Tenth Circuit began its discussion with an overview of the Re-
construction Amendments.9' The court then honed in on the most rele-
vant of the three Reconstruction Amendments for its analysis: the Thir-
teenth Amendment.92 Noting that, on its face, the Thirteenth Amendment
seems to only abolish and prevent the return of slavery and involuntary
servitude in the United States and its jurisdictions, the court explained
that the Supreme Court had clarified that the enforcement provision of
82. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1196(10th Cir. 2013).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012).
84. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1196.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045) (rejecting defendants' challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the federal hate-crime statute).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1195.
90. Id.
91. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
which were enacted at the end of, and in the years following, the Civil War, are generally referred to
as the "Reconstruction Amendments." See id. at 1196.
92. ld. at 1197.
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the Thirteenth Amendment also extends to "eradicating slavery's linger-
ing effects, or at least some of them."
93
The Tenth Circuit first addressed and outlined the historical evolu-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment to include Congress's power to abol-
ish the badges and incidents of slavery.94 The court outlined the Civil
Rights Cases where the Supreme Court first mentioned the possibility of
the Thirteenth Amendment expanding beyond a mere protection against
slavery.95 Acknowledging the narrow holding in the Civil Rights Cases,
the court moved its analysis to an overview of the evolution of the badg-
es and incidents of slavery, noting that the phrase as a whole has become
the generally accepted judicial gloss on the Thirteenth Amendment con-
gressional power.96 In its discussion of Hodges, the Tenth Circuit pre-
sented one main concern regarding the expansion of the Thirteenth
Amendment to include private badges and incidents-that it would lead
to overly broad congressional power over private action.
97
The court next addressed the shift in treatment of the Thirteenth
Amendment away from the narrow holding from the Civil Rights Cases
and Hodges and presented the backdrop for its conclusion that the
Amendment is available in modem jurisprudence as a source of congres-
sional power beyond simply preventing the return of slavery.98 Here,
Judge Tymkovich focused his analysis on the holding of Jones where the
Supreme Court expanded the usage of badges and incidents of slavery as
constitutional congressional authority for enacting legislation preventing
biased treatment in the real estate market.99 The Tenth Circuit recognized
that Jones expanded the congressional power by holding that Congress
has the power to rationally determine what the badges and incidents of
slavery are in order to pass legislation to eliminate them.00 The Tenth
Circuit ended its historical discussion by concluding that "after these
cases the Thirteenth Amendment can be seen as treating most forms of
racial discrimination as badges and incidents of slavery, and that Con-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1197-200.
95. Id. at 1197-98 ("[lI]t is assumed that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by
appropriate legislation, clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abol-
ishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States .... (emphasis omitted) (quoting The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))).
96. Id. at 1198.
97. Id. at 1199 ("In other words, the Court in Hodges reasoned that if badges-and-incidents
extends to the type of conduct at issue there and if Congress's badges-and-incidents authority applies
to all races, then Congress could legislate against 'every act done to an individual which was wrong
if done to a free man, and yet justified in a condition of slavery."' (quoting Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1, 19 (1906), overruled inpart by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968))).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1199-1200.
100. Id. at 1200.
[Vol. 91:3
UNITED STATES V HATCH
gress not only has the power to enforce the amendment, but also to a
certain extent define its meaning."
'101
Judge Tymkovich next discussed the Hate Crimes Act and, after in-
troducing the relevant sections and Congress's cited purposes and au-
thority for enacting it, the court considered the substance of Hatch's con-
stitutional claims.0 2 The court quickly determined that, under Jones, if
Congress rationally determines something-such as racial violence-is a
badge or incident of slavery, Congress may broadly legislate against 
it.'03
Applying the rational-determination test from Jones to the Hate Crimes
Act at issue in Hatch, the court concluded that it was indeed rational for
Congress to conclude that racial violence is a badge or incident of slav-
ery and that the Hate Crimes Act is therefore a constitutional exercise of
congressional power.104
Discussing the various arguments made by Hatch, the court left
some of these issues for the Supreme Court to decide.105 Hatch argued
that under the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate against the badg-
es and incidents of slavery should be left to the states.0 6 The Tenth Cir-
cuit quickly dismissed this challenge, holding that "when the Constitu-
tion explicitly grants Congress authority to act, the Tenth Amendment
gives way."'1 7 The court also analyzed Hatch's claims that recent Su-
preme Court treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for more
limits on congressional power.0 8 Hatch argued that under City of Boerne
v. Flores,109 congressional power must be evaluated under a test for its
congruence and proportionality to the injury at stake."0 The court de-
scribed the issue but avoided ruling specifically on this argument, stating
that City of Boerne did not make mention of the Thirteenth Amendment
or Jones, and therefore Jones' rational-determination test was controlling
precedent for the Tenth Circuit, and the issue would need to be addressed
by the Supreme Court."' The court treated similarly Hatch's argument
that in light of United States v. Morrison
l
1
2 and United States v. Lopez,"
3
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1200-01. The Court presented the language of both subsections of § 249 but noted
that only § 249(a)(1) was in question. Id. The Court also outlined Congress's explicit announcement
that it enacted § 249 under its Thirteenth Amendment badges-and-incidents authority. Id.
103. Id. at 1201.
104. Id. at 1209.
105. See id. at 1201-02. Hatch raised many arguments to the constitutionality of § 249(a)(1),
the most significant of which was a federalism argument based on recent Supreme Court treatment
of post-Jones cases concerning the Tenth Amendment and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. Hatch argued that the recent restrictions under these doctrines show that the congressional
power to determine and enforce against the badges and incidents of slavery is overly broad. Id
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1202 ("The Thirteenth Amendment, enacted after the Tenth Amendment, explicitly
gives Congress power to enforce its prohibitions.").
108. Id.
109. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
110. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1202.
111. Id. at 1202-05.
112. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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two recent Commerce Clause cases, Jones creates a loophole for Con-
gress to enact otherwise impermissible police-power legislation.14 The
Tenth Circuit shared the concerns raised by Hatch but left consideration
of these arguments to the Supreme Court and reached its ultimate con-
clusion of the constitutionality of the Hate Crimes Act under the control-
ling authority of Jones." 5 Relying on stare decisis and Jones as the con-
trolling precedent for Thirteenth Amendment powers, the Tenth Circuit
"[left] it to the Supreme Court to bring Thirteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence in line with the structural concerns that prompted the limits [on
congressional power] announced in City of Boerne, Lopez, and Morri-
son."116
Judge Tymkovich, however, did not stop his analysis at stare deci-
sis. He explained why the Hate Crimes Act may be constitutional even
given the recent shift away from unfettered congressional discretion."
17
Judge Tymkovich explained that the Hate Crimes Act presents a more
narrow approach to congressional power than what Jones allows."8 With
an emphasis on limiting principles imbedded in the Hate Crimes Act,
Judge Tymkovich showed that Congress actually included checks within
§ 249(a)(1), making this specific Act much more narrow and limited than
other actions the Jones test may allow.119 He wrote that § 249(a)(1) actu-
ally focuses on three connected considerations: (1) the salient character-
istic of the victim, (2) the state of mind of the person subjecting the vic-
tim to some prohibited conduct, and (3) the prohibited conduct itself.
120
The discussion further outlined each of these elements and concluded
that by requiring consideration of these elements on a case-by-case basis,
the Jones precedent clearly supports § 249(a)(1).1
2 1
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed and rejected Hatch's final ar-
guments that the certification requirement 22 under the Hate Crimes Act
113. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
114. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1203-04.
115. Id. at 1204-05 ("While this debate raises worthwhile questions, the Supreme Court has
never revisited the rational determination test it established in Jones. And more importantly for our
purposes, none of the federalism authorities Hatch cites mention Jones or the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Thus, even if we assume Hatch's authorities impliedly undermine Jones's approach to the
Thirteenth Amendment, we may not blaze a new constitutional trail simply on that basis: 'If a prece-
dent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case ... yet appears to rest on reasons reject-
ed in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly con-
trols, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."' (alterations in
original) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
116. Id. at 1205.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1205-06.
119. Id. at 1205 ("Although 'badges and incidents of slavery' could be interpreted as giving
Congress authority to legislate regarding nearly every social ill (because nearly all can be analogized
to slavery or servitude), [§ 249(a)(1)] does not take such an approach,").
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1206.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 249(b) (2012). The Act requires that the Attorney General certify in writing
that the state in which the crime was committed does not have jurisdiction or wants the federal
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is unconstitutional and that the Hate Crimes Act constitutes a violation of
equal protection. 123 The court dismissed both of these arguments, stating
that they have no constitutional significance.124 Having addressed and
dismissed Hatch's arguments and having left consideration of the feder-
alism concerns for the Supreme Court to resolve should it see reason to
do so, the Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) as a valid exercise of congressional power under
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment and affirmed Hatch's convic-
tion. 121
III. DISCUSSION
The decision of the Tenth Circuit exemplifies a proper use of consti-
tutional construction and inquiry to find a source of power for the enact-
ment of a statute. But the analysis of the court, and the precedent relied
on, leaves the question: how far should it go? To answer this question it
is first necessary to revisit the Tenth Circuit's approach in Hatch and the
court's approach to Hatch's "loophole" argument.126 Next, analysis of the
Supreme Court's treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement
provision and the criticism that followed shows the necessity for judicial
scrutiny when attempting a similar approach with regard to the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
A. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
The court in Hatch was correct in upholding the constitutionality of
the Hate Crimes Act. The Tenth Circuit gave rejuvenated emphasis to the
Thirteenth Amendment as a power that is alive and active in contempo-
rary American jurisprudence. The court in Hatch grounded its analysis in
the Jones precedent, conducting a rational-basis inquiry into congres-
sional power and the badges and incidents of slavery.127 But the Tenth
Circuit left determination of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment
power and Jones to the Supreme Court. 128 In modern society, the Thir-teenth Amendment remains a sparsely used source of congressional au-
government to prosecute the case instead of the state. Id. Hatch challenged this requirement arguing
that it is itself a type of congruence-and-proportionality test as was presented in City of Boerne.
Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1207.
123. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1207-08.
124. Id. at 1208 ("We therefore see no merit in Hatch's argument that the Hate Crimes Act's
certification requirement somehow proves the need for congruence and proportionality, or the lack
of it in this case."). The Tenth Circuit noted that although Jones overruled the main portion of Hodg-
es, Hodges still held that the Thirteenth Amendment applied to all races and the power extended to
Congress to legislate to protect all races, Id. at 1208-09 (clarifying that, "[i]n any event, Hatch's
argument does not raise an equal protection problem .... [T]he legal guarantee of equal protection is
not a supraconstitutional principle by which the Constitution itself is judged .... [Section 
2
49(a)(1)]
does not run afoul of equal protection principles").
125. Id. at 1209.
126. Id. at 1203-04.
127. Id. at 1201.
128. Id.
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thority.' 29 Will it become more popular as a source of congressional
power as other sources become interpreted more narrowly?3 ' The an-
swer remains to be seen.' 3  Examination of Hatch's arguments, the Su-
preme Court's recent treatment of similar issues, scholarly criticism of
the Supreme Court's decisions, and the Thirteenth Amendment's scope
of power and limitations, sheds a sliver of light on the topic.
B. Hatch's Federalism Arguments
Hatch made multiple arguments against the constitutionality of the
Hate Crimes Act.'32 His main argument was that the Hate Crimes Act is
"impermissible [federal] police power legislation."1 33 Hatch argued that
City of Boerne demonstrates the need for limits on federal power.'
34
Hatch's argument is interesting, and the Tenth Circuit called upon the
Supreme Court to fully flesh out the federalism concerns inherent in
Thirteenth Amendment congressional power.'
35
In City of Boerne, in analyzing the constitutionality of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)136 as applied to the states, the
Supreme Court adopted a congruence-and-proportionality test for deter-
mining when Congress may have overstepped its powers under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.137 Hatch argued that by imposing the
congruence-and-proportionality test on the enforcement clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court showed its desire to limit the
129. Tsesis, supra note 2, at 349.
130. See id. at 350.
131. Hatch filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on October 1, 2013.
Supra note 4. The Court denied the petition on Mar. 24, 2014. Id.
132. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1201-09.
133. Id. at 1203-04.
134. Id. at 1202. The Tenth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court in City of Boerne ad-
dressed Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the inherent prob-
lems with unlimited congressional discretion to define the scope of its power. "The Court acknowl-
edged that Section 5 ... gives Congress important powers, but '[i]f Congress could define its [Sec-
tion 5] powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution
be superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997)).
135. Id. at 1201.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
137. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (noting that the congruence-and-proportionality test
requires a reviewing court to balance the harm Congress seeks to prevent by its action and the means
Congress adopts to prevent the harm). Congress's Section Five power involves a similar enforce-
ment provision as in Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1202. The
Court in City of Boerne determined that the evolution of Congress's enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment showed it was meant to be a remedial power rather than authority for sub-
stantive congressional power. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the power vested in Congress under Section Five was merely the power to enact enforcement legisla-
tion. Id. at 529. In imposing limits to the enforcement power granted to Congress, the Court ex-
pressed its main federalism concern that "[i]f Congress could define its own powers by altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means.' It would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like
other acts,... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it."' Id. (omission in original) (quot-
ing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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enforcement powers of Congress.138 Following this logic, it would have
been possible for the Tenth Circuit-and remains possible for future Su-
preme Court decisions-to impose similar limitations on the enforcement
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment.'39 This sort of limitation must
be approached carefully with an eye towards how City of Boerne affected
the Fourteenth Amendment and how similar treatment could affect the
Thirteenth Amendment.
The City of Boerne Court described the enforcement provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment as allowing Congress only to adopt remedial
enforcement provisions rather than define its own power and adopt sub-
stantive restrictions on the States as it did with RFRA.'4° After City of
Boerne, the Supreme Court continued to narrow the scope of congres-
sional power, specifically Congress's Commerce Clause power.1 41 The
Court's decision in City of Boerne and the post-City of Boerne limita-
tions to congressional power were met with fierce backlash and criti-
cism. 42 Arguments against the Court's retraction of congressional partic-
ipation in defining the scope of the enforcement provisions focus on two
main principles established in City of Boerne and achieved through the
congruence-and-proportionality test: first, Section Five does not provide
the power for Congress to substantively define the scope of rights it may
protect; and second, congressional action to protect judicially defined
rights must be narrowly tailored to that specific right. 143 Concerning the
first principle, it is argued that historical inquiry shows the intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment that Congress be the primary
source of enforcement of the Amendment.144 The Court, when keeping
historical intent in mind, should therefore give respect to the interpreta-
tions and enforcement legislation of Congress-RFRA being precisely
one of these methods of enforcement.45 Concerning the second princi-
ple, it is further argued that the Court's decision to subject congressional
enforcement to stringent narrow-tailoring scrutiny (congruence and pro-
portionality), a check more rigorous than any other check on Article I
138. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1202. The Hatch court further stated that "[City of Boerne] does,
however, note the Reconstruction-Era Congress's concern with ensuring that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant general police power to the national government." Id. at 1203.
139. See id. at 1202. The Hatch court did not follow Hatch's request to limit the Thirteenth
Amendment power but rather followed precedent and left the issue for the Supreme Court. See id.
140. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (providing a succinct summary
of the majority's holdings and reasoning).
141. Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2001) ("For the first time in seven decades, the Supreme Court has begun
to narrow the scope of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce."). "[M]ore of the Supreme
Court's major federalism cases in the last decade involved Section 5 than any other font of federal
power." Id. at 113 1.
142. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of
City of Boeme v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 153 (1997); Caminker, supra note 141, at 1132.
143. Caminker, supra note 141, at 1131.
144. McConnell, supra note 142, at 194.
145. Id. at 195.
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power, should not be defended.146 This sort of judicial strangulation of
congressional enforcement authority, as exemplified in City of Boerne,
threatens to engulf more Article I powers and other congressional en-
forcement provisions-provisions Congress might be better suited to
address and carry out as a representation of the voice of the people sub-
ject to its power.
147
Hatch's federalism argument is that Jones and the rational-
determination test (to determine whether something constitutes a badge
or incident of slavery) "create[] a constitutional loophole through which
Congress can enact all sorts of otherwise impermissible police power
legislation."'148 Hatch argued that this seemingly unrestricted source of
enforcement power mirrors the same problem as the City of Boerne
Court faced when it restricted congressional enforcement authority under
the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Therefore, the argument goes, similar
limiting treatment should be taken with respect to Thirteenth Amend-
ment congressional power and the broad grant of power under the Jones
rational-determination test.50 In support of this argument, Hatch ad-
dressed judicial treatment of Congress's Commerce Clause'5' power in
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison. The Hatch court
addressed these cases, noting that in each case the Supreme Court re-
stricted an expanding congressional power.152 The Court in City of
Boerne, Lopez, and Morrison established limits on the respective federal
powers, and Hatch's argument echoes this rationale.153 As the Tenth Cir-
cuit put it, "'Badges and incidents of slavery,' taken at face value, puts
emphasis solely on the conduct Congress seeks to prohibit, and it seems
to place few limits on what that conduct might be."'
' 54
Essentially, Hatch argued-and the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the
significance of the inquiry though left resolution of it to the Supreme
Court-that without specific limitations on the enforcement provision of
the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress will be able to legislate against a
plethora of actions, finding rational determinations of the badges and
146. Caminker, supra note 141, at 1133.
147. Id. at 1198-99.
148. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2013).
149. Id. at 1201-04.
150. Id.
151. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The power to regulate interstate commerce has expanded
since its original drafting. The inquiry demands a determination of whether or not the regulated
activity is economic. Economic activities can be viewed in the aggregate whereas non-economic
activities can be regulated only if they affect interstate commerce on their own. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
152. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1203.
153. Id. at 1203-04.
154. Id. at 1204 (further noting that "[g]iven slaves' intensely deplorable treatment and slav-
ery's lasting effects, nearly every hurtful thing one human could do to another and nearly every
disadvantaged state of being might be analogized to slavery-and thereby labeled a badge or inci-
dent of slavery under Jones's rational determination test").
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incidents of slavery.155 Thus, it will be up to the Supreme Court to bring
the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power in line with these other
limiting cases if it so chooses.
156
C. Jones's Rational-Determination Test
As Hatch made clear, after Jones it is for Congress to rationally de-
termine what the badges and incidents of slavery are in order to enact
enforcement legislation against them under Section Two of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.157 The troubling issue, however, remains: how does
the rational-determination test from Jones match up with the more recent
approach to limit congressional authority not only to enact legislation in
a certain area, but also to define the scope of that area? In City of Boerne,
the Supreme Court recognized that Congress, under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, has a similar power to the enforcement provi-
sion of the Thirteenth Amendment.'58 However, the Court held that the
enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment provided Congress
only with the power to enforce, not the power to determine what amounts
to a constitutional violation. 59 A similar approach to the enforcement
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment would render the ration-
al-determination test from Jones an unconstitutional expansion of con-
gressional power. As the Court in City of Boerne mentioned, "While the
line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions
and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not
easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining
where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed."'160 So, again, it
remains to be seen what the Supreme Court may do with Jones and the
rational-determination test's expansion of the power explicitly granted by
the Thirteenth Amendment. The power as it currently exists under the
Thirteenth Amendment o legislate against he badges and incidents of
slavery is extremely important and worthwhile. Creating hate-crime stat-
utes should be within congressional power.
155. Id. The Tenth Circuit made note, however, that even in light of the seemingly broad scope
of Congress's power under Jones, the Hate Crimes Act is not the sort of overly broad frightening
legislation that should be called into question under limiting cases such as City ofBoerne, Lopez, and
Morrison. See id. at 1205-06. The Tenth Circuit articulated that the limited scope of the Hate Crimes
Act incorporated by Congress into the statute itself sufficiently narrows its applicability. Id. at 1205
(noting that the statute requires inquiry into the salient characteristics of the victim, the state of mind
of the person subjecting the victim to the conduct, and the conduct itself).
156. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1205.
157. Id. at 1201.
158. Id. at 1202. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "Congress shall
have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
159. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
160. Id. at 519-20.
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D. Should the Thirteenth Amendment Be Subject to the Same Limits as
the Fourteenth Amendment?
If the Supreme Court chooses to further determine the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment, it will have to look very closely at the ramifica-
tions of limiting congressional power. If the Court someday answers the
call of the Tenth Circuit, it should not overturn Jones to bring the Thir-
teenth Amendment in line with the Fourteenth Amendment and City of
Boerne. The argument that the similar language of the enforcement pro-
visions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments warrants similar
treatment with regard to limiting Congress's enforcement powers ignores
that the two Amendments are extremely different. The Amendments dif-
fer in subject matter and scope, making the application of precedent from
one to the other unwarranted and unwise.
61
Jones and the Thirteenth Amendment are different from all other
areas of congressional power because they deal with the badges and inci-
dents of slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment's protections and the en-
forcement power addressed by City of Boerne (and relied on by Hatch in
his federalism arguments) are general and apply to extremely broad are-
as. The Fourteenth Amendment's scope continues to be molded and
shaped in modem society.'62 The Thirteenth Amendment is different
because its scope is much more narrow and defined. 63 It is limited to
slavery.
Slavery was possibly the darkest time in the history of the United
States, and its elimination was so important that it has its own specific
amendment.164 The Court should not solve the theoretical problem of
overly broad congressional power by overturning Jones and stopping
congressional power to define the badges and incidents of slavery. In
addition to the Thirteenth Amendment's inherent limit that the Four-
teenth Amendment lacks-slavery-congressional determinations under
Jones must still be rational. Is it not enough that under Jones, Congress's
determination that something constitutes a badge or incident of slavery
must be rational? A relation to slavery and the rationality of Congress's
161. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
162. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (applying the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to public university admissions procedures);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment as
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protections to private life-
style decisions).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
164. See Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, II U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1337, 1337-38 (2009).
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decision are its limits, and that rationality remains for Article III courts to
determine whenever the Thirteenth Amendment power is expanded to a
new area.
CONCLUSION
Although the Thirteenth Amendment is often forgotten and is usual-
ly viewed as a relic of history, as the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme
Court cases cited within Hatch have shown, it is very much alive in
modem American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court decisions expand-
ing the enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment demon-
strate its vitality through time. The Tenth Circuit's recognition of Thir-
teenth Amendment-based congressional power in Hatch showcases the
Amendment's recent revival and also its significance and meaning in
today's society. Unfettered federal governmental power is a concern
rooted in the formation of the United States,165 and limits on authority
should exist where governmental power is undefined. However, compar-
isons may not be made among all things, and where power is restricted
already, over-restriction may be detrimental. The Thirteenth Amend-
ment, and the cases interpreting it, clearly shows it is limited by its sub-
ject matter, and its reach may not extend beyond what is rationally relat-
ed to slavery. Notwithstanding that the Amendment has proved itself
important in modern American society, its internal limits alone should be
sufficient to withstand future judicial scrutiny. But with the existence of
arguments proclaiming a potential for broad congressional authority and
discretion under the Thirteenth Amendment, it is all but certain that dis-
cussion of the Thirteenth Amendment will continue to be a topic in cases
to come.
Joseph W. Mark*
165. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. I (Alexander Hamilton).
* J.D. Candidate, 2015. Thank you to the Denver University Law Review and University of
Denver Sturm College of Law professors Daniel Domenico and Rebecca Aviel for their wisdom and
assistance through the drafting and publication of this Comment. Thank you also to all of my friends
and family for their continued support and guidance.
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BuRNs v. ASTRUE: "BORN IN PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES,"
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN AND THE
ADEQUACY OF STATE INTESTACY LAWS
ABSTRACT
A posthumously conceived child is one born to a woman who became
pregnant by the preserved semen of a dead man. This Comment exam-
ines the rights of posthumously conceived children to receive social se-
curity benefits using an example from the Utah Supreme Court, Burns v.
Astrue. Currently, the result is determined by the intestacy laws of the
state where the semen donor died. It also discusses the applicable intesta-
cy provisions in the states comprising the Tenth Circuit, as well as the
approaches used by the Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Parent-
age Act. The Comment concludes by addressing whether it would be
more desirable to leave the determination of the issue to each state, to
pass federal legislation that would bring all states into conformity with
each other, or to adopt model legislation in every state.
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INTRODUCTION
Robert Bums wrote the poem On the Birth of a Posthumous Child
in 1790.1 In it, the great poet, whose last child was born on the day of his
funeral,2 noted that a baby born after its father's death has come into the
world missing "the shelt'ring tree" that would "shield thee frae the
storm."3 Gayle Burns (no relation to the poet) was probably not thinking
of the two-hundred-year-old poem when she decided in 2003 to become
pregnant by preserved sperm from her deceased husband.4 When she
later applied for social security benefits, Gayle Burns applied for herself
and her child because her deceased husband was no longer alive to care
for them.5 Subsequently, a legal battle arose as to whether the Govern-
ment or Gayle Bums herself would be the sheltering tree for this post-
humous child born two years and nine months after the death of its bio-
logical father.6 The Utah Supreme Court recently decided the issue in
Burns v. Astrue.
7
The facts in Burns are similar to other cases that address posthu-
mously conceived children: a husband or lover dies prematurely after
cryogenically preserving his sperm; months or years later the woman
conceives a child using the man's sperm and files for social security ben-
8efits based on the man's income. Oftentimes, the woman will apply di-
rectly with the Social Security Administration (SSA).9 The Social Securi-
ty Act (Act), however, contains a provision that leaves such questions to
state intestacy laws.10 The laws in each state vary drastically; thus, the
1. Robert Bums, On the Birth of a Posthumous Child, in I THE COMPLETE POETICAL
WORKS OF ROBERT BURNS 374, 374 (William Scott Douglas ed., 1871).
2. JAMES CURRIE, 1 THE LIFE OF ROBERT BURNS, WITH A CRITICISM ON His WRITINGS 52
(1838).
3. Bums, supra note 1.
4. Burns v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 553 (Utah 2012).
5. Id. at 554.
6. Id.
7. 289 P.3d 551 (Utah 2012).
8. See Alycia Kennedy, Note, Social Security Survivor Benefits: Why Congress Must Create
a Uniform Standard of Eligibility for Posthumously Conceived Children, 54 B.C. L. REV. 821, 821-
22(2013).
9. See id
10. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C. (Capato I), 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2028 (2012) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012)).
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outcome of whether the child can receive benefits is determined by the
location in which the husband or lover died."
Part I of this Comment discusses the various forms of assisted re-
productive technology that give rise to the legal issues of posthumously
conceived children whose fathers die intestate. It also addresses the Act
and its provisions that leave the status of a child to state intestacy laws.
Finally, the deference afforded to the SSA, the circuit split, and the sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision are addressed in Part I. Part II of this
Comment discusses the state intestacy laws within the Tenth Circuit that
address-or do not address-the ability of posthumously conceived chil-
dren to inherit under state law as well as the adoption of the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) and the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) and their
effects. Part III explores the most recent posthumously conceived child
case within the Tenth Circuit, Burns v. Astrue-a Utah Supreme Court
case that examines one method the courts use to analyze consent to be
the parent. Part IV examines the moral and ethical implications of
providing or not providing social security benefits to posthumously con-
ceived children. Part V analyzes whether a federal amendment to the Act
or leaving the issue to state intestacy laws would be the best remedy go-
ing forward. Finally, Part VI recommends nationwide changes to state
intestacy laws that must be considered in order to provide posthumously
conceived children with access to benefits as well as protect social secu-
rity funds from fraud.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Assisted Reproductive Technology and Cryopreservation
As early as 1790, women were being artificially inseminated via
turkey basters.12 In modem times, advancements in medicine have al-
lowed for more sophisticated but equally unromantic methods of artifi-
cially conceiving. There are two popular mechanisms. Artificial insemi-
nation, the means used in Burns v. Astrue, is the most common form of
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), possibly because it is the
cheapest.13 Also called intrauterine insemination, artificial insemination
is performed by placing the sperm into the woman's uterus through arti-
ficial means such as a syringe (turkey basters are banished to the kitch-
11. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) ("[Tlhe devolution of intestate personal property [is determined]
•.. if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the
time of his death.").
12. Alyssia J. Bryant, Comment, Death, Sperm Heists, and Test Tube Babies: Support for
Measures to Prevent Social Security Abuse, Conserve Government Funds, and Protect Families, 56
How. L.J. 917, 926 n.44 (2013).
13. Amanda Homer, Comment, I Consented to Do What?: Posthumous Children and the
Consent o Parent After-Death, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 157, 159 (2008).
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en).14 In vitro fertilization (IVF), a much newer form of technology, is
another popular method of ART.15 This approach requires extracting the
woman's egg from her uterus and combining it with a single sperm in a
laboratory.16 Both methods can be done with the use of cryogenically
preserved semen-a practice that gives rise to the issue raised in this
Comment.17 In 1949, scientists discovered that they could treat sperm
with glycerol and freeze it for extended periods.'8 This revelation later
led to the first pregnancy derived from cryopreserved sperm in 1953.19
Before cryopreservation, the determination of one's heirs was rela-
tively easy and straightforward.20 The class was closed upon the death of
the woman or it closed nine months after the man's death.2' However,
the advent of cryogenically preserved sperm stored in liquid nitrogen
allows for long-term conservation and conception far beyond the death of
the father.22 In fact, it is possible to preserve semen for up to ten years or
more when stored at temperatures minus 100 degrees Celsius.23 Cryogen-
ically preserved semen has complicated probate laws around the country
and has presented new issues of survivorship in regard to social security
benefits for children.
B. The Social Security Act and Status of a Child
In August of 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Act
into law to establish a program that would allow retired workers over the
age of 65 to receive benefits.24 The Act, otherwise known as the "Old
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance," or more colloquially as Social
Security, received a huge overhaul in 1939 in order to provide monthly
benefits not only to retired workers but also to surviving families of
workers who died prematurely.25 The Act was created to protect individ-
uals from becoming destitute when they lost their "earning power.26
14. See Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old lceblock: How Cryopreservation Has
Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 21
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347, 352 (2011).
15. Id. at 353.
16. Horner, supra note 13, at 160.
17. See Carpenter, supra note 14, at 355.
18. Id
19. Id. at 355-56.
20. Id. at 349.
21. Id.
22. See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Securi-
ty Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 270 (1999).
23. Id.
24. Bryant, supra note 12, at 920 ("President Roosevelt signed the Social Security Act ...
into law in 1935 ...."); Robert J. Myers, Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Provisions:
Summary of Legislation, 1935-58, SOC. SECURITY BULL. at 15 (1959) available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v22n1/v22nIp1 5.pdf.
25. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 826 (stating that the goal of survivor benefits was "to replace
the lost financial support of the deceased wage eamer"); Myers, supra note 24.
26. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633 (1974). The Court further explained that the
"provisions excluding some afterbom illegitimates from recovery are designed only to prevent
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Congress did not contemplate the technology available today that allows
women to conceive children far beyond the father's death.27 Nor did
Congress contemplate the technology when it amended the Act in 1965
to read as it does now.28 This is one reason why the current legislation is
inadequate to protect posthumously conceived children.
In order to claim survivorship benefits under the Act, several re-
quirements must be met.29 These include: (1) the child is unmarried; (2)
the child is under eighteen or subject to a disability; and (3) the child is
dependent upon the individual at the time of the individual's death.30 The
Act, however, requires a more fundamental question to be answered
first.31 The child must satisfy the definition of "child" as set out in 42
U.S.C. § 416(e).32 Prior to the Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Astrue
v. Capato (Capato J),33 federal appellate courts were split on the issue of
whether posthumously conceived children fit the definition of child un-
der the Act.34 The appellate court decisions all turned on the definition of
child in section 416(e) and section 416(h)'s elaboration on that defini-
tion.35
To meet the definition of a child under the Act, section 412(d) pro-
vides the first bit of guidance and sets out the "basic grant of benefits.36
Section 402(d) states that "[e]very child (as defined in section 416(e) of
this title) of an individual ... who dies a fully or currently insured indi-
vidual, .... shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit."37 Turning
then to section 416(e), several definitions of child are provided, includ-
ing: (1) a child or legally adopted child of an individual; (2) a stepchild;
and (3) a grandchild or step-grandchild of an individual or his spouse.
38
Because the quoted preceding sections are vague and lack elaboration,
39
one must next turn to section 416(h)(2)(A), which is the "next gateway"
to determine whether a child is eligible for benefits.40 The provision enti-
tled "Determination of Family Status" provides:
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully
or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the
spurious claims and ensure that only those actually entitled to benefit receive payments." Id. at 633-
34.
27. Capato I, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 2011).
30. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B)-(C) (2012).
31. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
32. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 2004).
33. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
34. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012).
35. Id. at 2027-28.
36. Capato I1, 132 S. Ct. at 2027; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 52.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C)(iii); Capato 1H, 132 S. Ct. at 2027.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2012); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2011).
39. Capato H, 132 S. Ct. at 2027-28.
40. Bryant, supra note 12, at 924-25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be
applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property
by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domi-
ciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured
individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domi-
ciled at the time of his death 1
There are other "narrower categories" listed under section 416(h) that
provide other methods for determining the status of a child, but these
criteria do not apply to posthumously conceived children.4 2
Both the Supreme Court and the SSA consider section 416(h) as
"completing § 416(e)'s sparse definition of 'child."' '43 Both sections (e)
and (h) are used together when analyzing the status of a child.44 Thus, in
order for a posthumously conceived child to receive benefits, the child
must qualify under the applicable state's intestacy laws as stated in sec-
tion 416(h)(2)(A) .
C. Pre-Capato II and SSA Deference
Before the Supreme Court decided Capato II in May 2012, there
was much confusion in the federal courts about whether the regulations
promulgated by the SSA were interpretations of sections 416(e) and
416(h) of the Act entitled to Chevron deference.46 An agency's regula-
tions are entitled to Chevron deference "when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency" and the agency promulgated rules
using notice and comment rulemaking or "some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent.,47 Chevron deference is a two-step
process: (1) determine whether Congress spoke directly to the issue at
hand; and (2) if not, whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable.48
If both steps are satisfied, then the agency's interpretation is afforded
deference.49 In 2011, the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits were
split on the issue of whether the SSA's interpretation of the Act was enti-
tled to deference.50 All four appellate courts used tools of statutory con-
struction, but the Third and Ninth Circuits completely missed the most
important textual clue.5 The textual clue, contained in section 416(h),
41. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A); Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2028.
42. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 827 28.
43. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2029.
44. Id.; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 828.
45. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2028.
46. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 830.
47. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001).
48. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
49. Id.
50. Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 962 (8th Cir. 2011); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 835 n. 136.
51. Capato ll, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2024 (2012).
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requires reference to section 416(h) after passing through section
416(e).
52
The SSA has interpreted sections 416(e) and 416(h) of the Act using
official "notice-and-comment rulemaking.,53 Additionally, Congress
gave the Social Security Commissioner authority to issue regulations
"that are 'necessary or appropriate to carry out' his functions."54 The
SSA's regulations are analogous to sections 416(e) and 416(h) of the
Act 55 and parallel the statute's provisions by "elaborat[ing] on its
terms.",56 The regulations refer the reader to other parts of the regulations,
as does the Act, to determine whether the child is a "natural child," simi-
lar to references found in section 416(h) of the Act regarding the status
of a child.57 Under the regulations, a natural child is eligible for benefits
if he or she meets any one of four conditions, including the condition of
being capable of inheriting "the insured's personal property as his or her
natural child under State inheritance laws., 58 The regulations establish
"that the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the provisions of § 416(h)
are the exclusive means by which an applicant can establish child status
under § 416(e) as a natural child. 59
In the 2004 decision Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,60 the Ninth Circuit
became the first federal court to decide the issue of a posthumously con-
ceived child's status under the Act.61 The Ninth Circuit did not conduct a
Chevron two-step analysis in its opinion to determine whether the SSA
should be afforded deference.62 The court, however, concluded that sec-
tion 416(h) had no relevance in determining the status of a biological
child conceived after the death of the father.63 This provision was only
52. Compare Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2024 (stating that the "key textual clue" is found in
416(h), which states "for purposes of this subchapter" (internal quotation marks omitted)), with
Capato ex rel. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629 (3d Cir. 2011) (determining that
416(h) is not applicable and thus does not need to be used to analyze posthumously conceived chil-
dren), rev'd sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2012 (2012), and Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining that 416(h) is only used when parentage is
in dispute, and in the case of posthumously conceived children, parentage is not in dispute when the
mother and father are known).
53. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 829 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.350, .354
to .355 (2012)).
54. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 959-60 (citing 42 U.S.C. § § 405, 902 (2012)).
55. It should be noted that 20 C.F.R. § 404.354 is analogous to § 416(e) of the Act, and 20
C.F.R. § 404.355(a) is analogous to § 416(h)(2)(A) of the Act. Id at 960.
56. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 831.
57. Section 404.354 of the regulations includes language that should refer the reader to
§ 404.355 to determine whether the child is a "natural child" similar to the guidance found in
§ 416(e) of the Act. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960.
58. 20 C.F.R. § 404.355(a)(1) (2012); Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960.
59. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. Bryant, supra note 12, at 931; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 832.
62. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597 n.4; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 832.
63. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 832.
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used to determine if the child could receive benefits when the "parents
were not married or [the] parentage was in dispute."'
64
Approximately six years later, the Third Circuit agreed with the
Ninth Circuit and declined to give Chevron deference to the SSA's inter-
pretation of the statute.65 The court stated that section 416(h) merely of-
fers other methods by which a child can inherit when parentage is in
doubt.66 The court reasoned that the plain language of the statute demon-
strates that when a child is the biological offspring of the parents, courts
only need to pass through sections 402(d) and 416(e).67 The court ended
its opinion by noting that "technology has outpaced federal and state
laws," which fail to address the issue of posthumously conceived chil-
dren.68 The public policy reasoning behind the Ninth and the Third Cir-
cuit opinions demonstrates that Social Security laws need to address the-
se issues that will continue to arise with the continuing advancement of
medical technology.
69
The Eighth and Fourth Circuit decisions, handed down in 2011,
contained reasoning that greatly conflicted with the Ninth Circuit, thus
creating the circuit split.70 Both the Eighth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit
agreed with the SSA's interpretation of the Act, which requires appli-
cants to pass through section 416(h) in order to determine the status of a
posthumously conceived child for purposes of the Act.71 The Fourth Cir-
cuit determined that Congress had spoken to the issue because the plain
language of the statute demonstrated that the meaning of child included
the definitions under section 416(h).72 The court noted that Congress's
intent was clear because section 416(h) included the words "for purposes
of this subchapter," which required reference to section 416(e).73 The
court concluded that even if Congress did not speak clearly on the issue,
the agency's interpretation is reasonable and deference should be grant-
ed.74
64. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 833.
65. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 835-36.
66. Capato ex reL. B.N.C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011), rev'd
sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 632 (quoting Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Bryant, supra note 12, at 934.
69. See Bryant, supra note 12, at 936.
70. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 837.
71. See Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 2011); Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954,
961 (8th Cir. 2011); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 837.
72. See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 54.




D. Capato II: The Supreme Court Addresses a Sticky Situation
The Supreme Court finally settled the issue of deference in Capato
H.75 Justice Ginsburg, delivering the opinion for a unanimous Court,
swiftly concluded that the SSA's interpretation of the Act denying social
security benefits to a child conceived after the father's death was, at the
very least, "a permissible construction that garners the Court's respect
under Chevron."76 The Court looked to the core purpose of the Act,
which was to establish a program to "provide ... dependent members of
[a wage earner's] family with protection against the hardship occasioned
by [the] loss of [the insured's] earnings.,77 The purpose was not simply
to generate income for the needy.
78
The Court did not conduct a thorough Chevron analysis, but instead
glossed over steps one and two, and simply held that the SSA's interpre-
tation of the Act was better than the one proposed by the respondent,
because it was at the very least a reasonable interpretation.79 The Court
spent most of the opinion combing through the statute and addressing the
respondent's arguments of statutory interpretation, thereby implying that
Congress's intent was unambiguous.80 For instance, the respondent ar-
gued, and the Third Circuit had agreed, that there was no reference to
section 416(h) in section 416(e), and thus, section 416(e) was irrelevant
in this case.81 The Court used its statutory interpretation repertoire to
counter this argument.82 Justice Ginsburg noted that the "key textual
clue" lies in subsection 416(h)(2)(A), which states that in order to deter-
mine "whether an applicant is the child... of [an] insured individual for
purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner... shall apply [state in-
testacy law]., 83 The word "subchapter" in section 416(h) refers to sec-
tions 401 to 434, which is the entirety of Subchapter 11.84 Although it is
not a direct reference, it is a reference nonetheless and "Congress had no
need to place a redundant cross-reference" in either section 416(h) or
section 416(e).85
Justice Ginsburg wrote that using state intestacy law to determine
the status of a child under the Act is "anything but anomalous"; the Act
75. Capato I1, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012).
76. Id. at 2025-26 (citation omitted); Kennedy, supra note 8, at 840.
77. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. at 2032 (alterations and omission in original) (quoting Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 2026; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 840.
80. See Capato 11, 132 S. Ct. at 2030-32; see also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 839-40.
81. Capato ll, 132 S. Ct. at 2031.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2023-24, 2031 (alterations and omissions in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012)).
84. Id. at 2031.
85. Id. at 2030-31 (stating that the phrase "purposes of this subchapter" in § 416(h)(2)(A)
refers to the entirety of Subchapter II, so there is no need to put another reference to 416(e) in the
statute).
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refers to state law in other provisions to determine family status, such as
the definition of "wife. 86 For instance, in section 416(b), the definition
of wife is somewhat amorphous by stating "the wife of an [insured] indi-
vidual., 87 The definition is further clarified in section 416(h) where the
cross-reference "for purposes of this subchapter" is found. It directs that
the applicant must be married and if not, then the status of wife must be
determined by state intestacy laws.88 This same method of defining the
family status is found for "husband" and "widower" within the Act as
well.89
The Court also disagreed with the Third Circuit's reversal based on
the biological status of the child and the respondent's argument regarding
the legitimacy of the child.90 The Third Circuit determined that the anal-
ysis could stop at section 416(e) because the status of a child is deter-
mined by its biological status.91 Justice Ginsburg disagreed by writing
that nothing in section 416(e) indicated that the biological status of the
child determined its status as a child under the Act.92 The word "biologi-
cal" did not appear anywhere in the Act.93 The respondent countered
with the dictionary definition of child and argued that it meant "legiti-
mate offspring."94 But, once again, nothing in Congress's definition of
child showed intent for a child to merely attain status as a child through
legitimacy or illegitimacy.95 Therefore, the Court determined that "'bio-
logical' parentage" is not a prerequisite for classification as a child for
96purposes of 416(e).
II. INTESTACY LAWS WITHIN THE TENTH CIRCUIT STATES AND THE
UNIFORM CODES
For posthumous conception cases, the status of a child requires ref-
erence to the intestacy laws of the state where the father was domiciled
when he died.97 Currently, only seven states explicitly allow posthu-
mously conceived children to inherit from deceased parents.98 The re-
maining states either expressly prohibit posthumously conceived children
from inheriting intestate property, do not address it at all, or mandate
86. Id. at 2031; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 841.
87. Capato 11, 132 S. Ct. at 2031 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2027, 2029.
91. Id. at 2029.
92. Id. at 2030.
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 2029 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 465 (2d ed. 1934)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2030.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012).
98. Currently, Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, and New
York each have a statute expressly allowing posthumously conceived children to inherit under state
intestacy laws. See Bryant, supra note 12, at 930.
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various types of prerequisites before they can inherit.99 Four states within
the Tenth Circuit require prerequisites for a posthumously conceived
child to inherit from the parents. Colorado and New Mexico have adopt-
ed the UPC, whereas Utah and Wyoming have adopted the UPA. ° Two
states within the Tenth Circuit-Kansas and Oklahoma-do not address
posthumously conceived children whatsoever.10' Part II discusses the
UPC and the Tenth Circuit states that have adopted the intestacy sections
of the UPC. Then it discusses the UPA and the states that have adopted
the intestacy portions of the UPA. Finally, it examines other methods by
which Tenth Circuit states have dealt with the issue of posthumously
conceived children within their statutes.
A. Uniform Probate Code
The UPC was adopted in full by nineteen states and has been par-
tially adopted by many others since its inception in 1969. ° 2 A major
revision of the UPC by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) took place in 2008, which helped mod-
ernize the UPC's treatment of children of assisted reproduction.0 3 Before
the 2008 amendments (UPC Amendments), the UPC did not address
what happens when a parent dies before sperm is taken from cryopreser-
vation to be used for insemination.104 Since the UPC Amendments, the
only states within the Tenth Circuit that have adopted the section on arti-
ficial reproduction are Colorado and New Mexico.
10 5
The UPC Amendments address consent and the timing of concep-
tion with much more clarity than any other model act.106 Under the UPC
Amendments, the parent must provide consent, which can be shown by a
signed record that "evidences the individual's consent.' ' 10 The wife can
choose to conceive the child up to thirty-six months after the death of the
husband.0 8 The UPC allows for a presumption of consent of a posthu-
99. See id. at 931.
100. Wendy S. Goffe, Postmortem Conception Quandary: When Must an Heir Be Here?, 40
EST. PLAN. 17, 18-24 (July 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120 (2013).
101. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 228 (2013).
102. Probate Code Amendments (2008) Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Probate%2OCode%20Amendments / 20(2008) (last
visited May 26, 2014).
103. Id.
104. Kristine S. Knaplund, Children of Assisted Reproduction, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899,
901 (2012).
105. Legislative Fact Sheet - Probate Code Amendments (2008), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=probate%2OCode%2OAmendments%20
(2008) (last visited May 26, 2014); Parentage Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited May 26, 2014) (showing
that Utah adopted the UPA regarding posthumous conception).
106. Jennifer Matystik, Recent Development, Posthumously Conceived Children: Why States
Should Update Their Intestacy Laws After Astrue v. Capato, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
269, 288-89 (2013) (noting that the UPC is more clear than the UPA and the ABA Model Act).
107. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1) (amended 2010).
108. Id. § 2-120(k)(l).
20141
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
mously conceived child as follows: (1) as long as a wife can prove that
there was no divorce proceeding at her husband's death;10 9 (2) that the
father intended to serve as the parent of the child but was unable to do so
because of illness or death;'10 or (3) if "intent is established by clear and
convincing evidence."
'11
Additionally, the NCCUSL encourages states to "enact a provision
requiring genetic depositories to provide a consent form that would satis-
fy [the] subsection" regarding consent. 12 The drafters of the 2008 UPC
Amendments cited to a consent form included in the California Health
and Safety Code." 3 This consent form states, "if you wish to allow a
child conceived after your death to be considered as your heir (or benefi-
ciary of other benefits such as life insurance or retirement) you must
specify that in writing and you must sign that written expression of in-
tent."'1 4 This is an excellent example of how donor sites could aid cou-
ples going through traumatic cancer treatments to specifically consider
and deal with the possibility of conceiving after the father has died.
The UPC provision on posthumously conceived children was mod-
elled after an amendment to the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act (USCACA), which was drafted in 1988 by the
NCCUSL.1 1 5 Originally, the USCACA explicitly excluded posthumously
conceived children, but in 2000 the NCCUSL struck the provision and
decided to recognize posthumously conceived children as long as the
deceased parent consented to be the parent of the child.
116
1. Colorado and New Mexico
Both Colorado and New Mexico explicitly addressed posthumously
conceived children in their intestacy statutes by adopting the 2008
amendments to the UPC. 117 Colorado adopted the 2008 amendments for
assisted reproduction in 2009 and the legislation became effective in
2010.1 8 New Mexico's statute adopting the 2008 amendments to the
UPC took effect in 2012.119
109. Id. § 2-120(h)(1).
110. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(B).
111. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C).
112. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE 43 (2008); Matystik, supra note 106, at 289.
113. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 112, at 43 (citing
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1644.7 (West 2013), titled "Form provided to depositor regarding
decedent's intent for use of material pursuant to Probate Code § 249.5").
114. HEALTH & SAFETY § 1644.7.
115. Goffe, supra note 100, at 23.
116. Id.
117. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-120 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120 (West 2013); UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (amended 2010).
118. Elizabeth A. Bryant et al., Changes to Colorado's Uniform Probate Code, 39 COLO. LAW.
41,41 (2010).
119. § 45-2-120; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120.
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Under New Mexico and Colorado law, the first determination that
must take place is whether there is a parent-child relationship between
the deceased and the child. 20 In order for a parent-child relationship to
be established when a child is conceived through ART, these states re-
quire the father to consent to "assisted reproduction by the birth mother
with intent to be treated as the other parent of the child.' 2' Additionally,
determination of intestate succession depends on whether the child is
"treated as in gestation" at the time of the father's death.2 2 If the child is
conceived through ART and the father dies before the birth of the child,
the child will be "treated as in gestation,"'123 if the child is: (1) "[i]n utero
not later than thirty-six months after the individual's death;" or (2)
"[b]orn not later than forty-five months after the individual's death.'
124
Similar to the UPC, consent can occur through a signed record or it
can be impliedly met by satisfying one of the following: (1) the sperm
donor showed an intent "to function as a parent of the child no later than
two years after the child's birth" but was unable to do so due to "death,
incapacity, or other circumstances";'25 (2) the sperm donor "[i]ntended to
be treated as a parent of a posthumously conceived child, if that intent is
established by clear and convincing evidence";126 or (3) "[i]f the birth
mother is a surviving spouse and at her deceased spouse's death no di-
vorce proceeding was pending."'127 The presumption of consent essential-
ly does away with the need for consent to be in writing, unlike the
UPA. 1
28
B. The Uniform Parentage Act
Section 707 of the UPA, titled "Parental Status of Deceased Indi-
vidual," addresses the issue of posthumously conceived children. 129 The
statute states:
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted
reproduction dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the
deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction
were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent
of the child. 1
30
120. § 15-11-120(4); § 45-2-120(D); Bryant, supra note 12, at 931.
121. § 15-11-120(6); § 45-2-120(F); see Bryant, supra note 12, at 931.
122. § 15-11-120(l 1); § 45-2-120(K).
123. § 15-11-120(11); § 45-2-120(K).
124. § 15-11-120(1 I)(a)-(b); § 45-2-120(K)(1)-(2).
125. § 15-11-120(6)(b)(11); § 45-2-120(F)(2)(b).
126. § 15-11-120(6)(b)(111); § 45-2-120(F)(2)(c).
127. § 15-11-120(8)(b); § 45-2-120(H)(2).
128. Matystik, supra note 106, at 291.
129. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
130. Id.
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Similar to the UPC, section 707 was modelled after an amendment o the
USCACA.131 Eight states have adopted the UPA in part or in whole.'
32
Both Wyoming and Utah included aspects of the Act in their intestacy
laws to acknowledge posthumously conceived children.'
33
Several differences between the UPC and the UPA are worth not-
ing. Unlike the UPC, section 707 of the UPA does not provide a time
frame after the death of the father in which the woman must conceive the
child. 34 Additionally, the 2000 version of the UPA required written con-
sent if a "spouse" died before placement of the sperm; not just any indi-
vidual.135 It was amended in 2002 to apply to both spouses and non-
spouses who consent in writing.' 36 Finally, the UPA requires the parent's
consent to be in writing.' 37 The UPC, however, allows for a presumption
of consent of a posthumously conceived child. 38
1. Utah
Utah adopted laws regarding the parental status of a deceased
spouse similar to those defined under the 2000 version of the UPA.
139
The amendment, codified in U.C.A. subsection 78b-15-707 and effective
in 2008, provides, "If a spouse dies before placement of ... sperm...
the deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child," unless he
"consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after
death" he "would be the parent of the child."'
' 40
The definition of "parent" is contained in subsection 78b-15-201,
but the definition of "consent" is not defined anywhere in Utah's UPA.
141
Utah's definition of "parent" requires that the father establish a parent-
child relationship.42 The father establishes the parent-child relationship
by "having consented to assisted reproduction by a woman under Part 7,
Assisted Reproduction [78b-15-707], which resulted in the birth of the
child.' '143 Thus, the definition of a parent is circular within section 78b-
15-707 and the child can only receive inheritance rights if the father es-
tablishes consent to be the parent of the child. 44 The case that illustrates
131. Goffe, supra note 100, at 25.
132. Parentage Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspxtitle=Parentage%20Act (last visited May 26, 2014).
133. Goffe, supra note 100, at 18-24.
134. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707.




139. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78b-15-707 (LexisNexis 2013); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707.
140. § 78b-15-707.
141. Bums v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 555 (Utah 2012).
142. Id.
143. § 78b-15-201(2)(e).
144. Burns, 289 P.3d at 555.
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this Utah law, Burns v. Astrue, is discussed in more detail in Part III of
this Comment.
2. Wyoming
Wyoming adopted section 707 of the UPA of 2000.141 Section 14-2-
907, titled "Parental Status of Deceased Individual," directly addresses
the issue of posthumously conceived children.146 It requires that the fa-
ther consent to be the parent "before placement of ... sperm."'147 Wyo-
ming's definition of a "parent" begins in section 14-2-501, which states
that a "father-child relationship is established" when the man has "con-
sented to assisted reproduction by his wife under article 8 of this act
which resulted in the birth of the child.,148 Thus, like Utah, Wyoming
requires consent before the placement of the sperm for artificial insemi-
nation, but it does not specify a time limit after the death of the father.
C. Other Approaches in the Tenth Circuit
1. Kansas
Kansas's intestacy succession statute defines a child to mean a "bio-
logical child[].,,149 A "posthumous child" is explicitly included in this
definition. 50 However, a posthumously conceived child is not mentioned
in this statute, nor in Kansas case law. In Baugh v. Baugh,151 a child born
just a few months after the father died intestate received the entirety of
the wrongful-death insurance money.52 Both the parents and the girl-
friend of the dead father tried to split the insurance money but were de-
nied because a Kansas statute explicitly leaves the inheritance of a parent
who dies intestate and without a spouse to the surviving children in order
to protect the interests of the child.
53
The intestacy law in Kansas defines child to be the biological child.
A posthumously conceived child whose father is clearly the man from
whom the woman is trying to receive the benefits may be able to receive
benefits based on her deceased husband's wages.154 However, Kansas
courts have not directly addressed the issue; thus, it has yet to be deter-
mined whether a posthumously conceived child will be able to inherit
from the father.
145. Goffe, supra note 100, at 18-24.
146. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2013).
147. Id.
148. § 14-2-501(b)(v).
149. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501(a) (2013).
150. Id.
151. Baugh v. Baugh ex rel. Smith, 973 P.2d 202 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999).
152. Id. at 204-05.
153. Id. at 206.
154. § 59-501(a).
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2. Oklahoma
Oklahoma adopted the UPA, but did not adopt its intestacy laws for
children.155 Oklahoma law states, "Posthumous children are considered
as living at the death of their parents.'  This statute seems to provide
for benefits for posthumously conceived children without any prerequi-
sites, but the statute does not distinguish between posthumous children
and posthumously conceived children.57 At the time this statute was
enacted, however, cryopreservation was not as popular as it is now.1
58
Therefore, it may be difficult for an advocate to make the case that post-
humously conceived children should be included in this definition.
III. BURNS V. ASTRUE: THE UTAH SUPREME COURT REJECTS SOCIAL
SECURITY BENEFITS FOR POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT PROOF OF CONSENT
A. Facts
Michael Bums was married to his wife, Gayle, for just two-and-a-
half years when he discovered he had cancer.59 Fearing he would be-
come sterile from radiation treatment and chemotherapy, the couple de-
cided to cryogenically preserve his sperm at the University of Utah
School of Medicine, Division of Urology.' 60 Before preserving the se-
men, Mr. Bums filled out a storage agreement with the University.'
61
Importantly, subsection 31 of the agreement gave Mr. Burns two options
as to how the University would deal with his semen upon his death.
62
Option one was to destroy the semen, which Mr. Bums left blank.163 Op-
tion two, which he initialed, stated that the semen was to be
"[m]aintained in storage for future donation to Gayle Burns... who will
assume all of the obligations and terms described in this contract."'
64
Michael Bums filled out his wife's name in the blank showing his intent
to have his wife receive the sperm upon his death.
165
Unfortunately, "cancer-related complications" claimed Mr. Bums's
166life in March 2001. His wife, however, using artificial insemination,
155. Parentage Act, supra note 132 (showing a map where Oklahoma has adopted the Uniform
Parentage Act). Section 707 of the Uniform Parentage Act is different than the Oklahoma provision,
thus Oklahoma has not adopted the UPA to address posthumously conceived children. Compare
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 228 (2013), with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
156. tit. 84, § 228.
157. Courtney Hannon, Comment, Astrue v. Capato: Forcing a Shoe That Doesn't Fit, 16 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 403, 412-13 (2013).
158. Id. at 413.
159. Bums v. Astrue, 289 P.3d 551, 553 (Utah 2012).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 556.






was able to use her husband's cryogenically preserved sperm to conceive
a child two years after his death.67 Shortly after giving birth to a child,
I.M.B., on December 23, 2003, Mrs. Burns applied for social security
benefits for both herself and for her child based on her deceased hus-
band's income.168 The SSA twice denied her application for benefits on
the grounds that she had failed to show that her child was "Mr. Bums's
'child' as defined by the Social Security Act. 1 69
B. Procedural History
After Mrs. Bums's application was rejected twice by the SSA, both
an administrative law judge and the Third Judicial District Court of Utah
ruled that she should have received benefits based on her deceased hus-
band's income.170 The state court decided that Mr. Burns was the father
of the child and the administrative law judge reversed the SSA's decision
to reject her application.'17 The SSA's Appeals Council reopened her
case due to "errors in the administrative law judge's decision granting
benefits" and ruled that Gayle "was not entitled to benefits ... because
they had not shown that I.M.B. was the 'child' of Mr. Burns as defined in
the Social Security Act., 172 Gayle Bums appealed to the United States
District Court in Utah where the court certified the state law question
giving the Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction over the matter.
73
C. Opinion
As a result of the Social Security Act leaving the status of the child
to state intestacy laws, the court was required to interpret a section of the
Utah Uniform Parentage Act.174 It states:
If a spouse dies before placement of eggs, sperm, or an embryo, the
deceased spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the de-
ceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were
to occur after death, the deceased spouse would be a parent of the
child. 
175
Due to the clear language of the statute, the court noted that it was im-
portant to find some evidence of Mr. Burns's consent to have his cryo-
genically preserved sperm result in the birth of the child.176 The court
then looked to the meaning of "parent" as defined by the UPA, which
circularly defines parent as dependent upon the formation of a parent-
167. Id.







175. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78b-15-707 (LexisNexis 2013).
176. Burns, 289 P.3d at 554.
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child relationship. 177 In order for a dead parent to establish a parent-child
relationship, the deceased spouse must "consent to 'be a parent of the
child."'
178
Mrs. Burns argued that subsection 31 alone constituted her hus-
band's consent to be the child's parent.179 Additionally, she directed the
court's attention to the agreement's "numerous references to pregnancy
... and artificial insemination," which further "demonstrate[d] that sub-
section 31 constitute[d] Mr. Burns's consent to be a parent of a child con-
ceived after his death."'80 For instance, the first section of the agreement
stated, "[s]emen is desired by the donor for one or more of the following
reasons."'8 The possible choices were: (1) "[p]rior to irradiation and/or
chemotherapy, and" (2) "[p]rior to artificial insemination."82 But Mr.
Burns never circled or indicated in any way that he chose "[p]rior to arti-
ficial insemination."'183 In fact, Mrs. Burns admitted that, if her husband
had chosen, he would have circled "[p]rior to irradiation and/or chemo-
therapy" instead of "[p]rior to artificial insemination.
' 184
Mrs. Burns further urged the court to consider other parts of the
agreement as evidence of consent, but the court rejected her arguments
because "something more is required to constitute consent."'8 5 The court
noted that the purpose is clearly stated in the first sentence of the agree-
ment: "to act as an agreement o store semen for the purpose of ... stor-
age in liquid nitrogen."'8 6 Furthermore, Mr. Burns did not choose to cir-
cle "[p]rior to artificial insemination" in the first section.87 The other
areas that Mrs. Burns argued were evidence of consent dealt with either
fee scheduling for the semen storage or "the process under which the
University [would] release the samples to the donor."' 88 The court con-
cluded that these sections had nothing to do with consent to be the parent
of the child. 8 9 Thus, the court held that the agreement did "not constitute
sufficient consent in a record to be the parent of a child conceived by
artificial means following the donor's death" under Utah Code Annotat-
ed section 78b-15-707.190
177. Id. at 555 (citing § 78b-15-102(17)).
178. Id. (quoting § 78b-15-707).
179. Id. at 556.
180. Id.
181. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. Id. at 557.
186. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).






The court did not elaborate on its explanation of "something more is
required to constitute consent."'191 By making this statement, however,
the court implied that if the contract explicitly addressed consent in an-
other manner, then the contract would have constituted consent on the
record.
IV. MORAL AND POLICY CONCERNS IN LIGHT OF BURNS V. ASTRUE AND
TENTH CIRCUIT STATE INTESTACY LAWS
A. The Administration of Estates
States have begun to acknowledge the need to protect posthumously
conceived children by permitting them to inherit from a parent who dies
intestate.'92 There are, however, still states that either expressly exclude
posthumously conceived children from their statutes or do not address
their needs at all.193 There are several arguments for and against exclud-
ing posthumously conceived children. Some argue that exclusion brings
finality to the distribution of the estate.94 Others argue that it is socially
disadvantageous for the child to be brought up in a single-parent home.'
95
Those states excluding posthumously conceived children argue that
"waiting for the potential birth" of the child "could tie up estate distribu-
tions indefinitely."'' 96 Excluding posthumously conceived children brings
finality to the distribution of the estate and provides for a more fair and
efficient process when probate courts are administering estates.197 This
argument, however, is misguided.98 Probate matters are already a
lengthy process.199 The personal representative is not required to provide
immediacy in the distribution of assets, but merely to ensure that assets
are distributed properly.200 Oftentimes a personal representative will wait
many months before distributing assets. For instance, in some states,
personal representatives must wait at least four months in order to allow
creditors ample opportunity to bring claims against the decedent's es-
tate.z0z In addition, personal representatives may further delay distribu-
tion in order to ensure that the resolution of disputed claims, payment of
191. Id.
192. Banks, supra note 22, at 259.
193. States that expressly exclude posthumously conceived children are as follows: Arkansas,
Florida, Minnesota, and Ohio; States that do not address posthumously conceived children are as
follows: Maine, South Dakota, and West Virginia. Bryant, supra note 12, at 931.
194. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 406.
195. Banks, supra note 22, at 298.
196. Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1184 (N.H. 2007);
Carpenter, supra note 14, at 406 n.379.
197. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 406 (citing In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (Sur. Ct.
2007)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 407.
200. Id. at 406-07.
201. Id. at 407.
202. Id.
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taxes, inability to contact heirs, or other business matters are attended
to.
203
B. The Interests of the Woman and Child
Proponents of exclusion also argue that it would be socially disad-
vantageous for the child to be born after the death of a parent.20 4 Some
scholars note that single-parent mothers are more likely to bring up chil-
dren who will be poor, drop out of school, and take part in delinquent
activity.20 5 Thus, posthumously conceived children degrade the tradition-
al American family and keep children from developing a relationship
with their parents.20 6 Under these arguments, birth of the child should not
be encouraged.
Additionally, excluding posthumously conceived children ignores
women's reproductive rights and causes them to be marginalized and
discriminated against simply because they chose to conceive after the
death of the father.207 Professor Gloria Banks, a scholar on wills and
trusts, concedes that while public policy should not necessarily promote
"orphaned children," there are constitutional safeguards protecting wom-
en's reproductive rights, which should not be restricted in any manner by
the state.20 8 The right to procreate is constitutionally protected and, as
Justice Douglas wrote in Skinner v. Oklahoma,209 is "one of the basic
civil rights of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.210 Punishing posthumously conceived children merely because
the mother opted to reproduce after the death of the father cuts against
the fundamental civil right described by Justice Douglas in Skinner.
21
1
By restricting procreation rights, the state withholds much-needed bene-
fits from single-parent households.2 12 Posthumously conceived children
are often brought up in single-parent households, which causes govem-
mental benefits to be more important than ever.213 The woman and child
are in need of the benefits and society is prejudicing them by not consid-
ering their interests.
214
Several different interests need to be balanced when determining
whether posthumously conceived children should inherit from a deceased
203. Id.
204. Banks, supra note 22, at 298.
205. Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 57, 62 (1995) (citing
Sara McLanahan & Karen Booth, Mother-Only Families: Problems, Prospects, and Politics, 51 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 557 (1989)).
206. Banks, supra note 22, at 299.
207. Id. at 302.
208. Id. at 298-99.
209. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
210. Id. at 541; Banks, supra note 22, at 302.
211. Banks, supra note 22, at 302 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
212. Matystik, supra note 106, at 281.
213. Id.
214. Banks, supra note 22, at 302.
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parent, including the interests of the child, the deceased parent, the sur-
viving parent, and the state.215 As most states in the Tenth Circuit have
already done, state statutes should uniformly address time limits and
requirements of consent in order to balance the interests of all the parties
involved.2 16 But encouraging legislatures to draft and adopt a model act
is tricky, as Justice Breyer noted during oral arguments for Capato /.217
He speculated that legislatures would perceive the situation as one where
children conceived by traditional methods were already consuming the
Social Security trust fund,2t 8 and posthumously conceived children
would "take the money away from the other children.,
219
Justice Breyer's point brings up the question of whether a mother
who makes a conscious choice to conceive a child after her husband or
lover has died should be entitled to benefits at taxpayer expense. A good
argument can be made that a woman who has made a deliberate choice to
bear a deceased man's child should be responsible for all of the expens-
es. States that exclude posthumously conceived children are "stigmatiz-
ing and isolating" the children by preventing them from establishing a
parent-child relationship for the purposes of receiving social security
benefits.22 ° Society should not treat these children as "modem day
Frankensteins.22 1 They are human beings whose "liberties and rights are
indisputably protected by principles of fairness and equity promoted by
the Constitution."22 2 Thus, a balance should be struck between the inter-
ests of the surviving partner or spouse, the decedent who donated the
223sperm, the posthumously conceived child, and the state.
V. ALLOWING STATES TO ADDRESS POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED
CHILDREN
Currently, federal law does not expressly provide benefits for post-
224humously conceived children. As stated previously, the SSA requires
parties to refer to their state's intestacy laws. 225 Due to the delicate na-
ture of issues involved with posthumously conceived children, many
scholars argue for a federal amendment o the Act in order to bring about
215. Laurence C. Nolan, Critiquing Society's Response to the Needs of Posthumously Con-
ceived Children, 82 OR. L. REV. 1067, 1090 (2003).
216. Morgan Kirkland Wood, Note, It Takes a Village: Considering the Other Interests at
Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to Posthumously Conceived Children, 44 GA. L. REV. 873,
898, 904-05 (2010).
217. Matystik, supra note 106, at 279-80.
218. Id. at 281-82.
219. Id. at 281.
220. Id.
221. Banks, supra note 22, at 303.
222. Id. at 304.
223. See Wood, supra note 216, at 902.
224. Raymond C. O'Brien, The Momentum of Posthumous Conception: A Model Act, 25 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 332, 358 (2009).
225. Id.
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national uniformity.226 However, in light of the recent government grid-
lock and shutdown, the SSA's ability to look at posthumously conceived
children on a "case-by-case" basis227 is not likely nor is it feasible.
Furthermore, a federal amendment expressly providing benefits for
posthumously conceived children would run contrary to the Act's pur-
pose and Congress's original intent in promulgating the Act.228 Posthu-
mously conceived children were not contemplated during the drafting of
the Act because the technology to produce them was not available at that
time.229 The purpose of the Act was originally "to provide... dependent
members of [a wage earner's] family with protection against the hardship
occasioned by [the] loss of [the insured's] earnings."230 The aim was not
to benefit the needy, but to provide support for a child who lost a living
parent so the child was not thrust into poverty.231 Congress was attempt-
ing to protect the Social Security trust fund by limiting the benefits to
those children who were no longer able to receive their parents' sup-
port.232 It is therefore tough to argue that survivor benefits should be ex-
tended for a child of someone who "did not exist" when the child was
born.233 By allowing states to address the issue, more children may actu-
ally be benefitting than otherwise would be the case under a uniform
federal approach.234
At least one author has argued that the SSA is more capable than the
states to handle the distribution of federal funds on a "case-by-case ba-
sis",235 because the organization has added many people to its staff and
has "plenty of resources.,236 The federal government, however, initiated
federal spending cuts in 2013,237 causing federal agencies to impose
mandatory sequestration on current employees and initiate nationwide
hiring freezes.238 For example, many agencies had to shut down opera-
tions in late 2013,239 including the SSA.240 During the Congressional
226. Banks, supra note 22, at 258; Kennedy, supra note 8, at 822.
227. Capato II, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012).
228. Bryant, supra note 12, at 923.
229. Matystik, supra note 106, at 280.
230. Capato I1, 132 S. Ct. at 2032 (alterations in original) (quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S.
47, 52 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Bryant, supra note 12, at 943.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 943-44.
234. Matystik, supra note 106, at 280-81.
235. The Supreme Court stated in Capato I! that the SSA was not capable of handling the issue
of posthumously conceived children because they would have to do so on a "case-by-case basis"
since each case is unique and requires analysis. Capato 11, 132 S. Ct. at 2032-33.
236. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 845.
237. Joe Davidson, Report: Sequestration Cuts Could Get Worse in 2014, WASH. POST, Dec. 3,
2013, at B04.
238. First Command. Federal Employees Bracing for Second Round of Sequestration,
WIRELESS NEWS, Nov. 6, 2013.
239. Congress Lays Groundwork for Blame over Obamacare and Possible Shutdown, WASH.




gridlock of 2013, up to 800,000 federal employees were furloughed, and
241only the most "essential" workers were kept in federal offices. Austeri-
ty measures will most likely continue for some time, because of Con-
gress's continuous gridlock over making federal deficit decisions.242
Thus, the SSA may not be in a position to cope with a uniform change in
federal law that would require the agency to look at each and every post-
humously conceived child case.243 Allowing states to address the issue of
federal benefits is not only more efficient, but it complies with the con-
cept of federalism that prompted Congress to defer to state intestacy
laws.24
Because of the SSA's inability to take on cases of posthumously
conceived children, the UPC and the UPA are currently the best vehicles
for providing benefits to applicants. The two model codes restrict the
pool of qualifying individuals by requiring either recorded consent or
imposing time limits.2 45 This mode of qualifying individuals is the best
method of balancing the interests of the deceased father, the woman con-
ceiving, the taxpayers, and the posthumous child.246 Like Burns v.
Astrue, the UPA's requirement of recorded consent must indicate that the
sperm is to be used specifically for artificial insemination in the case of
death of the father.247 This requirement prevents applicants from filing
fraudulent claims that may have been against the wishes of the dece-
dent.248
Although the UPA and UPC are the best options, the UPA's strict
consent requirement does not adequately address the interests of the
posthumously conceived child.249 Additionally, the UPC allows an appli-
cant to receive benefits even if there is no express written consent, which
may result in the interests of the deceased not accurately being fol-
250lowed. Some argue, however, that a lack of written consent should not
keep a child from inheritance rights because a non-posthumous child can
already inherit without specific consent when the parent dies intestate.25'
240. Annie Kami, Government Shutdown Leaves Local Furloughed Workers Struggling with
Bills, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 6, 2013, 2:58 AM,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/shutdown-leaves-furoughed-workers-struggling-article-
1.1477581.
241. Lockheed Martin to Furlough 3K Workers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 4, 2013.
242. Davidson, supra note 237.
243. The Supreme Court stated that it would be "burdensome" for the SSA to make "case-by-
case determinations" as to whether a child was "dependent on her father's earnings." Capato II, 132
S. Ct. 2021, 2032 (2012). Thus, it can be inferred that this burden coupled with the current austerity
measures being taken by the federal government weighs against requiring the SSA to rule upon each
posthumously conceived child case.
244. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 844-45.
245. Matystik, supra note 106, at 287, 289.
246. Id. at 282.
247. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (amended 2002).
248. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 421.
249. Matystik, supra note 106, at 287.
250. See id. at 289-91.
251. Id. at 283.
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Ultimately, requiring written consent should be required to prove the
intent of the decedent and to protect against "fraudulent claims by sur-
viving partners.252
In regard to time limits, the only states within the Tenth Circuit that
impose such constraints are Colorado and New Mexico. Benjamin Car-
penter argues that ime constraints allow the states "to provide finality to
the administration process in those scenarios where a posthumously con-
ceived child could 'divest' others of all or a part of their share of the de-
cedent's estate.,253 Otherwise, an estate would have to wait-potentially
for years-for a posthumous child to be born, thus requiring an estate to
remain open indefinitely.254 The time constraint imposed by Colorado
and New Mexico is three years for conception, which allows the wife a
period of grieving for her lost loved one, a certain amount of time to
make an informed decision, several attempts at becoming pregnant, and
"a fairly efficient estate administration.,255
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because many Americans move from state to state for various rea-
sons, state statutes addressing posthumously conceived children should
256be more uniform. However, the legislative process of adopting a large
package such as the UPC or UPA is difficult and cumbersome.2 Addi-
tionally, the potentially hot-button interests involved with posthumous
conception and the impact on the federal budget of providing for these
children are the sorts of issues likely to produce more demagoguery than
compromise between liberal and conservative politicians.25 8 As previous-
ly discussed, the interests involved with posthumous conception include:
(1) the SSA's trust fund and its potential depletion; (2) a state's desire to
promote efficiency and speed in its probate courts; (3) the desires of the
deceased father and the need for his consent; (4) the woman's reproduc-
tive rights; (5) the inheritance rights of children born during the hus-
band's lifetime; (6) and the rights of the posthumously conceived chil-
dren themselves.259
A hybrid UPA-UPC standard would best strike a balance between
all interests involved.2 60 This model would include the "written consent
252. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 421.
253. Id. at 425.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 424-26; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-120(K) (West 2013).
256. Probate Code Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Probate%2OCode (last visited May 26, 2014).
257. Id.
258. Historically, the issues of the woman's reproductive rights and issues relating to the
federal budget have proven to be extremely divisive. See Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice:
Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 413 (2013); Federal Govern-
ment Shuts Down, FRONTRUNNER, Oct. 1, 2013.
259. See Matystik, supra note 106, at 282.
260. Id. at 292.
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requirement of the UPA" and the "time limit requirement of the UPC.' ' 2 6I
Use of the time limit requirement from the UPC would allow states to
bring the desired finality to the distribution of the estates, while also al-
lowing women to have a period of grieving for their loved one. Although
the three-year time limit proposed by the UPC seems arbitrary, the
NCCUL Commissioners chose that period to allow the "surviving spouse
or partner a period of grieving, time to make up his or her mind about
whether to go forward with assisted reproduction, and a reasonable al-
lowance for unsuccessful ... pregnancy."262 The thirty-six month period
also "coincides with Section 3-1006, under which an heir is allowed to
recover property improperly distributed or its value from any distributee
during the later of three years after the decedent's death or one year after
distribution.'" 263 Thus, the UPC's time restriction serves both the interests
of the state and the interests of the woman involved in the posthumous
conception.
The consent requirement is important for the decedent's interests
because it ensures that only an intended beneficiary receives the inher-
itance rights.264 The UPA's consent requirement has been criticized as
being too strict (requiring consent on the record), which can result in
inheritance rights "be[ing] overly exclusive."265 However, the UPC's
consent requirement allows for too many presumptions, which could
possibly lead to more fraudulent claims and could prevent the decedent's
266intent from being considered. Thus, the combination of the time re-
strictions from the UPC and the consent requirement from the UPA
would be most amenable to providing for all the interests involved.
One final solution would require sperm donor sites to provide a
consent form that would establish a parent-child relationship in the event
the wife decides to conceive a child by inseminating herself with her
husband's sperm after his death.267 The drafters of the UPC refer to Cali-
fornia Health and Safety Code section 1644.7 as a model consent form
for sperm donor sites to use.268 Requiring such a form would force the
couple to specifically consider the issue and make their intentions clear
from the beginning. Use of such a form would also "promote efficien-
261. Id.
262. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt. subsec. (k) (2010); Carpenter, supra note 14, at
373-74.
263. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) cmt. subsec. (k).
264. Matystik, supra note 106, at 283.
265. Id. (stating that the consent-on-the-record requirements are too strict, because "state[s]
will generally allow a non-posthumously conceived biological child to inherit when there is not a
will").
266. Carpenter, supra note 14, at 420 (stating that if legislatures did not "require proof that the
decedent consented to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material .. the door would be open
to the possibility of improper posthumous use of one's genetic material-for instance, postmortem
sperm retrieval").
267. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 legis. note.; Homer, supra note 13, at 176.
268. Matystik, supra note 106, at 289.
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cy ' ' 269 by removing any difficulty the woman might later have when
faced with trying to prove the wishes of the father regarding the child
born in these peculiar circumstances.
Lane Thomasson*
269. Id.
* J.D. candidate 2015, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
the Denver University Law Review staff and board as well as Professor Roberto Corrada for their
time and effort spent editing this Comment. Thank you to my aunt and uncle, Merrill Shields and
Ray Thomasson, for their constant love and support. Above all, I would also like to thank my hus-
band, Morley Swingle, for being my cheerleader and tolerating my life as a law student.
[Vol. 91:3
NEW MEXICO TAXATION & RE VENUE DEPARTMENT V.
BARNESANDNOBLE. COMLLC: RECONSIDERING THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE IN AN E-COMMERCE
WORLD
ABSTRACT
Vacationing off the coast of Belize on a remote Central American
island, I bought a book from Amazon's website while on a dock 100
yards into the ocean. Within seconds the book was downloaded onto my
Kindle. From my hammock I marveled at the ease and simplicity of one-
click purchasing without even considering the tax implications.
My experience is far from unique. E-commerce is a way of life for
American consumers, which has tangible consequences for retailers and
states. Brick-and-mortar bookstores are forced out of business because of
online competition. Black Friday is not what it once was. Consumers
now wait until Cyber Monday to make their holiday purchases to avoid
long lines and sales taxes.
But our collective online shopping experience may soon change. A
number of states have passed the so-called "Amazon tax," which requires
Internet retailers to collect taxes if they have in-state affiliates. The Ama-
zon tax and similar laws are designed to make up for the more than $20
billion in revenue states are losing each year due to online commerce.
According to the Congressional Research Service, e-commerce has
caused states to lose out on almost a third of their total tax revenue. Be-
cause of the losses, many states are considering unconventional ways to
bring Internet retailers within their state's tax jurisdiction.
This Comment explains when the dormant Commerce Clause al-
lows states to tax Internet retailers. The New Mexico Supreme Court
faced that issue in New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department v.
Barnesandnoble.com LLC. The court held that New Mexico could im-
pose gross receipts tax on an Internet retailer because of a relationship
with an in-state sister corporation, which created a substantial nexus with
the state. This Comment analyzes the court's opinion and uses that case
as a lens to explore how other states deal with taxation of Internet retail-
ers. In particular, this Comment discusses a New York case where a
court found that the Amazon tax was constitutional and the U.S. Su-
preme Court's subsequent denial of certiorari in that case. This Comment
argues that the New Mexico decision provides a practical approach to
Internet retailer cases, including situations where retailers have affiliate
agreements with in-state residents. According to the New Mexico court,
there is a substantial nexus when a retailer "establish[es] and maintain[s]
a market" within a state because of the economic presence of the retailer.
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This Comment also contends that the Supreme Court missed an oppor-
tunity to modernize its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence when it
denied certiorari in the New York case. It should have replaced an out-
dated physical presence requirement with an economic presence test to
reflect the realities of the Digital Age.
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INTRODUCTION
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate inter-
state commerce.1 Implied in the Clause is the dormant Commerce Clause
(DCC), which forbids states from burdening interstate commerce.2
Courts have interpreted the DCC as prohibiting states from taxing Inter-
net retailers when doing so would interfere with interstate commerce.3 In
1967, in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,4 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a retailer had to be physically present within a
state to be subject to the state's tax jurisdiction without offending the
DCC.5 In 1977, in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,6 the Court held
that the clause is not violated if a tax "is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State."7 In 1987, in Tyler Pipe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue,8 the Court held
that an out-of-state retailer's activities could produce a substantial nexus
if the "activities performed in [the] state on behalf of the taxpayer are
significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and main-
tain a market" in the state.9 Then in 1992, in Quill Corp. v. North Dako-
ta,10 the Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess's bright-line rule, holding that a
physical presence is required to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement
of the DCC.11 The Court has not updated its DCC jurisprudence as ap-
plied to out-of-state retailers since Quill.
2
In the twenty-plus years since Quill, technological advancements
and electronic commerce (e-commerce) have drastically changed retail-
ers' ability to exploit state markets without being physically present.
Because Quill does not account for this change in the national economy,
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
3. See generally id. at 317-18 (holding that in order to be exposed to state sales and use
taxes, retailers must be physically present within the state).
4. 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
5. Id. at 757-58.
6. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
7. Id. at 279.
8. 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
9. Id. at 250-51 (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126
(Wash. 1986), vacated, 483 U.S. 232) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
11. See Emily L. Patch, Note, Online Retailers Battle with Sales Tax: A Physical Rule Living
in a Digital World, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 673, 684-85 (2013).
12. Congress has, however, taken up the issue of internet taxation. In 1998, Congress passed
the Internet Tax Freedom Act which bars states from taxing access to the Internet and placing multi-
ple or discriminatory taxes on e-commerce. Internet Tax Freedom Act §§ 1100, 1101, 47 U.S.C. §
151 note (1998). The Act did not apply to internet use and sales taxes. See Scott M. Edwards, Wash-
ington High Court Says Cable Internet Access Not Taxable as Telephone Utility Service, 19 J.
MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES 36, 36 (2009). Rather, it prohibited states from taxing consumers
as a result of making an online purchase or treating online shoppers differently. Id. The Act also
allows state taxation that is otherwise constitutionally permissible. Internet Tax Freedom Act §
1101(b).
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states have attempted to maneuver around strict adherence to the physical
presence requirement. There are three ways states have sought to find a
substantial nexus in order to tax out-of-state retailers: (1) through com-
mon ownership with in-state businesses, (2) through the economic pres-
ence of the retailer in the taxing state, and (3) through affiliate agree-
ments with in-state residents. The general trend is that states have devel-
oped their own methodologies to address Internet retailers. Moreover,
different courts have come to different conclusions as to the constitution-
ality of these taxation schemes, even with almost identical factual scenar-
ios.
This Comment argues that the solution to the Internet retailer taxa-
tion problem lies in the economic presence test, which considers the x-
tent of a business's economic contacts within a state, and better reflects
the realities of e-commerce in the Digital Age.1 3 In doing so, Part I of
this Comment examines the relevant DCC case law and presents the In-
ternet retailer and state taxation issue. Part II summarizes the facts, pro-
cedural history, and opinion of New Mexico Taxation & Revenue De-
partment v. Barnesandnoble. corn LLC (Barnesandnoble. corn I) ,14 which
held that a substantial nexus occurs when an Internet retailer "estab-
lish[es] and maintain[s] a market" in a state. 15 Part III argues that the
U.S. Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in a recent New York
case in order to overrule Quill's outdated physical presence requirement.
Finally, Part III concludes that the economic presence t st and the New
Mexico Supreme Court's holding provide a workable framework for
analysis.
I. BACKGROUND
In the context of the states' taxing powers, the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause are interrelated.6 Both clauses place limits on
the states' taxing authority.17 However, there are distinct differences as
well. 18 For instance, a state may have the power to tax certain taxpayers
without violating the Due Process Clause, yet that same tax may offend
the Commerce Clause.1 9 This Part is concerned primarily with the DCC
and its relation to states' taxing powers over out-of-state retailers. First,
this Part summarizes the Due Process Clause with respect to state taxa-
tion. Second, this Part provides background material on the relevant
13. This Comment uses the term "Digital Age" to refer generally to the last fifteen years of
the twentieth century to the date of publication of this Comment.
14. 303 P.3d 824 (N.M. 2013).
15. Id. at 829.
16. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (citing Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. For a further discussion on the distinction between the Due Process Clause and the
Commerce Clause, see infra text accompanying notes 55-74.
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DCC case law. Finally, this Part demonstrates how different states and
courts have attempted to address the Internet retailer question.
A. The Due Process Clause and State Taxation
Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, no state
may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."20 At the heart of the Due Process Clause is the notion of funda-
mental fairness.2 1 A state should not tax an entity if there is insufficient
connection with the state because doing so would be unfair to the enti-
ty.22 As the U.S. Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence evolved, it
became evident that physical presence within a taxing state was neces-
sary for a state to constitutionally levy a tax.23 But in Quill, the Court
explained the evolution of its due process jurisprudence as a corollary to
24judicial jurisdiction. The Court further explained that it had expanded
the relevant judicial jurisdiction inquiry from what was once a strict
physical presence test to the "minimum contacts" test of International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.25 Thus, the Court has favored a more flexible
due process inquiry.26 To illustrate, in Quill the Court made clear that the
Due Process Clause could be satisfied "irrespective of a corporation's
lack of physical presence in the taxing State.,27 Nevertheless, the tax
28may still be unconstitutional if it violates the Commerce Clause.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Article I of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.",29 One purpose of the Commerce Clause is toprevent states from burdening interstate commerce.30  Although the
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
22. See id. (explaining that the touchstone of the due process fairness analysis is notice and
fair warning, and that the minimum contacts test isa proxy for notice).
23. Id. at 306.
24. Id. at 306-07.
25. Id. at 307 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). In Internation-
al Shoe, the Court held that judicial jurisdiction extends to situations where a person has "certain
minimum contacts with [a state] such that the maintenance of [a] suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
26. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. For example, in "[a]pplying these principles [the Court has] held
that if a foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the
forum State, it may subject itself to the State's in personam jurisdiction even if it has no physical
presence in the State." Id.
27. Id. at 308.
28. Seeid. at 312.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3-Supreme Court Cases, 41 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, § 2 (2009); see
also Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967), overruled by Quill, 504
U.S. 298 (1992) ("The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national economy free
from such unjustifiable local entanglements. Under the Constitution, this is a domain where Con-
gress alone has the power of regulation and control.").
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Commerce Clause specifically gives Congress the power to regulate in-
terstate commerce, it does not expressly limit state activity.31 The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, has construed the Commerce Clause also to
include its converse.32 That is, implied in the Commerce Clause is the so-
called "dormant Commerce Clause," which prohibits most state regula-
tions that discriminate against interstate commerce in the absence of
congressional action.33 Although states are permitted to regulate their
own intrastate commerce, a state regulation that adversely affects inter-
state commerce violates the DCC.34 A state regulation that incidentally
burdens commerce, however, is still valid if it is not designed to regulate
interstate commerce and is aimed instead at promoting a public policy
objective.35 In contrast, where a state has specific intent to discriminate
against other states, such facial discrimination is per se unconstitution-
al.36 Thus, the DCC is implicated in cases concerning state tax jurisdic-
tion over Internet retailers because it forbids states from interfering with
interstate commerce37 and most Internet retailers by their very nature are
involved in interstate commerce. The following Subpart summarizes the
relevant DCC case law of the last fifty years with respect to state taxation
of out-of-state retailers and provides a foundation for an analysis of In-
ternet tax issues.
1. Dormant Commerce Clause Case Law
A distinct line of U.S. Supreme Court cases involves the taxing
power of the states with respect to out-of-state retailers.38 Specifically,
these cases sought to address when a state goes too far in levying a tax
against out-of-state retailers under the DCC.39
In 1967, the Supreme Court announced a bright-line rule in Nation-
al Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue.40 In Bellas Hess, the issue
was whether Illinois could constitutionally tax an out-of-state mail order
company that had no property or employees in the state.41 The Court held
that Illinois could not impose taxes on the out-of-state company, because
31. Buchwalter, supra note 30, § 2.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231-32 (1824) (Johnson, J., concur-
ring).
34. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 72-73 (majority opinion).
35. Id. (holding that state laws which have a legitimate object, such as public health, are not
unconstitutional if they "incidentally restrict or regulate" interstate commerce).
36. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978).
37. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
38. See id at 309; Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232
(1987); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't
of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
39. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 309.
40. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-60; Daniel Tyler Cowan, Recent Development, New
York's Unconstitutional Tax on the Internet: Amazon.com v. New York State Department of Taxa-
tion & Finance and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1423, 1424 (2010).
41. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54.
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the company had no office, employees, solicitors, or property within the
42state. The Court further held that physical presence was a requirement
for taxation under both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses.43
In 1977, the Supreme Court expanded upon Bellas Hess's physical
presence rule.44 In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the Court once
again considered whether an out-of-state corporation could be required to
pay a state tax for activities conducted within the state.45 The Complete
Auto Court held that the state could tax the out-of state corporation.46 In
its holding, the Court announced a four-prong test extracted from prior
decisions.4 7 The Court declared that a tax does not violate the Commerce
Clause when it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.
' 48
The substantial nexus prong-the focus of this Comment and the cases
discussed below-stands for the proposition that retailers having an in-
sufficient or limited connection with a state cannot be taxed without of-
fending the DCC.49
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v.
Washington State Department of Revenue, a consolidated case raising the
issue of whether Washington could constitutionally tax out-of-state man-
ufacturers whose products were sold in the state.50 The manufacturers did
not have any property, offices, or employees in Washington.51 But unlike
the business in Bellas Hess, which did not have any sales representatives
within the state, the out-of-state manufacturers had independent contrac-
tors in the taxing state who enabled them to establish and maintain a
market in Washington.52 The Court held that even though the companies
had no traditional employees or property in Washington, the independent
contractors' in-state activities established a nexus sufficient to permit the
state to tax the out-of-state manufacturers.53 In its reasoning, the Court
used the language of the Washington Supreme Court, which said that
42. Id. at 758-59. The Court also noted that where the only contacts with a state were by
means of common carrier or United States mail, there were not sufficient connections so as to permit
the state to tax the out-of-state company. Id. at 758.
43. Id. at 756-60.
44. See generally Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that a
substantial nexus is required for a state to tax a business).
45. Id. at 276.
46. See id. at 277-78, 289.
47. Id. at 279; Jon Gworek, Comment, The Imposition of Use Tax Collection Liability on
Mail-Order Retailers: What Happens When the Bellas Hess Barrier Is Removed?, 23 CONN. L. REV.
1087, 1108 (1991).
48. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. This Comment discusses the "substantial nexus" prong
of the Complete Auto test in-depth. The other three prongs are beyond the scope of this Comment.
49. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310-11 (1992).
50. Id. at 234, 249.
51. Id.
52. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1967), overruled by Quill,
504 U.S. 298.
53. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250-51 (1987).
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"the crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in
this state on behalf of the taxpayer are significantly associated with the
taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for the
sales.,
54
i. The Physical Presence Test: Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota provides the current law regarding out-
of-state retailers and state tax jurisdiction. Before Quill there was signifi-
cant overlap between Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause issues
to the extent that it was sometimes difficult to distinguish the two in
court decisions.5 5 The Quill Court set out to clarify.56
Quill was similar to Bellas Hess in that it concerned a state tax
against an out-of-state corporation that sold office products and solicited
orders for its products through catalogs, advertisements, flyers, and tele-
phone calls.57 Quill had no significant property in North Dakota, nor did
it have any employees or representatives within the state.58 Like the
business in Bellas Hess, it sold its products through mail order to con-
sumers within the state.59 North Dakota imposed a use tax on Quill,
which it contested.60 The state sued and the trial court ruled for Quill.
61
The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, rejected Bellas Hess's
bright-line physical presence rule with regard to the Commerce Clause
and reversed the lower court's decision.62 Instead, the court framed the
question in terms of the minimum contacts test of the Due Process
Clause63 and whether Quill had been provided any opportunities, bene-
fits, or protections from the taxing state.
64
Thus, the main issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether
North Dakota's tax violated the Due Process Clause or the Commerce
54. Id. (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126 (Wash. 1986),
vacated, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-06, 312 (1992) ("Despite the similarity in
phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical.").
56. See id. According to the Quill Court, the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause
each represent distinctive constitutional concerns. Id. at 305. Due process mainly involves the fun-
damental fairness of government action. Id. at 312. For instance, due process requires that a person's
connections to a state be substantial enough to justify the state in exercising power over him. Id.
Conversely, the Commerce Clause is concerned with "structural ... effects of state regulation on the
national economy" so that state activity does not burden interstate commerce. Id. Consequently, the
inquiry into the validity of an exercise of state taxing power necessarily requires an independent
analysis of the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. See Cowan, supra note 40, at 1430-
32.
57. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301.
58. Id. at 301-02.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 303.
62. Id. at 303-04.
63. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
64. Quill, 504 U.S. at 304.
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Clause.65 With respect to whether the tax violated the Due Process
Clause, the Court held that the state could tax the out-of-state corpora-
tion, because Quill had "purposefully directed its activities at North Da-
kota residents."66 In expressly overruling past decisions that adhered to
the physical presence requirement, the Court reasoned that the evolution
of due process jurisprudence, particularly in the area of judicial jurisdic-
tion, mandated such a holding.67 In addition, the Court noted that there
was a sufficient link between the tax and the benefits Quill received from
access to the North Dakota market.
68
After deciding the due process issue, the Court turned to the Com-
merce Clause. The Court held that Quill did not have a substantial nexus
with the state because it had no offices or employees in North Dakota.
69
The Court rejected the North Dakota Supreme Court's ruling that if the
minimum contacts test of the Due Process Clause is satisfied, then the
substantial nexus test of the Commerce Clause is automatically 
met.70
Instead, the Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess's bright-line rule, and held that
to satisfy the DCC an entity must have physical presence within the tax-
ing state.7'
In summary, the Quill Court distinguished the requirements of the
72
Due Process Clause from those of the Commerce Clause. Due process
does not require physical presence if the minimum contacts test is satis-
fied.73 The Commerce Clause, however, does require physical presence
to satisfy the substantial nexus requirement.74
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Question of Internet Retail-
ers
Under the DCC, a business is exposed to a state's tax jurisdiction if
it has a substantial nexus with the state.75 A substantial nexus is estab-
lished through physical presence.76 However, the governing case-
Quill-was decided over twenty years ago;77 since then, the Internet has
65. See id at 301,305.
66. Id. at 308.
67. Id. ("[T]o the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process Clause requires
physical presence in a State for the imposition of duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those hold-
ings as superseded by developments in the law of due process."). For a discussion on the evolution
of judicial jurisdiction, see supra Part I.A.
68. Quill, 504 U.S. at 308.
69. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1424.
70. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305, 312-13, 318 (explaining that a corporation could have the mini-
mum contacts required under the Due Process Clause but still not meet the requirements of the
substantial nexus test under the Commerce Clause).
71. Patch, supra note 11, at 684-85.
72. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
73. Id. at 307-08.
74. Patch, supra note 11, at 684-85.
75. Quill, 504 U.S. at311.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 298.
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greatly changed the face of commerce. In response to the e-commerce
revolution, states have begun to experiment with their own Amazon tax-
es,79 which permit states to tax Internet retailers even if they are not
physically present within the state.0 The goal of these taxes81 is to close
the gap between state expenditures and revenue accrual.82 Another goal
is to level the playing field between brick-and-mortar and online busi-
nesses.83 It is very much an open question, however, whether Amazon
taxes are consistent with the Commerce Clause. Different courts have
come to different conclusions. Some courts have found a substantial
nexus through common ownership with an in-state business. Other courts
have found a substantial nexus solely through the economic presence of
the retailer in the taxing state. New York, for example, has attempted to
establish a substantial nexus through affiliate agreements with in-state
residents. In general, though, there is not a common methodology to deal
with taxation of Internet retailers. The following three Subparts show
how different states have attempted to establish a substantial nexus and
how the outcomes have been inconsistent in state and federal courts.
1. Establishing a Substantial Nexus Through Common Ownership
Some states have sought to establish a substantial nexus when an In-
ternet retailer and an in-state brick-and-mortar business have common
ownership. This Subpart discusses three cases that examined the com-
mon ownership method and the different analyses the courts employed.
In 1991, in SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon,84 the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that Connecticut could not tax a mail order compa-
ny, because common ownership and sharing a brand name with an in-
state affiliate did not create a sufficient nexus with the state.8 5 In its rea-
soning, the court expressly rejected an economic presence test, declaring
that the court was bound to Bellas Hess's bright-line rule that required
physical presence.
86
78. See Patch, supra note 11, at 699; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
79. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "Amazon tax" refers to any law or methodol-
ogy that seeks to bring an Internet retailer into a state's tax jurisdiction.
80. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1429; see infra note 121 and accompanying text.
81. This Comment is concerned primarily with sales, use, and gross receipts taxes. A sales tax
is "[a] tax imposed on the sale of goods and services." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1597 (9th ed.
2009). It is synonymous with the term "retail tax." Id. A use tax is "[a] tax imposed on the use of
certain goods that are bought outside the taxing authority's jurisdiction." Id. A gross receipts tax is
"[a] tax on a business's gross receipts, without a deduction for costs of goods sold, or allowance for
expenses or deductions." Id. at 1595.
82. See Cowan, supra note 40, at 1423.
83. Brief for Respondents at 29-30, Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation &
Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013) (No. 2013-0033).
84. 585 A.2d 666 (Conn. 1991).
85. Id. at 668. SFA Folio Collections, Inc. was a mail order company that was affiliated with
Saks Fifth Avenue and shared the corporate name. Id.
86. Id. at 676.
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In more recent times, however, some courts have been willing to
adapt to the realities of e-commerce, while others have reached the same
conclusion as the SFA Folio court. In 2005, in Borders Online, LLC v.
State Board of Equalization,87 a California appeals court found that Bor-
ders Online was subject to a use tax because of its affiliation with Bor-
ders' stores in California.88 In 2007, a federal district court in Louisiana
considered St. Tammany Parish Tax Collector v. Barnesandnoble.com,
89
a factually similar case to Borders Online.9° The issue was whether
Barnesandnoble.com had a substantial nexus with Louisiana as a result
of in-state Barnes & Noble Booksellers (Booksellers) stores.9' The dis-
trict court evaluated the common use of the Barnes & Noble trademark,
the return policy, the loyalty program membership, and the gift cards
sold at brick-and-mortar Booksellers' locations that could be redeemed at
Barnesandnoble.com.92 In considering the shared activities, the court
held that there was not a substantial nexus between Barnesandnoble.com
and Louisiana.93 The court reasoned that Booksellers' activities within
the state were not sufficient to establish a market-based nexus.94 Unlike
the Borders Online court, which held that common ownership created a
substantial nexus, the St. Tammany Parish court relied on the absence of
an agency relationship in holding there was not state tax jurisdiction de-
spite the common ownership.
95
2. Establishing a Substantial Nexus Through Economic Presence
While some courts have looked to whether an out-of-state retailer
had a corporate relationship with an in-state affiliate, other courts have
considered the economic presence within a state by an outside vendor.
96
87. 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176 (Ct. App. 2005).
88. Id. at 178. The Borders Online court found that the use of a shared logo and return policy
by both the Internet retailer and the in-state stores established a substantial nexus. See id. at 190.
Moreover, the court noted that cross-marketing strategies enabled Borders Online to establish and
maintain a market in California. Id. at 190-91. In reasoning that the Internet retailer benefited from
the in-state stores' activities, the court found that Borders Online effectively had a representative in
California, which created the requisite physical presence. Id. The court also explained that there was
a link on Borders' website which directed consumers to Borders Online's Internet address. Id. Fur-
ther, the two companies shared market and financial information. Id. Thus, according to the court,
both companies were actively promoting the Borders trademark. Id. at 192.
89. 481 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. La. 2007).
90. St. Tammany Parish is also factually similar to Barnesandnoble.com II, the focus of this
Comment. See infra Part 1I.
91. See St. Tammany Parish, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 576-77.
92. Id. at 578.
93. Id. at 580. But see infra note 187.
94. See St. Tammany Parish, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 580. The court further reasoned that a com-
mon brand name and close corporate relationships did not impute physical presence to the Internet
retailer. Id. at 580-81. Although the two companies shared a parent company, Bamesandnoble.com
and Booksellers did not share managers or directors and were separate entities. Id. at 581. Finally,
the court noted that there was no evidence that he companies had shared assets. Id.
95. Id. at 582.
96. See Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV.
157, 176-77 (2012); Bradley W. Joondeph, Rethinking the Role of the Dormant Commerce Clause
in State Tax Jurisdiction, 24 VA. TAX REV. 109, 112-13 (2004).
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The courts applying an economic presence test found that a state's tax
jurisdiction could be determined by an entity's economic presence in the
state, rather than by literal physical presence.97 Sales, property, or payroll
can make up economic presence.98 In addition, "deriving income from
licensing intangible property for use in the state is sufficient to establish
an economic nexus with the state."99 Again, different courts have come
to different conclusions. This Subpart analyzes how the economic pres-
ence test has been applied.
In 1990, in Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Bates,00 the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court held that there was not a sufficient nexus for
Mississippi to tax an Alabama-based carpet seller who had no agents or
employees in Mississippi.10' The court reasoned that he state did not
have the authority to tax the carpet retailer even though the retailer sold
carpets to Mississippi residents, because the business did not conduct
activities within the state.102 In addition, the court noted that local Missis-
sippi carpet installers did not receive any compensation from the Ala-
bama-based retailer and were not agents or employees of the retailer.,
0 3
Furthermore, the court appeared to rely on the physical presence re-
quirement, because it based its decision on the lack of "underlying activi-
ties conducted within the state."'0 4
Comparatively, in 1993, in Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission,105 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a company
that had no physical presence within the state, but which licensed valua-
ble intellectual property, was subject to state taxation.0 6 The court rea-
soned that he company had received income from licensing intellectual
property for use in South Carolina.'0 7 The court also mentioned that reli-
ance on Bellas Hess's physical presence requirement was "misplaced"
and that any business which consistently exploited a state's market
should be subject to taxation.'0 8 The court reasoned that "[t]he presence
of intangible property alone is sufficient to establish nexus."',
0 9
97. See Joondeph, supra note 96, at 112-13.
98. See id.
99. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 176. For further discussion on how economic presence
works, see infra Part IhI.D. 1.
100. 567 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 1990).
101. Id. at 191,194.
102. Id. at 191, 193.
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
106. Id. at 15 (noting that Geoffrey owned numerous trademarks and trade names, such as
"Toys R Us").
107. Id. at 18 ("[Tjhe taxpayer need not have a tangible, physical presence in a state for income
to be taxable there."); Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 173.
108. Geoffrey, 437 S.E.2d at 18.
109. Id. Additionally, the Geoffrey court dealt with Quill by reasoning that the physical pres-
ence requirement was limited to sales and use taxes. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 173. Starting in
2005, other state courts consistently rejected the physical presence requirement and moved towards
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In 2006, in Tax Commissioner v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., °" 0 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals"' also rejected a physical pres-
ence requirement.1 2 The court stated that the test "makes little sense in
today's world."' 3 The court held that a bank's solicitation and mainte-
nance of state residents' credit cards created a "significant economic
presence" which met the substantial nexus requirement.14 The bank was
incorporated in Delaware and had no property or employees in West
Virginia." 1 5 Issuing and servicing credit cards was the primary business it
conducted in the state." 16 In order to attract customers, the bank promoted
its business through telephone solicitation and mail." 7 Under the "signif-
icant economic presence" test the court announced, a business has a sub-
stantial nexus with the state if it "purposefully directs its activities" at the
state and has exploited the state market." 8 In addition, the court noted
that technological advancements made Quill's physical presence re-
quirement obsolete." 1
9
3. Establishing a Substantial Nexus Through Affiliate Agreements:
The "Amazon Tax" Case
In addition to common ownership and economic presence, states
have sought to establish a substantial nexus through affiliate agreements
with third-party, in-state residents.'20 Under these Amazon taxes, Internet
retailers are required to collect taxes from consumers even if affiliates
are the only connection the retailers have with the state.121 The following
Subpart discusses a New York case involving two market-dominant In-
ternet retailers and affiliate agreements.
the economic presence standard. Id. at 174-76. However, these courts also distinguished Quill by
reasoning that Quill did not apply to other types of taxes apart from sales and use taxes, such as
income taxes. ld To date, the Supreme Court has declined to clarify whether Quill extends only to
use and sales taxes, or whether the physical presence requirement encompasses other taxes as well.
Id. at 159, 173-74.
110. 640 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 2006).
Ill. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is the state's highest court.
112. MBNA Am. Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 234.
113. Id.
114. Megan A. Stombock, Economic Nexus and Nonresident Corporate Taxpayers: How Far
Will It Go?, 61 TAX LAW. 1225, 1230 (2008).
115. MBNA Am. Bank, 640 S.E.2d at 227.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Stombock, supra note 114, at 1230.
119. Id. The MBNA court also distinguished between Quill and the current case by claiming
that Quill did not extend to the Business Activity Tax, the tax at issue in MBNA. Id.
120. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1426, 1429.
121. See generally N.Y. TAX LAW § I 101 (b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2012) ("[A] person making
sales of tangible personal property or services... shall be presumed to be soliciting business through
an independent contractor or other representative if the seller enters into an agreement with a resi-
dent of this state under which the resident, for a commission or other consideration, directly or
indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on an internet website or otherwise, to the
seller, if the cumulative gross receipts from sales by the seller to customers in the state who are
referred to the seller by all residents with this type of an agreement with the seller is in excess often
thousand dollars ....").
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In 2008, the Amazon tax made its debut in New York.122 Under the
New York law, Internet retailers such as Amazon.com or Over-
stock.com123 are presumed to be doing business within the state if they
enter into agreements with in-state affiliates or representatives.24 Inter-
net retailers are considered to be soliciting business within New York if
state residents obtain commissions or consideration from sales of tangi-
ble property by means of referral to the seller, even if through a website
or Internet link. 25 Thus, out-of-state Internet retailers are exposed to
New York's tax jurisdiction if they receive online referrals from in-state
affiliates that result in sales.1
26
Amazon.com (Amazon) is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Washington State.'27 It has no property or offices in
New York and its sole source of business is online retail through its web-
site.128 Likewise, Overstock.com (Overstock) is a Delaware corporation
whose principal place of business is in Utah and does not have any prop-
erty, offices, or employees in New York.129 Both Amazon and Overstock
(collectively, Online Retailers) have affiliate programs whereby third
parties agree to place links on their own websites that direct consumers
to the Online Retailer's site.'30 If the consumer buys merchandise after
being redirected from an affiliate's website to the Online Retailer's web-
site, both Amazon and Overstock pay the third party a commission.
13
The affiliate contracts between the third parties and the Online Retailers
designate the affiliates as "independent contractors."'
' 32
In 2008, Amazon and Overstock sued the New York State Depart-
ment of Taxation and Finance in response to the state's tax law amend-
ments that created the Amazon Tax.133 Both companies argued that the
statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause
and the Commerce Clause.' 
34
122. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1426, 1429.
123. Amazon.corn and Overstock.com conduct their retail business entirely through Internet
sales and do not have any brick-and-mortar retail stores.
124. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1426.
125. Id.
126. Rob Owen, Recent Development, The "Amazon Tax" Issue: Washing away the Require-
ment of Physical Presence for Sales Tax Jurisdiction over Internet Businesses, 2013 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 231, 233.
127. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y.
2013).
128. Id.




133. Id. at 624.
134. See id. The due process question concerning the statutory presumption is beyond the
scope of this Comment. The issue was whether the rebuttable civil presumption, which presumed
that a retailer was doing business in the state if independent contractors received commissions from
sales stemming from solicitation in the state, violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 623.
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The New York Court of Appeals'35 addressed the question of wheth-
er the statute violated the DCC's substantial nexus test.'36 On March 28,
2013, the court upheld New York's tax law because the affiliate agree-
ments created a substantial nexus with the state.1 37 According to the
court, the affiliation agreements with New York residents amounted to
active advertisement by the Online Retailers.38 The court reasoned that
if a retailer pays a resident to solicit local business, the retailer should be
subject to the state's tax law.'39 Furthermore, the court held that the Am-
azon tax did not violate the Due Process Clause.40 The court explained
that the Online Retailers had "purposefully directed" their activities in
New York and therefore had notice that they could be subjected to state
14 1 42taxes.  Accordingly, the Amazon Tax was constitutional .
Following the unfavorable New York ruling, Amazon and Overstock
separately filed writs of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court.143 In its
petition, Amazon emphasized that the affiliate program, labeled the "As-
sociates Program," is merely a marketing tool and that affiliates place
"passive advertisements on their websites" which can link to Amazon's
website.144 According to Amazon, the New York court contravened Bel-
las Hess's physical-presence rule. 45 Amazon also claimed that the court
disregarded the rule from Quill, which held that advertisement by itself
does not establish a substantial nexus. 146 Similarly, Overstock argued that
the activities of the in-state, third-party affiliates did not impute a physi-
cal presence within the state because they were not agents of the compa-
ny.147 Overstock focused on the lack of an agency relationship with the
third-party affiliates and argued that economic presence does not assign
135. The New York Court of Appeals is the state's highest court.
136. Overstock.con, 987 N.E.2d at 625.




141. See id. ("[An entity 'that is engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business
within a State ... clearly has fair warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of [the
state],' even in the absence of physical presence." (second and third alterations in original) (omission
in original) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992))).
142. Id. at 627.
143. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin.,
2013 WL 4508624 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-259); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Over-
stock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 2013 WL 4495978 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2013)
(No. 13-252).
144. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *3, Amazon.com, 2013 WL 4508624 (No. 13-259).
145. See id. at *8.
146. See id. A more precise reading of Quill, however, shows that the Court was more con-
cerned with companies whose advertisements through a common carrier, such as through mail, were
the only connection the company had with the state. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. The Court stated that
there is a "sharp distinction" between companies that advertise but have no physical presence and
those that advertise and have some physical presence. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *20-21, Overstock.com, 2013 WL 4495978 (No. 13-
252).
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physical presence.148 On December 2, 2013, the Court denied certiorari
without offering any commentary. 1
49
II. NEW MEXICO TAXATION & REVENUE DEPARTMENT V.
BARNESANDNOBLE.COM LLC
New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department v. Barnesandno-
ble.com LLC (Barnesandnoble.com I1)150 is a common ownership case.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision in favor of
the state, framed the issue around the DCC and analyzed Quill's physical
presence requirement. While the court did not explicitly mention an eco-
nomic presence test, it considered whether an in-state sister corporation's
activities allowed the Internet retailer to maintain and exploit a market in
New Mexico.15' The New Mexico Supreme Court's analysis, therefore, is
tantamount to an economic presence test. This case is a recent and quin-
tessential example of how courts have injected their own reasoning in
light of the outdated Quill test.
A. Facts
Barnesandnoble.com (bn.com) does not have a physical presence in
New Mexico.152 It has no property or employees in the state.153 Incorpo-
rated in Delaware, bn.com is an out-of-state Internet retailer that sells
books, media, and other products through its website.154 Bn.com was a
wholly owned subsidiary of bames&noble.com, inc. during the time at
issue, and at least forty percent of the ownership of barnes&noble.com,
inc. had been owned by B&N.com Holding Corp.155 The parent corpora-
tion, Barnes & Noble, Inc. (Parent) had an interest in bn.com because
B&N.com Holding Corp. was a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent.'56
Further, Parent owned Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc. (Booksellers),
which currently has three retail stores in New Mexico. 
57
In addition to the common ownership, there is significant business
interrelationship between the two companies. Bn.com and Booksellers
sell Barnes & Noble gift cards that can be redeemed online or in a
store.58 On the back of the gift card is bn.com's website address. 5 9 Both
148. Id. at 21-24.
149. Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013); Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987
N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013).
150. The case is referred to as Barnesandnoble.com II to distinguish it from the lower court
case.
151. Barnesandnoble.com 11, 303 P.3d 824, 825 (N.M. 2013).
152. Id.
153. In re Bamesandnoble.com LLC (Barnesandnoble.com 1), 283 P.3d 298, 300 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2012).
154. Barnesandnoble.com I1, 303 P.3d at 825-26.
155. Barnesandnoble.com 1, 283 P.3d at 300-01.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 301.
158. Id.
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bn.com and Booksellers sell loyalty program memberships that give
members online and in-store discounts.16° The membership fees go to
Parent, bn.com, and Booksellers.'61 In addition, return policies, which are
reciprocated by bn.com and Booksellers, allow customers to return items
bought online at bn.com to Booksellers' retail stores.'62 Finally, bn.com's
website informs customers of Booksellers' store locations.
63
In 2006, the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department (Rev-
enue Department) audited bn.com and assessed a gross receipts tax
against the Internet retailer for a seven-year period from 1998 through
2005 for its sales to New Mexico customers.164 The Revenue Department
conducted the assessment under the authority of the Gross Receipts and
Compensating Tax Act.' 
65
B. Procedural History
Bn.com contested the gross receipts tax, claiming that it violated the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'66 A state hearing officer
granted summary judgment to bn.com, finding that it was unconstitution-
al to tax the Internet retailer.'67 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed,
finding that bn.com did have a substantial nexus with New Mexico as
required by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'68 The ap-
peals court relied heavily on Tyler Pipe, in which the Supreme Court
held that physical presence can be created through the establishment and
maintenance of a market.'69 As a result, the court reasoned that bn.com's
affiliation with Barnes & Noble stores through cross-marketing activities
and the shared use of trademarks created a substantial nexus.17 Bn.competitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.'7 1
C. Opinion
In 2013, New Mexico's highest court unanimously affirmed the ap-






164. Gail O'Gradney, Taxation of Online Retailer Did Not Run Afoul of Commerce Clause, 31
No. 7 FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISOR 6 (2013).
165. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9-1 to -114 (2012).
166. Barnesandnoble.com 1, 283 P.3d at 301. See generally Joondeph, supra note 96, at 120
(explaining that the Due Process Clause places limits on the states' taxing powers by prohibiting
states from taxing interstate activities if there is not a minimal connection between the state and the
interstate activities).
167. Barnesandnoble.com 11, 303 P.3d 824, 825-26 (N.M. 2013).
168. Id.; Barnesandnoble.com 1, 283 P.3d at 300. The appeals court declined to address the due
process claim, saying that it had no merit. Id at 307.
169. Barnesandnoble.com I, 283 P.3d at 302.
170. Barnesandnoble.com I1, 303 P.3d at 825-26.
171. Id.
172. Id
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Revenue Department could impose New Mexico gross receipts tax on
bn.com without violating the Commerce Clause, even though bn.com
had no physical presence in the state.I7 3 The court held that the state may
do so without violating the Commerce Clause because there was a sub-
stantial nexus between bn.com and the state.
174
The New Mexico Supreme Court framed the issue around the DCC
and the substantial nexus test.1 75 Analyzing the Supreme Court's decision
in Quill, the court said that "[t]he Commerce Clause has been interpreted
not only as an affirmative grant of power to Congress, but also as a limi-
tation on state actions that interfere with interstate commerce.'7 6 In re-
ferring to the part of Commerce Clause doctrine known as the negative
or dormant clause, the court said that the DCC is offended when inter-
state commerce is burdened by state taxation.177 Under the Complete
Auto test, however, states are allowed to tax parties involved in interstate
commerce without federal authorization if there is a substantial nexus
between the state and the party's activities within the state.78 According
to the court, therefore, the only question presented was whether bn.com's
online sales to New Mexico customers had a substantial nexus with the
state. 179
Having clarified the issue to be decided, the court turned to whether
the DCC had been violated.1 80 After evaluating Supreme Court prece-
dent, the New Mexico court determined that absence of physical pres-
ence was not dispositive.181 The court reasoned that the "Supreme Court
has consistently taken a functional approach to the substantial nexus
analysis. ' 82 Therefore, the court refrained the issue as "whether
173. Id. at 825.
174. Id
175. See id. at 826; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several States").
176. Barnesandnoble.com 11, 303 P.3d at 826 (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 309 (1992)).
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 826-27. The court compared Quill, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that North
Dakota could not constitutionally tax a mail order company with no property or employees within
the state, with Tyler Pipe. Id. In the latter case, the Court held that even where a vendor had no
employees or property within a state, in-state activity could establish a sufficient nexus. Id.; see also
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987) ("[T]he crucial
factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are
significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to establish and maintain a market in this state for
the sales." (quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 715 P.2d 123, 126 (Wash. 1986),
vacated, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also referred to Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson, a 1960 U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a business that had no
property or full-time employees in Florida could nonetheless be exposed to the state's tax jurisdic-
tion. Barnesandnoble.com II, 303 P.3d at 826-27 (citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 208-
09, 211 (1960)). The Court had reasoned that contractors had solicited business within Florida on the
company's behalf. Id.
181. See Barnesandnoble.com 11,303 P.3d at 826-27.
182. Id.
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Booksellers performed activities on behalf of bn.com [which were] sig-
nificantly associated with bn.com's ability to establish and maintain a
market for its sales in New Mexico."'
8 3
The court then addressed Booksellers' activities in New Mexico that
were associated with bn.com.184 The court held that Bookseller per-
formed activities in the state that "were significantly associated with
bn.com's ability to establish and maintain a market" in New Mexico.1
85
The court reasoned that a substantial nexus existed because of the sale of
gift cards at Booksellers that displayed bn.com's web address, the loyalty
program membership sold by both companies, and the return policy that
enabled customers to return items bought at bn.com to Booksellers' loca-
tions in New Mexico.' 86 Further, the court noted that bn.com and
Booksellers shared their patrons' email addresses with each other, both
companies used the Barnes & Noble trademark, and as a result, bn.com
benefitted from consumer brand loyalty established at Booksellers'
stores.187 Accordingly, the court concluded that Booksellers' in-state
activities, including the use of the shared trademark, helped bn.com "es-
tablish and maintain a market" in New Mexico.' 88 Therefore, the Court
held that the Commerce Clause did not prevent the Revenue Department
from collecting gross receipts tax from bn.com, because the company
had a substantial nexus with the state.' 
8 9
III. ANALYSIS
In Barnesandnoble.com II, the New Mexico Supreme Court ex-
plored the controversial issue of whether Internet retailers could be sub-
jected to state sales taxes by virtue of affiliations with in-state entities
without violating the DCC' 90 In this case, direct affiliation through
common use of trademarks and business policies established enough of a
nexus to allow New Mexico to impose a gross receipts tax. '9 In its dis-
183. Id. at 827.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 829.
186. See id. at 827.
187. Id. at 827-28. In its discussion, the court also considered the Borders Online, SFA Folio,
and St. Tammany Parish cases. Id. at 828-29. In doing so, the court noted the divergent viewpoints
and holdings. Id. at 829. In particular, the court mentioned that St. Tammany Parish was nearly
identical to Barnesandnoble.com II, yet had come out differently. Id. at 829. The New Mexico
Supreme Court then claimed that the district court in St. Tammany Parish had erroneously applied a
higher standard than Tyler Pipe demanded. Id. According to the New Mexico court, Tyler Pipe
required that the activities performed on behalf of the business be "significantly associated with
[bn.com's] ability to establish and maintain a market." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tyler Pipe
Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 250 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The St. Tammany Parish court, however, had read that requirement o mean that a suffi-
cient nexus occurred only when another entity was acting as an agent of the out-of-state retailer. Id.
188. Id. at 829.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 826-28. In relying on Quill, the court held that the physical presence of an in-state
sister corporation satisfied the requirements of the DCC. Id. at 826, 829.
191. See id. at 827-28.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cussion, the court identified Quill as providing the governing law, but
looked beyond the literal meaning of the physical presence require-
ment,'92 recognizing that strict adherence to Quill was impracticable in
an e-commerce world. In fact, the court adeptly employed an economic
nexus-type analysis, under the guise of the physical presence test.
93
Thus, according to the court, when an entity is able to "establish and
maintain a market" in a state, even in the absence of in-state employees
or property, there is state tax jurisdiction, because the business's pres-
ence within the state creates a substantial nexus.'94 This reasoning is
more in line with an economic presence analysis, in which economic
exploitation is comparable to physical exploitation.
95
With the backdrop of the Barnesandnoble.com H decision as a
guidepost, this Part first contends that the U.S. Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to weigh in on the precise standard courts should use when
determining substantial nexus when it denied certiorari of the recent New
York case. As demonstrated in Part I.B., courts have applied varying
standards and the outcomes have been unreliable; therefore, the Court
should have alleviated the uncertainty with respect to the DCC and Inter-
net retailers by setting a clear standard that comports with modem day
realities. Next, this Part argues that the Quill decision is irrelevant in the
Digital Age. In addition, this Part contends that Bellas Hess's bright-line
physical presence rule and Quill's affirmation of that rule should be
overruled. Moreover, this Part discusses congressional attempts to over-
rule the physical presence requirement and the Marketplace Fairness Act
of 2013. Finally, after having established the problem with the current
state of the law, this Part recommends a solution: the Court should adopt
the economic presence standard because it is more viable in the Digital
Age. Further, in arguing for adoption of an economic presence standard,
this Part concludes by suggesting that the New Mexico Supreme Court's
holding in Barnesandnoble.com H provides a practical approach to Inter-
net retailer taxation cases.
A. The Supreme Court Should Have Weighed in: Amazon and Overstock
The U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to address Internet re-
tailer taxation in a pair of high-profile cases that made their way to
Washington.196 On August 22, 2013, Overstock petitioned the Court for a
writ of certiorari following the New York Court of Appeal's ruling,
192. See id. at 826-27. The court noted that bn.com did not have any property or employees in
the state but asserted that there could nonetheless still be a substantial nexus. Id. at 826-27.
193. See generally id. at 829 (holding that a substantial nexus existed because the in-state sister
corporation had enabled bn.com to "establish and maintain a market" in New Mexico).
194. Id. at 826-27, 829.
195. See Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 195.
196. See supra Part I.C.3..
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which held that affiliate agreements created a substantial nexus.197 The
next day, Amazon followed with its own petition. 198 The cases concerned
the constitutionality of New York's Amazon Tax.' 
99
The Court, however, has left many questions unanswered. On De-
cember 2, 2013, the Court denied the writs of certiorari without offering
any commentary.200 The Court should have taken the opportunity to up-
date its DCC jurisprudence in light of the changing nature of interstate
commerce.
As noted in Part I.B., different courts have come to different con-
clusions, and the Court's failure to settle the matter leaves the nation in a
continued state of uncertainty. For example, some courts have held that
common ownership with an in-state sister corporation establishes a sub-
stantial nexus with the state.20 1 Like the Barnesandnoble.com Ii court,
these courts have reasoned that the DCC is not offended if the Internet
202
retailer "establish[es] and maintain[s] a market" in the taxing state.
However, not all courts have reached similar conclusions under almost
203
indistinguishable factual scenarios. For instance, in St. Tammany Par-
ish, a federal district court held that shared marketing activities between
Booksellers and bn.com did not create a substantial nexus despite the
factual similarities to Barnesandnoble.com H.2°4 Still other courts have
guessed as to the applicability of Quill in employing an economic pres-
ence test.2°5 Again, courts considering the economic presence test have
come out differently.20 6 And finally, the Amazon and Overstock cases
represent yet another methodology used by states to subject Internet re-
tailers to state tax jurisdiction-affiliate agreements with third-party, in-
state residents.20 7
197. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation &
Fin., 2013 WL 4495978 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2013) (No. 13-252).
198. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin.,
2013 WL 4508624 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-259).
199. Greg Bensinger, Amazon Asks Supreme Court to Decide Sales Tax Fight, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 28, 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/08/28/amazon-asks-supreme-court-to-decide-sales-
tax-fight/.
200. Amazon.corn LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013); Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987
N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 682 (2013).
201. See, e.g., Borders Online, LLC v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 192 (Ct.
App. 2005).
202. See Barnesandnoble.com II, 303 P.3d 824, 829 (N.M. 2013).
203. See St. Tammany Parish Tax Collector v. Barnesandnoble.com, 481 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580
(E.D. La. 2007).
204. Id.
205. See Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 173-76; see also discussion supra Part I.B. .
206. Compare Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18-19 (S.C. 1993) (holding
that a company which had no physical presence within the state, but which licensed valuable intel-
lectual property for use within the state, was subject to state taxation), with Miss. State Tax Comm'n
v. Bates, 567 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 1990) (holding that there was not a nexus sufficient for Mississippi
to tax an Alabama-based carpet seller who had no agents or employees in Mississippi).
207. See Cowan, supra note 40, at 1426; see also supra Part I.C.3.
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Thus, there are three ways courts have analyzed state taxation of
out-of-state retailers: (1) establishment of a substantial nexus through
common ownership, (2) establishment of a substantial nexus through
economic presence, and (3) establishment of a substantial nexus through
affiliate agreements.208 As is demonstrated by these different methods of
analysis, there is no one standard courts can look to in determining
whether an Internet retailer has a substantial nexus with a state such that
it can be exposed to taxation without offending the DCC.
The Court had the opportunity to address the Internet retailer issue
and establish unambiguous rules for state taxation of e-commerce. In-
stead, the Court chose to deny certiorari in the Amazon and Overstock
case. As a result, states are employing various and inconsistent standards
to obtain tax jurisdiction. In the absence of clear direction from the
Court, interstate commerce will remain in a continued state of flux with
respect to taxation and Internet retailers.209 For instance, state legislators
may pass similar Amazon taxes in the wake of the New York ruling,210 in
which the New York court held that the state's tax law did not violate the
Commerce Clause because affiliate agreements created a substantial
nexus with the state.21 The Court should have at the very least set guide-
lines and rules for state taxation of e-commerce.212 The absence of such
guidance has left a void in which courts have applied varying and some-
times incompatible interpretations of the DCC in Internet retailer cas-
213es.
The impact on small businesses engaged in e-commerce is also pal-
pable. Because unambiguous rules concerning state taxation facilitate
settled expectations and encourage individuals and business owners to
invest,214 a clear rule is needed. The Court's lack of direction will proba-
bly encourage other states to implement their own Amazon taxes.
21 5
Consequently, businesses will be compelled to update their infrastructure
and incur compliance costs in order to conform to state laws.216 For ex-
ample, businesses will need to upgrade their accounting software and
take-on licensing and maintenance costs.2 17 These changes will dispro-
portionately affect small businesses.2 18 The Court's decision to deny re-
208. See supra Part I.C.
209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *33, Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation
& Fin., 2013 WL 4495978 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2013) (No. 13-252).
210. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *24-25, Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxa-
tion & Fin., 2013 WL 4508624 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2013) (No. 13-259).
211. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 626 (N.Y.
2013).
212. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *26, Amazon.com, 2013 WL 4508624 (No. 13-259).
213. See discussion supra Part I.C.
214. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992).
215. Brief for Scrapbook.corn, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Over-
stock.com, 987 N.E.2d 621 (Nos. 13-252, 13-259).
216. See id.
217. Id. at 2-3.
218. Id. at 2.
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view creates more ambiguity in an already uncertain climate.219 If busi-
nesses cannot be sure about the scope of state tax jurisdiction, they can-
not effectively plan their compliance costs.220 The legal uncertainty will
only lead to a chill on investments and a downturn in economic
growth.2 2'
In addition, the New York court's decision raises questions about
the continued relevance of Quill's substantial nexus rule222 because states
are continuously looking for a way to maneuver around the physical
presence requirement. Therefore, the Court should have taken the oppor-
tunity to set a clear standard.
B. Quill Is Not Relevant in an E-Commerce World
Quill's utility is limited in the modem era of e-commerce. Yet Quill
remains the governing law regarding out-of-state retailers and state taxa-
tion, despite that it was decided more than twenty years ago.223 Since the
1992 Quill decision, commerce has changed drastically and Quill's phys-
224
ical presence test is largely outdated. As the New York Court of Ap-
peals stated, "An entity may now have a profound impact upon a foreign
jurisdiction solely through its virtual projection via the Internet.,225 Con-
sequently, an overhaul of DCC jurisprudence is needed in order to recon-
cile retailers' interests in uniform tax collection rules with the states'
interest in closing the gap between expenditures and revenue.226
The physical presence test, announced in 1967 and then reaffirmed
in 1992, does not take into account modern-day realities.227 Indeed, when
the rule was first articulated, physical presence was generally required
for a retailer to enter a state's market.228 For instance, to generate mean-
ingful business in a state, retailers would have once needed employees,
2 230
warehouses, or offices within the state. 29 This is not the reality today.
Communication technology has proliferated to the extent that it is possi-
ble, and likely, that a retailer will establish and maintain a market with-
out a physical presence.23 1 Therefore, any retailer that consistently ex-
ploits a state's market, such as through cross-marketing strategies with
219. Seeid. at3.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 15.
222. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1444.
223. David H. Gershel, Comment, The Day of Reckoning: The Inevitable Application of State
Sales Tax to Electronic Commerce, 14 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 335, 339 (2011).
224. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y.
2013).
225. Id.
226. Patch, supra note 11, at 694-95.
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in-state sister corporations or with third-party affiliate agreements,
should be exposed to state tax jurisdiction.2
Not everyone recognizes the impact of technological advance-
ments.233 In his dissent in the Amazon and Overstock case, Justice Smith
failed to consider the far-reaching changes e-commerce has brought, and
wrongly contends that a website owner who is "trying to persuade mem-
7 234bers of the public" is not equivalent to a sales agent. Justice Smith
attempted to bolster his argument by claiming that a traditional salesman,
who seeks to promote a specific product so that he will get a commis-
sion, is not comparable to a website owner that promotes an Internet re-
tailer's products.235 Instead, he argued "no website owner promotes
Overstock or Amazon for a similar reason [as a traditional salesman
does], because everyone who wants to buy from either of those firms can
go to the retailer's website directly.2 36 But this view is mistaken, partic-
ularly in the age of e-commerce where the pace of commerce has in-
creased exponentially to where transactions occur by a simple click of a
button.
For example, consider a small business owner engaged in the lawn
mower industry who repairs broken lawn mowers and who sells lawn
mower components. Next, assume the company does not actually sell
lawn mowers. It may, however, advertise on its website for the particular
kinds of lawn mowers it services and sells parts for. In this respect, it is
in the small business owner's interest to solicit business for an Internet
retailer that sells lawn mowers. The more people in the locality that own
a particular brand of lawn mower, the more business the company will
see through repairs and sales of component parts. The same reasoning
holds true for a small business that sells the primary product but does not
sell the components. In other words, contrary to Justice Smith's argu-
ment, people may not always go directly to an Internet retailer's website
to buy a certain product and it is advantageous to the small business
owner and the Internet retailer to engage in such mutually beneficial so-
licitation tactics. As demonstrated above, the Internet has completely
changed the face of commerce. It is high time to recognize that what
232. See Geoffrey, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993).
233. This is especially true for out-of-touch judges well into their life tenures. See generally
Joseph Goldstein, Life Tenure for Federal Judges Raises Issues of Senility, Dementia, PROPUBLICA
(Jan. 18, 2011, 7:30 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/life-tenure-for-federal-judges-raises-
issues-of-senility-dementia (describing an eighty-four year old judge that needed to have email
explained to him and a 2010 study that found that approximately twelve percent of federal judges are
over eighty years old).
234. Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 628 (N.Y.




2014] NEW MEXICO TAXATION V. BARNESANDNOBLE.COM 765
constitutes a substantial nexus in 2014 is very different from what consti-
tuted a substantial nexus in 1992.237
As the facts of recent legal disputes make clear, the physical pres-
ence requirement is arbitrary and anachronistic in an age where physical
boundaries have little to no import.238 For instance, the foundation of the
physical presence requirement is the fundamental prohibition against
extraterritorial taxation.239 The ban on extraterritorial taxes is a basic
limit on state authority, which the nation's highest court has recognized
since the mid-1800s.240 This reflects the principle that states are generally
limited to taxing those activities which occur within state borders.241 But
traditional notions of state boundaries and borders have changed dramat-
ically in the Digital Age. Chief Justice John Marshall recognized the
evolving nature of the national landscape in the pioneering case, McCul-
loch v. Maryland.242 In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall explained that
it was "impossible for [the framers] to foresee the infinite variety of cir-
cumstances ... [that would impact this] society [of] ours [because it is]
for ever changing and for ever improving."243 Stated differently, there is
room for adaptability in the nation's jurisprudence.
When Quill was decided, the emergence of individual Internet us-
244
age was just beginning. In fact, in 1992, the same year the Quill Court
came down with its decision, Congress first permitted the government,
including the military, to use the Internet.245 It was not until 1994 that
people began to use the Internet for business.246 Fast-forward twenty
years: The Internet has revolutionized commerce and emergent technolo-
gies have transformed state economies.24 7 For instance, in 2005, the U.S
Census Bureau reported that the total adjusted amount of e-commerce
retail sales was $90.1 billion. 24' But in the first quarter of 2014 alone, e-
commerce accounted for $71.2 billion of total retail sales and are on pace
to reach $285 billion by the end of the year.249 And according to the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures, the states missed an estimated
$23.3 billion in revenue in 2012 because they were not allowed to collect
237. See generally Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311 (1992) (discussing the DCC
and the substantial nexus requirement in the context of mail order businesses).
238. See Joondeph, supra note 96, at 112.
239. Id. at 122.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 122-23.
242. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 384-85 (1819) (holding that the states
have no power to tax or burden a national bank created by Congress and establishing that Congress
has implied powers apart from those enumerated in the Constitution).
243. Id. at 385.
244. See Patch, supra note I1, at 675-76.
245. Id. at 675.
246. Id. at 676.
247. See id. at 699.
248. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: I Quarter
2014 (May 15, 2014), available at https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec urrent.pdf.
249. Id.
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and remit sales and use taxes from Internet retailers.250 The current tax
scheme makes little sense in an e-commerce world, because sales and use
taxes are central to the states' fiscal health.2 5' As it is, states already face
budget shortfalls.
252
In conclusion, Quill's substantial nexus test, which requires physi-
cal presence in the taxing state,253 has lost relevance in our Internet and
technology driven society.25 4 The change to a service-based economy
from a mercantile economy, together with the increased mobility of capi-
tal, further shows that Quill is outdated because companies can conduct
their in-state business from almost anywhere.5 Geography and physical
presence do not have the significance they had when Quill was decid-
ed.256 As a consequence of the antiquated rule, Internet retailers have
been able to evade taxes. 7 Furthermore, Internet retailers have used the
current tax rules in order to create price advantages over their brick-and-
mortar counterparts who are required to collect state taxes.258 Requiring
Internet retailers to collect state taxes does nothing more than oblige
those retailers to collect what other vendors that do business within a
state already have to do.259 Therefore, continued adherence to Quill's
physical presence rule fails to reflect the realities of doing business in the
Digital Age.
C. Bellas Hess and Quill Stare Decisis Should Be Overruled
The majority's holding in Quill was illogical.260 In his dissenting
opinion, Justice White explained that affirmation of Bellas Hess's bright-
line physical presence rule would create perverse results.26' For example,
an out-of-state retailer with just one in-state employee could be brought
into a state's tax jurisdiction, even if the employee's activities were unre-
lated to sales within the state. 262 Meanwhile, an out-of-state retailer that
is the dominant retailer in a state could "creat[e] ... infrastructure bur-
dens and undercut[] the State's home companies by its comparative price
advantage in selling products free of use taxes.'263 Nevertheless, the out-
250. Jessica Nicole Cory, The Gap Created by E-Commerce: How States Can Preserve Their
Sales and Use Tax Revenue in the Digital Age, 8 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 57 (2012).
251. Joondeph, supra note 96, at I 10.
252. Gershel, supra note 223, at 335-36.
253. Cowan, supra note 40, at 1424.
254. See John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspec-
tive, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 321 (2003).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 344.
257. See Cory, supra note 250.
258. Id.
259. Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 29-30.
260. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
261. Id. at 328-29.
262. Id. at 328.
263. Id. at 328-29.
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of-state retailer would be immune from the state's tax jurisdiction under
the physical presence rule.264 According to Justice White, "[t]he majority
clings to the physical-presence rule not because of any logical relation to
fairness or any economic rationale related to principles underlying the
Commerce Clause, but simply out of the supposed convenience of hav-
ing a bright-line rule. 265 This, he says, is illogical, and disagrees with the
266majority's ruling that is based on stare decisis grounds. The Court
should have instead given the physical presence rule the "complete buri-
al" it deserved.267
Because the Quill Court reaffirmed Bellas Hess's bright-line physi-
cal presence rule primarily under stare decisis grounds,268 and the reasons
for doing so no longer exist today, the Supreme Court should have over-
ruled Quill. 269 The social, technological, and economic changes of the
Digital Age demonstrate that strict adherence to a physical presence
standard is no longer relevant.270 Further, the old rule is proving unwork-
able because states are losing out on vast amounts of revenue as a result
of the Quill standard.271 Therefore, the Court should have discarded a
literal interpretation of Quill's physical presence standard; particularly in
light of the dramatic changes that e-commerce brings to the digital mar-
ketplace. Therefore, it makes sense to interpret physical presence broadly
so that Internet retailers are subject to a state's tax jurisdiction when they
have affiliate agreements with state residents or share common owner-
ship with in-state brick-and-mortar businesses.
In holding that the physical presence test continues to control, the
Quill Court dedicated much of its opinion to the benefits of stare deci-
sis.272 In fact, three concurring Justices adhered to Bellas Hess's bright-
line rule solely on stare decisis principles.273 The majority opinion, how-
ever, admitted that the Bellas Hess rule was "artificial at its edges.274 In
recognizing that the physical presence rule was artificial, the Court stated
that the benefit of an unambiguous rule outweighs its artificiality. 275 The
Court reasoned that the physical presence rule established clear bounda-
264. Id.
265. Id. at 329.
266. See id. at 317-19 (majority opinion); id. at 328-29 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
267. Id. at 322 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White was referring
to the Quill Court's overturning of the physical presence requirement of the Due Process Clause and
its affirmation of the physical presence requirement under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 321-22.
268. See Swain, supra note 254, at 329, 331 (noting that many commentators view stare decisis
as the crux of the Quill decision).
269. See generally id. at 332 (defining stare decisis as "a bedrock principle of law" which
"provides that courts will adhere to existing precedent and not disturb settled points").
270. See discussion supra Part Il.B.
271. See Cory, supra note 250; see also supra text accompanying notes 250-52.
272. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315-17 (majority opinion).
273. Swain, supra note 254, at 330.
274. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
275. Id.
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ries for state tax jurisdiction and in doing so decreased litigation potential
regarding sales and use taxes.276 But the Court has not always been reluc-
tant to turn away from stare decisis:
[It] has identified four factors that it considers [when overruling ex-
isting precedent]: (1) whether there has been significant change in re-
lated principles of law; (2) whether there has been a change in the
factual milieu (social, economic, cultural, technological, and so on);
(3) whether the old rule has become unworkable; and (4) whether
there are strong reliance interests in the old rule that would be
harmed by a change.
277
In Quill, the Court looked to the reliance interest factor in finding that
individuals and businesses seeking to invest would benefit from the
bright-line rule.278 But any basis that existed for the holding in 1992 is
not applicable in 2014, because the rationale for the physical presence
standard has been displaced by modern developments.279 In fact, the
Court could have very well overturned the physical presence r quirement
based on factors one to three if it had granted certiorari in the Amazon
and Overstock case. Furthermore, the Quill Court's affirmation of Bellas
Hess's bright-line physical presence standard on stare decisis grounds
was weak.280 By openly admitting the artificiality of the rule, the Court
essentially acknowledged that the physical presence standard had vulner-
2811abilities.
In addition, in affirming the bright-line rule, the Quill Court validat-
ed Bellas Hess's reasoning, which was based largely on administrative
concerns.282 The Bellas Hess Court had reasoned that "[t]he many varia-
tions in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in administrative and
record-keeping requirements could entangle [the company's] interstate
business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local jurisdic-
tions. 283 Thus, at the core of the Court's holding was the concern that
imposing state tax jurisdiction based on anything other than physical
presence could ensnare the national economy with local issues, which
284was the very thing the Commerce Clause was designed to avoid. The
Bellas Hess Court, however, then asserted that it was within the domain
of Congress to settle such matters.285 The Quill Court repeated that sen-
276. Seeid. at 315-16.
277. Swain, supra note 254, at 332.
278. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 316.
279. See id. at 327-28 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra Part
III.B.
280. Alexander Smith, Quill by Affiliation, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 755, 761 (2012).
281. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 (majority opinion).
282. See generally Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1967),
overruled by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306-08, 315-16 (1992) (establishing that
the bright-line rule would provide for ease of tax administration).
283. Id. (footnotes omitted).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 60.
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timent saying that "the underlying issue is... one that Congress may be
better qualified to resolve ... [and] one that Congress has the ultimate
power to resolve.286
But Congress has already attempted to resolve the issue with a law
that explicitly does not bar states from collecting taxes from Internet
retailers and with legislation aimed at bringing Internet retailers within
the scope of state tax jurisdiction. The Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998
(ITFA)287 placed a moratorium on taxing specific Internet transactions.
288
The ITFA prohibits states from taxing access to the Internet.289 It also
prevents states from placing multiple or discriminatory taxes on e-
commerce. 29  In other words, the ITFA did not address sales and use
taxes themselves.29' Rather, it barred states from taxing online consumers
differently than consumers that shop in brick-and-mortar stores.292 The
ITFA's tax moratorium extends to November 14, 2014.293 Congress
could have included sales and use taxes in the moratorium, but specifi-
cally chose not to.294 This indicates that Congress's intent was to permit
295states to tax in-state sales that occur via e-commerce.
The Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 (Fairness Act) 296 is Con-
gress's attempt to respond directly to the Court's holdings in Bellas Hess
and Quill.297 The Fairness Act addresses the Court's concerns by author-
izing states to tax Internet retailers if the states simplify their sales and
use tax policies.298 The Fairness Act, however, has yet to become law
although it passed the Senate in May of 2013.299 Proponents of the
bright-line physical presence rule may argue that Congress's inability to
take decisive action and pass the bill in the House demonstrates that
Congress has not resolved the issue, as the Court advised it could do.
However, this argument will likely not prevail because the Court has no
problem taking action in the face of congressional inaction when action
286. Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
287. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1100, 47 U.S.C. § 151 note (1998).
288. Matthew G. McLaughlin, Comment, The Internet Tax Freedom Act: Congress Takes a
Byte out of the Net, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 209, 212 (1998).
289. Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101 (a).
290. Id. § l101(a)(2).
291. See Edwards, supra note 12, at 36.
292. McLaughlin, supra note 288, at 236 (explaining that sales taxes are permissible as long as
taxes on mail order and retail transactions are applied the same way).
293. Internet Tax Freedom Act Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-108, 121 Stat. 1024
(2007).
294. See Internet Tax Freedom Act § 1101.
295. See generally Matthew Adam Susson, Comment, Thinking out Cloud: California State
Sales and Use Taxability of Cloud Computing Transactions, 17 CHAP. L. REV. 295, 313 (2013)
(explaining that states retain their ability to tax out-of-state vendors under the ITFA).
296. S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013) (as passed by Senate, May 6, 2013).
297. See infra text accompanying notes 381-85.
298. S. 743 § 2. For a discussion on how states may simplify their sales and use tax policies
under the Fairness Act see infra text accompanying notes 386-87.
299. S. 743.
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is necessary. 30 0 To illustrate this point, the Quill Court noted that Con-
gress had made various attempts to pass legislation that would overrule
Bellas Hess's due process holding,30 but ultimately decided not to take
such action.302 Nevertheless, the Quill Court, noting the legislative at-
tempts, overruled Bellas Hess's due process holding despite Congress
failing to pass any law.30 3 Likewise, in the immediate situation, Congress
has recognized the DCC problem posed by Bellas Hess and Quill.304 Alt-
hough Congress has been unable to pass the legislation, the Fairness Act
is further proof that the physical presence test is irrelevant in the modem
era. Moreover, accounting for "a few thousand local tax rates is no long-
er an insurmountable technical, administrative, or financial burden."
305
Accordingly, the foundation for the Bellas Hess rule is no longer appli-
cable and adherence to it on stare decisis grounds is improper.
Although stare decisis is an essential consideration, it should not
trump other relevant factors.306 Some commentators, however, argue for
continued adherence to the physical presence requirement, because it
provides a plain rule and allows taxpayers to plan for tax compliance.
307
But the Court could have readily found that the advantages which stem
from the bright-line rule do not outweigh the disadvantages, such as the
enormous revenue states are losing out on as a result of Quill's physical
presence requirement.30 8 Additionally, the physical presence requirement
promotes perverse results, as Justice White pointed out.309 Moreover,
stare decisis only works if the precedent is still applicable.310 As dis-
cussed in detail above, Quill is no longer relevant in an era where com-
mercial transactions happen instantaneously and one-click transactions
are increasingly becoming the norm. Thus, continued observance of the
physical presence requirement on stare decisis justifications is not sensi-
ble.
D. Reconsidering the Economic Presence Test
Because Quill is irrelevant in the present era, analyzing and estab-
lishing a substantial nexus with state tax jurisdiction requires a new
300. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992).
301. In Quill, the Supreme Court overruled the due process holding of Bellas Hess, holding
that the Due Process Clause does not require physical presence in a state for the state to subject a
business to state tax jurisdiction. Id. at 306-08.
302. Id. at 318.
303. Id.
304. What Is the Marketplace Fairness Act?, MARKETPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG,
http://www.marketplacefaimess.org/what-is-the-marketplace-faimess-act/what-is-the-MFA.pdf (last
visited June 27, 2014).
305. Id.
306. See Cory, supra note 250.
307. Smith, supra note 280, at 776; Stombock, supra note 114, at 1237.
308. See Cory, supra note 250.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 260-64.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 268-70.
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framework.3 ' Pragmatically speaking, an economic presence standard
makes sense in light of the modem economy' 2 in which economic ex-313-
ploitation is equivalent to physical exploitation.313 In other words, the
Internet and other technologies have transformed commerce to a point
where certain companies no longer need to maintain brick-and-mortar
stores in order to carry out business.1 4 In fact, businesses can exploit
markets more comprehensively with a digital presence than with a physi-
cal presence alone.3 15 Thus, it is sensible to apply a state tax jurisdiction
analysis that reflects the realities of e-commerce in the twenty-first cen-
316tury. The following Subparts describe how an economic presence
standard works and the public policy reasons for adopting an economic
presence test.
1. How Economic Presence Works
Economic presence refers to connections businesses have within a
state as determined by their economic contacts.3 17 This economic nexus
standard permits states to tax entities that do not have a physical presence
within state lines, but which conduct a sufficient amount of economic
activity within the state.318 Nexus refers to a business's relationship with
a state and the state's concomitant ability to tax that business.31 9 The
economic presence test's underlying principle is that economic realities
are significantly more relevant than traditional concepts of physical pres-
ence, particularly when considering if a business has a substantial nexus
with a state.320 Furthermore, the economic presence test considers the
benefits and opportunities an entity receives by doing business within the
321taxing state. It also accounts for actual physical contacts with the
state.322 Under this approach, "the state's infrastructure creates and main-
tains the consumer market and economic climate that fosters demand for
the seller's goods and services.'323 In other words, economic nexus oc-
311. See Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 195 (explaining that the economic nexus standard stems
from social and technological changes).
312. See id.; see also Joondeph, supra note 96, at 1]2-13.
313. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 195.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Under the Due Process Clause, economic presence is enough to impose state tax jurisdic-
tion on a business that does not have a physical presence within a state. See Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992). However, this Comment is concerned with the economic pres-
ence test as applied to the DCC. This Comment argues that the economic presence standard should
be extended to the DCC and Internet retailer cases because e-commerce may create the necessary
substantial nexus.
317. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 159; see supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
318. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 159.
319. Id. at 166.
320. R. Todd Ervin, State Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical Presence or Eco-
nomic Presence Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 515, 531-32 (2000).
321. Id. at 532.
322. Id.
323. Id. (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 218 (N.D. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 298
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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curs when a business creates a market within a state and derives revenue
from the established market.
324
More specifically, economic nexus is comprised of substantive ju-
risdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.32 5 Substantive jurisdiction deals
with a state's substantive connection with a business's revenue source,
whereas enforcement jurisdiction deals with a state's power over a busi-
ness.326 That is, substantive jurisdiction refers a state's ability to tax "the
subject matter of the exaction," such as goods or services consumed in-
side a state but purchased elsewhere.327 Enforcement jurisdiction in-
volves the power of a state to collect taxes from items it has substantive
jurisdiction over.328 This includes the question of whether a state has the
authority to enforce tax collection on an out-of-state retailer.
329
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the DCC requires states to
have substantive jurisdiction over the value or activity it intends to tax
and enforcement jurisdiction with the entity it imposes the tax on.330 Un-
der Quill, the Court held that a business needs to be physically present
within the taxing state to have the requisite substantial nexus with both
substantive and enforcement jurisdiction.331 The central premise of this
Comment, however, is that substantive and enforcement jurisdiction can
be established through economic presence.332 Further, the New Mexico
Supreme Court, in Barnesandnoble.com II, provides a practical frame-
work for analysis: substantive and enforcement jurisdiction is established
when a business "establish[es] and maintain[s] a market" in the taxing
state.
333
2. Public Policy Reasons for Adopting the Economic Presence Test
Tax policy in America reflects a utilitarian view that taxation is es-
sential in order to promote the overall good of society.334 By imposing
324. Id.; Julie Roman Lackner, Note, The Evolution and Future of Substantial Nexus in State
Taxation of Corporate Income, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1387, 1388-89 (2007).
325. Thimmesch, supra note 96, at 166; see also Joondeph, supra note 96, at 113 ("Substantive
jurisdiction concerns a state's jurisdiction over the value or activity that it seeks to tax-the income,
the property, the sale, or the consumption, for example. Enforcement jurisdiction, in contrast, con-
cems a state's regulatory authority over the person or entity that it requires to pay or to collect the
tax.").
326. Id.
327. Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A
Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 3-4.
330. Joondeph, supra note 96, at 113.
331. See Patch, supra note 11, at 684-85.
332. It is widely understood that Quill's physical presence requirement only applies to sales
and use taxes. Smith, supra note 280, at 770. However, this Comment contends that the economic
presence test should apply to sales, use, and gross receipt taxes (the type of taxes at issue in the
Barnesandnoble. com II, Amazon, and Overstock cases).
333. Barnesandnoble.com II, 303 P.3d 824, 827 (N.M. 2013).
334. See Swain, supra note 254, at 374-75.
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and collecting taxes, the sovereign is able to pay for its operations.
335
Underlying the theory behind taxation are three fundamental values de-
signed to promote public policy goals: (1) equity, (2) efficiency, and (3)
administrability.336 An economic presence standard, as applied to Internet
retailers, better promotes the goals of tax policy. Therefore, there are
persuasive public policy reasons for adopting an economic presence
standard.
i. An Economic Presence Standard Promotes Equity
Tax policy should be fair.337 It should promote equity338 by ensuring
that all businesses that benefit from conducting activities within a state
are subject to state taxation.339 Otherwise, a corporation could exploit a
state's market while receiving the benefits and protection of the state, yet
evade state taxation.34° This would hardly be just. The basic premise of
the utilitarian view is that taxes are necessary for the sovereign to pay for
its expenditures.341 Consequently, if a corporation benefits from the sov-
ereign's functions it should pay for those expenses.342 For example, In-
ternet retailers profit from "the benefits and protections the State confers
in providing for a stable and secure legal-economic environment.9
3 43
Therefore, the economic presence test helps to ensure equity by requiring
all retailers that reap benefits from a state market-regardless of their
physical presence-to be exposed to the state's tax jurisdiction.34
In addition, application of an economic presence test is necessary in
order to avert further breakdown of tax equity between brick-and-mortar
and Internet retailers.34 5 For example, the New York Amazon tax,346
which requires Internet retailers to collect taxes from in-state consumers,
is aimed at "restor[ing] a level playing field" between in-state retailers
with physical stores and Internet retailers.347 Equity is achieved by ensur-
ing that Internet retailers without a physical presence do not remain free
335. Id.
336. Id. at 374.
337. See id. at 377.
338. Tax equity incorporates the principles of horizontal and vertical equity. Id. at 375. Hori-
zontal equity stands for the proposition that people that have an equal ability to pay should pay equal
taxes. Id. Likewise, vertical equity allows people with unequal abilities to pay taxes the ability to pay
different taxes. Id,
339. See id at 377.
340. See id. at 380 (arguing that if a business benefits from the ability to do business within a
state, the state is justified in subjecting the business to taxation).
341. See id. at 374-75.
342. See generally id. ("[T]he sovereign has clear normative authority to impose broad-based
taxes to fund its operations .... ").
343. Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 28 (quoting Orvis Co. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal,
654 N.E.2d 954, 959 (N.Y. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
344. Swain, supra note 254, at 377.
345. John A. Swain, Cybertaxation and the Commerce Clause: Entity Isolation or Affiliate
Nexus?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 419, 473 (2002).
346. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
347. Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 9.
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from their obligation to collect state sales tax.348 In other words, it is fair
to tax an Internet retailer as if it were a retail store with a physical loca-
tion. This is particularly true when the Internet retailer profits from the
benefits and protections afforded by doing business within the state.349
Therefore, requiring Internet retailers to collect the same taxes brick-and-
mortar stores already have to collect promotes equity, because it allevi-
ates the disparity in state tax collection.350 Accordingly, an economic
presence standard advances tax equity.
ii. Efficiency is Enhanced with an Economic Presence Test
The economic presence standard educes market inefficiencies.35'
While tax policy should be efficient,352 many economists believe taxes
inherently create market inefficiencies.353 For instance, people may make
decisions based on their considerations of tax implications.354 A clever
consumer, for example, may drive to a no sales tax state to purchase a
particular product to avoid paying the tax.355 Such behavior creates fur-
ther inefficiencies in the market.356 When the primary motivation for
business activity is tax avoidance and that activity would not occur ab-
sent the specific tax scheme, the tax policy is producing greater ineffi-
ciencies than would otherwise occur.357 Therefore, the goal of tax policy
is more accurately stated as reducing inefficiencies because inefficiency
is intrinsic to any taxing scheme to begin with. 8
In keeping with this goal, an economic presence standard is better
suited to minimize inefficiencies.359 The physical presence test enables
out-of-state retailers to avoid paying taxes that similarly situated in-state
retailers have to pay.360 Economic behavior is therefore distorted.36' Un-
der the physical presence standard, businesses are encouraged to "engage
in the economically wasteful enterprise of rearranging their operations or
corporate structure solely to minimize their tax liability." 362 In contrast,
an economic presence standard would likely reduce the possibility for
363such inefficient tax avoidance strategies, because it does not provide
348. See id; see also Swain, supra note 345, at 473.
349. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1967), overruled by
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
350. Brief for Respondents, supra note 83, at 29-30.
351. Swain, supra note 254, at 387, 389.
352. See id at 374.
353. Id. at 375.
354. Id. at 376.
355. Id. at 375-76.
356. Id.
357. Quinn T. Ryan, Note, Beyond BATSA: Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax Re-
form, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 318 (2010).
358. See Swain, supra note 254, at 375-76.
359. See id. at 383-84.
360. See id; see also supra text accompanying notes 258-59.
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the same opportunities for businesses to avoid taxes through corporate
reorganization.364 Under an economic presence standard, businesses
would probably not have a high incentive to restructure because of a
state's tax jurisdiction over the exploited market.365 Stated another way,
the benefit of restructuring to avoid taxation would likely not outweigh
the benefit of exploiting a state market and the sales derived from that
market.366 Moreover, it is easier to change where goods are produced
than where they are consumed.367 Therefore, if a state has jurisdiction to
tax via the economic presence standard there is less market inefficiency,
because the risk of avoidance behavior is minimized.368 Thus, the eco-
nomic presence standard reduces market inefficiencies.
369
iii. Equity and Efficiency Gains Outweigh Administrative
Concerns and the Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013 Ad-
dresses Such Concerns
Another goal of tax policy is administrability.370 Taxpayers should
be able to easily calculate their potential tax liability and states should be
able to administer tax policy easily.371 Thus, the focus of administrability
is enforcement and compliance.37 2 Undue burdens should be avoided in
both areas.373 Although a physical presence rule arguably promotes ad-
ministrability interests, such concerns are overstated.37 4 The equity and
efficiency benefits arising from an economic presence standard outweigh
any enforcement or compliance burdens.375
Proponents of the physical presence standard argue that a bright-line
rule enables a taxpayer to easily determine whether the taxpayer will be
exposed to a state's tax jurisdiction.376 Admittedly, a simple rule does
promote clarity.377 However, this argument fails to consider the unjust
results that occur when bright-line rules are favored over rules that seek
to take into account modem realities.378 The problem with the physical
364. See id. at 384.
365. See generally Ryan, supra note 357, at 318 (analyzing the benefits of an economic pres-
ence standard with regard to state income taxes).
366. See generally Swain, supra note 254, at 387 (arguing that the economic nexus standard
reduces market inefficiencies).
367. Id.
368. See generally id. ("The economic presence test, coupled with a destination-based receipts
factor, dampens the effect of shifts in property and payroll because the receipts factor ensures that at
least some income is apportioned to jurisdictions exploited by economically present taxpayers."
(footnote omitted)).
369. Id. at 387, 389.
370. Id. at 374; see also Ryan, supra note 357, at 319.
371. Ryan, supra note 357, at 319.
372. Swain, supra note 254, at 389.
373. See id.
374. See id. at 389-90.
375. See id.
376. Id. at 389.
377. Ryan, supra note 357, at 320.
378. See id.
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presence argument "is that the physical presence test completely sacrific-
es the other tax policy values of equity and efficiency.'" 379 Conversely,
tax policy that incorporates an economic presence approach is more ca-
pable of addressing a wide array of circumstances,380 such as the Internet
retailer issue.
Further, there is a solution to the administrative concerns-the Fair-
ness Act. 381 Under the Fairness Act, states have the ability to tax Internet
retailers if they address administrative issues.382 The goal of the Fairness
Act is to deal with the issue of Internet retailers by "restor[ing] States'
sovereign rights to enforce State and local sales and use tax laws. 38 3 The
Fairness Act is Congress's response to Bellas Hess's and Quill's un-
workable physical presence rule.384 It provides states the option to re-
quire Internet retailers to collect sales and use taxes if states simplify
their tax laws.385 There are two options for states wishing to impose sales
and use taxes on Internet retailers: (1) adopting the Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA), s6 which is a mechanism formulated
by forty-four states and over eighty-five businesses that aims to make
sales tax collection simpler; or (2) meeting five simplification require-
ments listed in the Fairness Act:
* Notify retailers in advance of any rate changes within the
state
" Designate a single state organization to handle sales tax reg-
istrations, filings, and audits
" Establish a uniform sales tax base for use throughout the
state
* Use destination sourcing to determine sales tax rates for out-
of-state purchases (a purchase made by a consumer in Cali-
fomia from a retailer in Ohio is taxed at the California rate,
and the sales tax collected is remitted to California to fund
projects and services there)
379. Swain, supra note 254, at 390.
380. Ryan, supra note 357, at 320.
381. S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013) (as passed by Senate, May 6, 2013).
382. MARKETPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, supra note 304.
383. S. 743.
384. MARKETPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, supra note 304.
385. Id.
386. Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Bd., Inc., Streamlined Sales
and Use Tax Agreement, (as amended October 30, 2013),
http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA As Amended 10-
30-13.pdf [hereinafter SSUTA]. The SSUTA is an agreement among participating states to cooperate
in tax compliance on a multistate level and provides model sales and use tax laws participating states
must adopt. See id. For an in-depth discussion of the SSTUA, see John A. Swain, Reforming the
State Corporate Income Tax: A Market State Approach to the Sourcing of Service Receipts, 83 TUL.
L. REV. 285, 336-41 (2008).
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Provide software and/or services for managing sales tax
compliance, and hold retailers harmless for any errors that
result from relying on state-provided systems and data 
387
Therefore, the Fairness Act addresses administrative concerns. However,
after passing the Senate with a vote of 69 to 27, the bill was referred to
the House Judiciary Committee where it has stalled.388 Nevertheless, the
equity and efficiency gains of an economic presence test outweigh ad-
ministrative concerns. Furthermore, the Fairness Act, should it pass the
House and be signed by the President, provides an answer to the admin-
istrative issues. Therefore, the benefits derived from an economic pres-
ence test offset administrative concerns, which will be addressed once
Congress passes the Fairness Act.
In sum, the economic presence test should replace Quill's irrelevant
physical presence requirement because of the transformation of the na-
tional economy in the Digital Age. A substantial nexus can be estab-
lished when a state has substantive and enforcement jurisdiction because
of a retailer's economic presence within a state. Additionally, there are
persuasive public policy reasons to replace the physical presence re-
quirement with an economic presence test. Equity and efficiency are
increased and outweigh any administrative concerns. The Fairness Act
also provides solutions to some enforcement and compliance issues.
Therefore, the economic presence test is superior to the outdated Quill
test, and the Barnesandnoble.com H court provides a workable frame-
work for the analysis. Specifically, a state has substantive and enforce-
ment jurisdiction over an out-of-state retailer when the retailer establish-
es and maintains a market within the state.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the DCC is to prevent states from burdening inter-
state commerce. By requiring a retailer to have a substantial nexus with a
state before it is exposed to the state's tax jurisdiction, undue burdens on
interstate commerce are avoided. However, the Quill Court's affirmation
of Bellas Hess's bright-line physical presence requirement is a relic of
the past and should be treated as such. And as states have suffered mas-
sive budget shortfalls, in part as a result of their inability to tax Internet
retailers, they have attempted to experiment with laws that would enable
them to establish tax jurisdiction over Internet retailers. But different
courts have come to different conclusions and there is sense of national
uncertainty regarding Internet retailers and the bounds of state taxation.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should have taken the opportunity present-
ed in the Amazon and Overstock case to set a clear standard with respect
to Internet retailers and state taxation. In addition, the Court should have
387. MARKETPLACEFAIRNESS.ORG, supra note 304.
388. See id.
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overruled the physical presence requirement, because Internet retailers
can comprehensively exploit state markets regardless of geography or
physical presence. Thus, any vestiges of a physical presence standard are
irrelevant in today's Internet and technology driven society. Further, the
Quill Court's adherence to Bellas Hess on stare decisis grounds was arti-
ficial, as the Court admitted. Therefore, the Court should not adhere to
the existing precedent, because it is no longer applicable. Rather, the
proper test is the economic presence standard, which advances tax equity
and efficiency.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's approach in Barnesandno-
ble.com II provides a practical approach for analyzing Internet retailer
cases. The court's holding-that a substantial nexus is created when a
business establishes and maintains a market within a state-is an appro-
priate way to evaluate Internet retailer cases in the twenty-first century.
Moreover, economic presence, as determined by a retailer's economic
activity within a state and the benefits and opportunities a retailer re-
ceives by conducting business within the state, is a proper way to analyze
a state's tax jurisdiction over state substantive and enforcement jurisdic-
tion. Under this approach, corporate relationships with in-state entities
may create a substantial nexus if there is direct affiliation through the use
of common trademarks and business policies. Furthermore, a cross-
marketing strategy, which provides an Internet retailer with a competitive
advantage over its counterparts, also indicates a substantial nexus with
the state. Also, any systematic solicitation and exploitation of a state's
market could give rise to a substantial nexus. In addition, if Internet re-
tailers have affiliate agreements with in-state residents that aid the retail-
er in establishing and maintaining a market in a state, the retailers would
have a substantial nexus and would be exposed to state taxes. In short,
the economic presence test should be adopted. It better enhances tax pol-
icy goals and addresses the e-commerce realities of the Digital Age.
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